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Abstract
In a frequency hopping (FH) scheme users communicate simultaneously using FH se-
quences defined on the same set of frequency channels. An FH sequence specifies the
frequency channel to be used as communication progresses. An inherent problem for an
FH scheme is interference, unintentional and intentional. Much of the existing research
on the performance of FH schemes in the presence of interference is based on either
pairwise mutual or adversarial interference (jamming), but not both. In this thesis,
we develop a new model for evaluating the performance of an FH scheme with respect
to both group-wise mutual interference and jamming, bearing in mind that more than
two users may be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of a jammer.
We then analyse existing constructions of FH schemes in the new model proposed
in this thesis. The FH schemes considered are optimal in the well-known Lempel-
Greenberger or Peng-Fang bounds. We estimate the group-wise mutual interference
using pairwise mutual interference to determine the performance of these FH schemes.
Further, we note that these FH schemes do not withstand a jammer for a long period
of time.
An FH scheme in which we can determine the minimum number of places an FH
sequence can be successfully used in the presence of mutual interfering FH sequences
can be designed from a cover-free code. We study and specify a jammer model for
cover-free codes. We examine necessary and desirable additional properties of cover-
free codes that can mitigate against jamming. We conclude that while MDS codes are
ideal cover-free codes for mitigating against jamming, MDS codes also do not withstand
a jammer for an extended period.
Finally, we propose an efficient and secure FH scheme. We consider the use of pseu-
dorandomness in an FH scheme based on Latin squares and how it affects the resistance
of an FH scheme against a jammer. We conclude that in order to have a guarantee
of transmission, as well as withstand a jammer for a long time, FH schemes should
minimize group-wise mutual interference and possess some form of pseudorandomness.
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1.1. Spread spectrum techniques 1. Introduction and motivation
1.1 Spread spectrum techniques
Spread spectrum is a signal transmission technique where the signal occupies a wider
bandwidth than the information rate or original bandwidth. Bandwidth is the fre-
quency width used for transmitting a signal. Figure 1.1 is an illustration of a spread
spectrum communication system.
Channel
encoder Modulator Channel Demodulator
Channel
decoder
Pseudorandom
sequence
Pseudorandom
sequence
Information
sequence
Output
data
Figure 1.1: Spread spectrum communication model [3].
A transmitter sends data (information sequence) on a frequency channel. It is
first encoded for the channel through the channel encoder. Spread spectrum signals
are modulated twice. Modulation is the process of adding information signal on to a
carrier signal (signal with constant amplitude and frequency). The first modulation
is done using narrowband techniques such as amplitude shift keying (ASK), frequency
shift keying (FSK) [96, 113], where the information is carried in a narrow band of
frequencies. It is then modulated again using spread spectrum techniques. A spread
spectrum technique uses pseudorandom sequence, called a spreading code, which is
shared by the transmitter and receiver. The pseudorandom sequence increases the
bandwidth over which the signal is to be transmitted. The modulated signal is then
transmitted through the frequency channel. A receiver then does the opposite of what
was done by the transmitter. To recover the information signal, the received signal is
extracted using the shared pseudorandom sequence. The demodulated signal is then
decoded using the channel decoder to obtain the transmitted data.
Spread spectrum communication techniques exploit the Shannon-Hartley theorem.
The Shannon-Hartley theorem C = B log2(1 + SNR), provides the maximum rate
14
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at which data can be transmitted through a noisy channel (a communication channel
where information is distorted), where SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio, C is the channel
capacity and B is the bandwidth that the signal occupies [104]. The SNR is the measure
of signal strength against noise at the receiver. A large SNR means a better system,
that is the signal level is much higher than the noise. However, note that even if the
SNR is very low (the transmitted signal being below the noise level), communication
performance can still be increased by allowing the signal to occupy a larger bandwidth
than it would normally do, that is by increasing B. So, even though increasing the
bandwidth B has the effect of increasing the noise and thereby reducing the SNR,
the data can still be transmitted at the same channel capacity C as when B is not
increased.
Despite the inherent redundancy of these techniques on the bandwidth, they have
some advantages over conventional narrowband signal transmission. Some of the sig-
nificant benefits are as follows [79, 81]:
 Low probability of intercept: the signal is transmitted at low power thus making
it difficult to detect its presence.
 Message privacy: only intended receivers can retrieve transmitted signals because
of their knowledge of the pseudorandom spreading code.
 Interference rejection: the signal is spread/transmitted over a range of frequency
channels to avoid interference.
We are particularly interested in the interference rejection capabilities of spread spec-
trum techniques. Some of the sources of interference result from cross talk (other users
sharing the medium), multipath fading (self-jamming) and jamming by adversaries. We
will focus on mutual interference and jamming.
In Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 a brief overview of the two fundamental spread spec-
trum techniques: direct sequence and frequency hopping spread spectrum are given
respectively.
15
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1.1.1 Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)
Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) is a technique where data is spread directly by
combining it with a pseudorandom sequence called a spreading code [50]. The spreading
code defines redundant bits that are transmitted for each information data bit. This
improves the resistance of the transmitted data against interference, as well as the
reliability of the received data in the event that it is corrupted during transmission.
The combined signal is then used to modulate a radio frequency carrier. The size of
the spreading code determines the processing gain, which is a measure of performance
advantage of spread spectrum over ordinary narrowband signals. It is also defined as
the ratio of the spread signal to that of the unspread signal.
The IEEE 802.11b standard [5] defines 14 overlapping 22MHz channels for DSSS on
the 2.4GHz industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band. Since the channels overlap,
they can cause co-channel interference. However the 2.4GHz ISM band can have a
maximum of three non-overlapping DSSS systems together, as shown in Figure 1.2.
2.4000
GHz
2.4835
GHzCh. 1 Ch. 6 Ch.11
Figure 1.2: Direct sequence spread spectrum model [1].
A set of transmitters, each employing a particular spreading code and using the
same communication channel simultaneously, form a code division multiple access (CDMA)
channel access system. The CDMA technology is used, for example, in global position-
ing systems (GPS) and the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), for
3rd generation mobile communication.
16
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1.1.2 Frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS)
The second spread spectrum method considered, Frequency hopping spread spectrum
(FHSS), is where the spreading code is a frequency hopping (FH) sequence, that specifies
the frequency channels on which data is transmitted. Data is transmitted on different
radio frequency channels as transmission progresses.
A pseudorandom sequence can be used to generate an FH sequence. The main re-
quirement for a transmitter and receiver to communicate is that they need to be on the
same frequency channel at the same time. The receiver has to stay synchronised with
the sender to generate the pseudorandom sequence and eventually the FH sequence.
When both the sender and receiver derive the FH sequence, they can commence com-
munication. The receiver knows which channel to tune to and the dwelling time on
each channel, which is the amount of time spent on each radio frequency channel before
hopping onto the next channel in the FH sequence. The pseudorandom sequence being
used can be kept secret or not. In the latter case the choice of which FH sequence
being used is kept secret. Otherwise an attacker can establish the FH sequence and
jam subsequent transmissions.
Figure 1.3 shows FHSS signals of two communications A and B. The y-axis and
x-axis represent frequency channels and time respectively. In the first time period,
communications A and B are on channels seven and two respectively. In the fifth time
period both communications A and B are on channel one and the signals interfere.
17
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Channel
Time
Communication A
Communication B
Collision
Figure 1.3: Frequency hopping spread spectrum example [2].
The IEEE 802.11 standard [5] employs 79 non-overlapping 1MHz channels for FH se-
quences in the 2.4GHz ISM band. It is widely used in signal transmission such as Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth and ultrawideband (UWB) communications [53, 33, 90]. Frequency hopping
spread spectrum can also be used in a multiple access system (see Section 1.1.4).
1.1.3 Comparison of frequency hopping and direct sequence spread
spectrum techniques
In this section we compare FHSS and DSSS techniques with respect to: narrowband
interference rejection, collocating systems, data rates, multipath immunity and finally
the near/far problem.
 Narrowband interference rejection: narrowband interference is unwanted signal
that is narrower than the wanted, ordinarily modulated signal. Consider a DSSS
system in the presence of narrowband interference. At the receiver, the interfering
signal is spread with the spreading code applied by the receiver while the trans-
mitter’s signal is despread. When both the interfering signal and the transmitted
data signal goes through a process of removing the interfering signal called filter-
ing, a small part of the interfering signal remains in the bandwidth of the data
signal [41]. The interfering signal now appears as noise. As long as the signal-
18
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to-noise ratio is above a defined threshold, the receiver will successfully retrieve
and demodulate the legitimate transmitted signal. The resistance of DSSS to a
narrowband interference is dependent on the strength of the interfering signal. In
FHSS when a channel hop is experiencing interference, then demodulation of a
signal may not be successful (depending on the interference-signal-ratio). How-
ever if there is no interference on the next jump then data can be successfully
retrieved. Further, FHSS was introduced to mitigate interference from unautho-
rised users of a communication system on the assumption that the unauthorised
users have no knowledge of the FH sequences being used [83]. Therefore it is
crucial that the interfering signal does not hop in synchronisation with the trans-
mitter’s signal. So, in DSSS there is narrowband interference suppression while
in FHSS we have interference avoidance.
 Collocating systems: applications that use FHSS have the advantage of putting
more systems in the same area than DSSS. By definition a DSSS signal occu-
pies a larger bandwidth compared to FHSS channels. The distance between
non-interfering wide band frequencies is also large in DSSS. As the total ISM
unlicensed band is 83.5MHz wide (2.4GHz - 2.4835GHz), the number of DSSS
systems that can be put together without causing interference with each other is
thus small, 3 for DSSS and 26 for FHSS.
 Data rates: in practice DSSS is often favoured over FHSS for its speed. The
data rate for FHSS, 2Mbps, is lower than that for DSSS, 7Mbps. So, users seek
applications that offer high data rates.
 Multipath immunity: DSSS systems are sensitive to delays as the signals are
transmitted at higher data rates than FHSS signals. Multiple copies of signals
are received, which are shifted versions of the transmitted signals. Therefore
receivers have more difficulty demodulating transmitted signals in DSSS systems.
However, there are ways in which the delayed spread signals can be controlled
19
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[93].
 Near/far problem: this is the ability of a receiver to be able to retrieve a signal
from the intended transmitter in the presence of other foreign transmitters in the
proximity of the receiver. The issue is how well can a receiver acquire signals
from the intended transmitters in the presence of other more powerful signals
from other transmitters. FHSS receivers operate well in such conditions where
the foreign transmitters only hop to some of the radio frequency channels visited
by legitimate transmitters. On the other hand DSSS systems fare less well.
In conclusion, the choice of which spread spectrum technology to use depends on
the environment in which it is deployed.
1.1.4 Frequency hopping in applications requiring multiple access
A set of FH sequences form a frequency hopping scheme (FH scheme). An FH scheme
is used in a frequency hopping multiple access1 (FHMA) system, where a number of
users employ FH sequences which are defined on the same set of frequency channels.
Each transmitter-receiver pair that are to communicate in an FHMA system share an
FH sequence and change the frequency channels in synchronisation. In this thesis we
use the term FH scheme to mean an FHMA.
Mutual interference occurs when two or more transmitters use the same frequency
channel simultaneously, which can result in signal loss. Pairwise mutual interference
is when two users mutually interfere with each other. When interference comes from
adversarial sources then it is called jamming. The adversary in this context is called a
jammer. It is desirable that an FH scheme be constructed such that interference from
both other users of the system, as well as adversaries, is minimised.
In Chapter 2 we describe the system model of an FH scheme, as well as the effect
of the presence of adversarial interference.
1Frequency hopping code-division multiple access (FH-CDMA) is a variant of FHMA that employs
both FHSS and DSSS. See [92, 105] for a description of FH-CDMA.
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1.1.5 Example: frequency hopping in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN
In this section we look at how FH sequences are employed in IEEE 802.11 wireless
local area metworks (LAN) [5]. We consider the FH sequences in this standard for the
following reasons:
1. An FH sequence transmits at maximum transmission rate in the presence of other
FH sequences.
2. Although FH sequences in this standard of wireless LAN are labelled as obso-
lete, they are still being used in hybrid frequency hopping-direct sequence spread
spectrum systems [105].
3. The FH sequences in this standard provides a motivation for a scheme we consider
briefly in Section 1.2.3 and in more detail in Chapter 5, which also achieves the
maximum transmission capacity in the presence of other FH sequences.
The IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN standard [5] describes FH sequences and how they
are employed in wireless LANs in the unlicensed ISM bands. We mentioned in Sec-
tion 1.1.2 that the standard defines 79 non-overlapping frequency channels, each 1 MHz
wide. The IEEE standard defines the total number of frequency channels that can be
used in different geographical locations: 23 for Japan, 27 for Spain, 35 for France and
79 for China, North America, as well as Europe. However, to avoid co-channel inter-
ference it defines a minimum hop distance of 6 channels. Further, to minimise mutual
interference there are three sets of FH sequences, each comprised of 26 FH sequences.
Therefore, in terms of multiple access, a maximum of up to 26 users can be placed in
the same geographical area.
The standard describes four ways in which FH sequences can be determined. When
users are in a regulatory domain (channels in the 2.4 GHz spectrum that are regu-
lated by the country in which they are used) they can use a predefined FH scheme.
Otherwise, they use some algorithms known as hyperbolic congruence code (HCC) and
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the extended HCC (EHCC) [66, 75]. Lastly, randomly generated FH sequences shared
between a transmitter-receiver pair can also be used. We consider these FH schemes
in more detail in Chapter 3.
All but the randomly generated FH sequences have the following property. The
channels used at each point in time by all the FH sequences in the FH scheme are
distinct, that is a channel does not appear on more than one FH sequence at a time.
We will describe a similar FH scheme in Section 1.2.3 and Chapter 5.
1.2 Overview of existing constructions of frequency hop-
ping sequences
In this section we present a brief summary of some FH schemes that exist in the
literature. The goal of most of the existing constructions is either to minimise pair-
wise mutual interference or improve the resistance of adversarial interference of FH
sequences, but not both. This motivated us to identify the two interference aspects
of FH schemes, which we then incorporated into a combinatorial framework in order
to analyse the performance of FH schemes. Most of the FH schemes’ constructions
described in this section will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 by considering
them in our proposed model.
1.2.1 Constructions minimizing pairwise mutual interference
Much research in the literature focuses on mitigating the problem of pairwise mutual
interference. Optimality of FH sequences, and in general optimality of FH schemes, is
often defined in terms of the well-known bounds on Hamming correlation developed by
Lempel and Greenberger in [55], (Lemma 2.2.5) and by Peng and Fan in [77], (Theo-
rem 2.2.11). In their seminal paper Lempel and Greenberger developed the well-known
Lempel-Greenberger bound, a lower bound for maximum Hamming auto-correlation of
FH sequences. Peng and Fan on the other hand gave a lower bound for the maximum
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Hamming correlation of an FH scheme which takes into account both the Hamming
auto- and cross-correlation of FH sequences. We describe these bounds in Chapter 2.
Most of the existing constructions of FH sequences use mathematical structures
in algebra, combinatorial designs, codes, as well as recursive constructions from other
sets of FH schemes. We now consider a sample of such constructions, differing in the
mathematical structures they use, as well as giving different parameters with respect
to the length of the FH sequences and the number of channels used in the FH scheme.
Algebraic contructions. Several researchers have used the algebraic linear transfor-
mation of other sequences, theory of cyclotomy, as well as trace functions to construct
FH sequences.
Lempel and Greenberger [55] developed the well-known lower bound on Hamming
correlation. They also constructed an FH scheme using algebraic transformation of
m-sequences whose FH sequences achieve their bound.
Chu and Colbourn [19] provided some of the early work on construction of FH
sequences using cyclotomy. The authors developed FH sequences over a prime field
meeting the Lempel-Greenberger bound. Several researchers have since then generated
FH sequences over prime power fields and with different FH scheme parameters.
Ge, Miao and Yao [37] used trace functions to construct FH sequences optimal in
the Lempel-Greenberger bound.
Combinatorial constructions. Fuji-Hara, Miao and Mishima [35] provided several
combinatorial constructions of FH sequences optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger bound
using affine geometries, cyclic designs and difference families. The authors provided a
correspondence between FH sequences and partition type difference packings.
Codes. Sarwate [91] provided a correspondence between FH sequences and cyclic
codes. A cyclic code can be obtained from an FH scheme by taking all the FH sequences
in the FH scheme together with all the cyclic shifts of each FH sequence. On the other
23
1.2. Literature review 1. Introduction and motivation
hand, an FH scheme can be obtained from a cyclic (linear) code by considering a single
codeword from each of the equivalence classes of the code.
Note that this construction based on obtaining a representative codeword from each
equivalence class of a code was also considered by Ding, Fuji-Hara, Fujiwara, Jimbo
and Mishima [27]. Further the authors provided upper bounds on the number of FH
sequences in an FH scheme from coding theory bounds: these are the Singleton, Plotkin,
sphere-packing and Johnson bounds on FH sequences. Optimality in these bounds does
not mean optimality in the Peng-Fan or Lempel-Greenberger bounds as the latter are
on the Hamming correlation of FH sequences. For instance, a [qm−1/q− 1, n−m, 3; q]-
linear code, q a prime power, m a positive integer with gcd(m, q) = 1, is optimal in the
sphere-packing bound for FH sequences but not optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger
bound.
Recursive constructions. Apart from constructing FH schemes using algebraic,
combinatorial structures and codes, some researchers have also explored using known
FH schemes to obtain new ones.
Chung, Han and Yang [21] used interleaving techniques to obtain FH sequences
optimal in the Peng-Fan bound.
Cyclic difference matrices have also been used by Ding et al. [27], as well as Fuji-
Hara et al. [35] to obtain an FH scheme by a recursive construction.
Pseudorandom construction. The Bluetooth 2010 standard [4] describes the gen-
eration of pseudorandom FH sequences. Bluetooth devices uses adaptive frequency
hopping (AFH) spread spectrum, where a controller can eliminate frequency channels
from the given set of frequency channels that are experiencing interference in the course
of communication. The goal of AFH spread spectrum is to improve the co-existence of
Bluetooth devices with other users, not using AFH spread spectrum, but operating on
the same ISM band. So, if there are no interfering devices, Bluetooth’s AFH spread
spectrum reverts back to an FH scheme with a full set of frequency channels.
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1.2.2 Constructions improving resistance against adversarial interfer-
ence
Interference originating from unauthorised entities where signals are deliberately trans-
mitted to interfere with legitimate transmission is called adversarial interference or
jamming. We discuss an adversarial interference model further in Chapter 2. Here we
briefly describe the work of Emek and Wattenhofer [31]. These researchers considered
FH sequences used in the presence of adversarial interference.
Emek and Wattenhofer [31] constructed FH sequences as random walks on an ex-
pander graph. The authors considered a single pairwise communication where subse-
quent channels for transmission are included in the data transmitted. An adversary
can eavesdrop and jam a fraction of the available frequency channels.
Two adversarial models were considered: in the first model, an adversary can only
acquire information about the channel that was used in previous time slots after a
certain number of time slots have lapsed, but not the transmitted data. In the second
model an adversary has knowledge of both. Knowledge of the transmitted messages is
vital since information of the subsequent frequency channels to be used is transmitted
in the messages. At any time slot, the transmitted data is guaranteed a successful
transmission with probability at least 1 − θ −  where θ is the fraction of the chan-
nels an adversary jams and  is a security parameter that defines the resilience of the
FH sequence. However, it is not clear what happens if more than one pair (transmit-
ter/receiver) of communication occurs simultaneously. We consider this construction
in more detail in Section 3.2.
1.2.3 Combined approach constructions
In Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 we described constructions of FH schemes whose performance
measure considers minimizing either the pairwise mutual interference or improving
resistance against adversarial interference, but not both. In this section we consider
schemes that suggest a combined approach to analyse the performance of FH schemes.
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Combinatorial construction. Bag, Ruj and Roy [9] used Latin squares with pseu-
dorandomness to obtain an FH scheme. We note that this scheme can be obtained
from the IEEE 802.11 FH sequences described in Section 1.1.5, with the added feature
of pseudorandomness. All legitimate FH sequences in this FH scheme share a single
pair of secret pseudorandom numbers (keys) before the start of communication which
are used for a specified number of time slots. The adversary can eavesdrop and jam
at most a certain number of the frequency channels in the frequency library. So, the
authors considered communication in the presence of both other mutual interfering
devices, as well as adversarial interference.
We point out that this construction has the following good features:
 The FH sequences constructed achieve a maximum transmission capacity without
adversarial interference. That is, in the presence of only mutual interference each
transmitter can communicate successfully at all time slots.
 The channels in the FH sequences are randomized by secret pseudorandom num-
bers which are then used for the entire duration (specified length) of the FH
sequences. Our study of cover-free codes in Chapter 4 shows that indeed we do
need pseudorandomness as it improves the resistance of an FH scheme against ad-
versarial interference. This scheme motivates our discussion in Chapter 5 where
we explore FH schemes with maximum transmission and improved resistance
against an adversary.
However, we note that the constructed FH scheme is unsatisfactory in several as-
pects:
 By using Latin squares to design the FH scheme, the number of FH sequences is
restricted by the number of frequency channels in the frequency library, that is,
the two must be the same. Therefore the maximum number of FH sequences to
be used in an FH scheme is restricted.
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 The authors assume that devices cannot leak information about the frequency
channels they are using and thus the adversary has no knowledge of active fre-
quency channels. However, in their adversarial model they state that the ad-
versary is capable of eavesdropping, inserting messages and jamming. It is not
clear what information the devices can leak and in turn what the adversary can
obtain from eavesdropping. In practice however it is assumed that an adversary
can acquire frequency channel information, and in some instances the messages
being transmitted on those frequency channels.
 In their analysis of the performance of the FH scheme Bag et al. [9] conclude
that FH sequences achieve maximum transmission capacity in the presence of an
adversary. It was shown in [73] that an adversary only needs to eavesdrop at a
single time slot to obtain the pair of secret shared pseudorandom keys. Acquiring
the secret keys enables the adversary to derive legitimate FH sequences and thus
interfere with any FH sequence of its choice. This is discussed in more detail in
Section 5.3.
Pseudorandom construction. In the FH sequences discussed thus far, a transmit-
ter and receiver need to share an FH sequence. Strasser, Po¨pper, and Cˇapkun [102]
suggests uncoordinated FHSS. They propose using a random FH sequence between
a transmitter and a receiver, in the sense that the pair of communicating users do
not share an FH sequence but both randomly select a frequency channel to trans-
mit/receive independently. To improve successful communication, a transmitter hops
among frequency channels at a higher rate than a receiver. Further, the sender and
receiver do not use all the frequency channels in the frequency library to increase the
receiver’s chances of listening on a frequency channel being used by the transmitter. It
was shown that with positive probability the transmitter and receiver communicate in
the presence of both mutual interference, as well as an adversary that eavesdrops and
interferes on a subset of frequency channels in the given set of frequency channels.
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As mentioned in their research work, uncoordinated FHSS provides a way of es-
tablishing keys for the generation of FH sequences in situations where the transmitter
and receiver are not known to each other before commencing communication. After
establishing common FH sequences to be used, the transmitter and receiver then use
coordinated FHSS, that is, they follow the shared FH sequence to communicate. In
our work we make the assumption in Chapter 2 that a transmitter and receiver have
the means to establish a common FH sequence and only focus on its construction.
In an uncoordinated FH scheme as the transmitter has to hop among several fre-
quency channels within a specified time period, while the receiver dwells on a single
frequency channel within the same time period, they only transmit and listen success-
fully for a small fraction of the time when compared to coordinated FH schemes.
1.3 Our contributions
The majority of the research on the performance of FH schemes in the presence of
interference is based on pairwise mutual interference. We have considered briefly some
such FH schemes in Section 1.2.1. However, keeping in mind that in an FH scheme
more than two users can be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of an adversary,
this renders the pairwise mutual interference criterion inadequate. The inadequacy of
the pairwise criterion was discussed in Wang and Bhargava [110] in that possibly more
than one user can be using a frequency channel at the same time however the authors
did not consider adversarial interference. Further, Wang and Bhargava consider FH
sequences used in conjunction with error correcting codes. It was concluded that FH
schemes should be designed in such a way that the probability of more than one user
being at a particular frequency channel is minimised. Note that none of the FH schemes
considered in Section 1.2.1 consider adversarial interference. In this thesis, we evaluate
the performance of an FH scheme with respect to both group-wise mutual interference
and adversarial interference. This framework was introduced in [73].
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An overview of our four major contributions is as follows:
1. We develop a combinatorial framework for an FH scheme in Chapter 2. In this
model we consider the performance of an FH scheme in the presence of both
group-wise mutual interference and adversarial interference.
2. In Chapter 3 we investigate existing constructions of FH sequences in our model.
We study in detail the mathematics behind these FH schemes. We note that most
of these FH schemes are optimal in the well-known bounds developed by either
Lempel and Greenberger [55] or by Peng and Fan [77]. These bounds are based on
pair-wise Hamming correlation. However we want to explore the performance of
the existing FH schemes in the proposed model of Chapter 2 and determine con-
nections amongst some of them. We consider FH schemes constructions based on
the following: random walks, difference packing, m-sequences, cyclotomic classes,
trace functions, Reed-Solomon codes, Latin squares and we also consider recursive
constructions.
3. We discuss a correspondence between a cover-free code and an FH scheme in
Chapter 4. We note that when a cover-free code is considered as an FH scheme,
a user can successfully transmit in at least a specified fraction of time in the pres-
ence of a given number of interfering FH sequences. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first time this correspondence has been highlighted. A cover-free code
however provides no additional information for use of the FH sequences in the
presence of adversarial interference. Therefore, we seek to determine these addi-
tional properties of cover-free codes that mitigate adversarial interference activi-
ties. Finally, we discuss the limitations of cover-free codes against a jammer, and
we propose the use of pseudorandomness to improve resistance against a jammer.
4. In Chapter 5 we discuss employing pseudorandomness in an FH scheme. From
the discussions of Chapter 3 and 4 we know that given an FH scheme we can
estimate the effect of mutual interference by using Hamming group-wise mutual
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interference or as given directly when the FH scheme is a cover-free code. However
in order to withstand an adversary for a longer time (period) FH sequences should
possess some form of pseudorandomness. So, we propose an efficient and secure
FH scheme that employs Latin squares with pseudorandomness.
1.4 Summary
In this chapter we introduced the theory of spread spectrum technologies. We looked
at some of the types of spread spectrum techniques, in particular direct sequence and
frequency hopping spread spectrum techniques. Further, we introduced a frequency
hopping multiple access system and a frequency hopping scheme. Finally, we consid-
ered some existing constructions of frequency hopping schemes and their performance
measures. We pointed out a deficiency of previous works: bearing in mind that more
than two users can be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of an adversary, the
pairwise mutual interference based analysis is inadequate. Therefore in our work we
evaluate the performance of a frequency hopping scheme with respect to both group-
wise mutual interference and adversarial interference.
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2.1 Introduction
Communication is a process that involves at least two entities, a transmitter and re-
ceiver, together with the medium through which they communicate. As presented in
Chapter 1, in the literature most researchers analyse the performance of FH sequences
in terms of pairwise mutual interference only, or adversarial interference, and very few
have considered both pairwise mutual and adversarial interference. We pointed out
that there exists a gap in the analysis of FH sequences, as well as giving the shortcom-
ings of some of the previous constructions. In this chapter we propose a new model of
analysing the performance of FH sequences.
In Section 2.2 we present the definitions and notation that will be used in this thesis.
We introduce a measure of pairwise mutual interference, the Hamming correlation,
which is the basis for analysing the performance of most FH sequences that exist in
the literature. Section 2.2 also presents a review of bounds that exist in the literature
which are based on the Hamming correlation of FH sequences. We consider the bounds
developed by Lempel and Greenberger [55], as well as those of Peng and Fan [77].
In analysing the Peng-Fan bounds in detail we make the observation that optimality
should be defined in terms of only one of the bounds and not both.
In Sections 2.3 through 2.5 we present the main contribution of this chapter: we
develop a combinatorial framework for analysing the performance of an FH scheme in
a multiple access communication system in the presence of a jammer. In Sections 2.3
and 2.4 we describe the system model where we consider only group-wise mutual in-
terference and its effect on an FH scheme. In Section 2.5 we introduce an adversary
into the system model, that is we describe the attacker model in an FH scheme. In
Section 2.5 we also provide the measures of the performance of an FH scheme in the
presence of both group-wise mutual and adversarial interference.
Finally, we summarise the chapter in Section 2.6.
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2.2 Hamming correlation
2.2.1 Definition
Let F = { f0, f1, . . . , fm−1 } be a set of m frequency channels; F is called a frequency
library. For simplicity, we assume a one-to-one mapping between the frequency channels
in F and a set of m elements, that is we write i for fi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
Definition 2.2.1. A frequency hopping (FH) sequence over a frequency library F
is a sequence X = (xt)
v−1
t=0 (or X = (xt) if there is no ambiguity) of length v, xt ∈ F .
A FH sequence X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) specifies that at time slot t a user of the FH
sequence transmits on frequency channel xt.
Definition 2.2.2. A (v, k,m)-frequency hopping scheme, denoted (v, k,m)-FHS,
is a set S = {Xi : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 } of size k, where Xi is an FH sequence of length v
defined over a frequency library F of size m.
Given a (v, k,m)-FHS, the use of the same frequency channel at the same time
by two FH sequences (or more) causes interference. Pairwise mutual interference is
where two FH sequences in a (v, k,m)-FHS interfere with each other. Formally, Defi-
nition 2.2.3 describes pairwise mutual interference as pairwise Hamming correlation or
simply Hamming correlation.
Definition 2.2.3. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and X,Y ∈ S, X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1)
and Y = (y0, y1, . . . , yv−1). The Hamming correlation HX,Y at relative time delay
τ between X and Y is:
HX,Y (τ) =
∑v−1
i=0 h(xi, yi+τ ), 0 ≤ τ < v, (2.1)
where
h(xi, yi) =

1 if xi = yi,
0 if xi 6= yi.
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Consider two FH sequences X,Y . At relative time delay τ there is mutual inter-
ference between X and Y when h(xi, yi) = 1 at time slot i and no mutual interference
otherwise. The Hamming correlation in Equation (2.1) gives the total number of posi-
tions at which the FH sequences X,Y interfere.
Note that in Definition 2.2.3 the operations on indices are performed modulo v.
When X = Y we write HX(τ) for HX,X(τ) and this is the Hamming auto-correlation
of X.
Definition 2.2.4. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and X,Y ∈ S.
1. The maximum out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation on an FH se-
quence X is:
H(X) = max
1≤τ<v
{HX(τ)}. (2.2)
2. The maximum Hamming cross-correlation between any two distinct FH
sequences X and Y is:
H(X,Y ) = max
0≤τ<v
{HXY (τ)}. (2.3)
3. The maximum Hamming correlation on FH sequences X,Y is:
M(X,Y ) = max{H(X), H(Y ), H(X,Y )}. (2.4)
2.2.2 Bounds
As discussed in Chapter 1, performance of FH sequences has mainly been analysed in
terms of Hamming correlation. Some researchers developed bounds on the measure of
Hamming correlation for FH schemes. We first look at one of the early notable work of
such bounds investigated in Lempel and Greenberger’s 1974 seminal paper [55]. Then
we consider a generalisation of Lempel and Greenberger’s bounds provided by Peng
and Fan [77].
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Lempel and Greenberger [55] defined optimality of FH sequences in the following
way.
1. X ∈ S is optimal if H(X) ≤ H(X ′) ∀ X ′ ∈ S.
2. X,Y ∈ S is an optimal pair if M(X,Y ) ≤M(X ′, Y ′) ∀ X ′, Y ′ ∈ S.
3. A subset C ⊂ S is an optimal family if every pair of distinct members of C is an
optimal pair.
Further, Lempel and Greenberger [55] developed a lower bound on H(X) for any
FH sequence X. We state the lemma and its proof. First, we need to define the
multiplicity of a frequency channel on an FH sequence. Let X be an FH sequence
defined over F . For any frequency channel fj ∈ F , we define the following. Define
µX(fj) =
v−1∑
i=0
h(xi, fj) (2.5)
where
h(xi, fj) =
 1 if xi = fj ,0 if xi 6= fj .
to be the number of times that frequency channel fj appears on an FH sequence X ∈ S.
Lemma 2.2.5 (Lempel-Greenberger bound I, [55], Lemma 4). For every sequence
X = (xt) of length v over F , |F| = m,
H(X) ≥ (v − r)(v + r −m)
m(v − 1) , (2.6)
where v ≡ r mod m.
Proof. The sum of the Hamming auto-correlation of the FH sequence X can be written
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in terms of its average out-of phase Hamming auto-correlation:
v−1∑
τ=0
HXX(τ) = v +
v−1∑
τ=1
HXX(τ) (2.7)
= v + (v − 1)H¯(Y ) (2.8)
with H¯(Y ) the average out-of phase Hamming auto-correlation.
Next, consider the sum of the Hamming auto-correlation of an FH sequence X in
terms of the multiplicity of frequency channel on X:
v−1∑
τ=0
HXX(τ) =
v−1∑
τ=0
v−1∑
j=0
h(xj , xj+τ )
=
∑
f∈F
[µX(f)]
2. (2.9)
From Equations (2.7) and (2.9) we have:
H¯ =
1
v − 1
∑
f∈F
[µX(f)]
2 − v
 .
Let
β = min
µX
∑
f∈F
[µX(f)]
2
 (2.10)
where the minimization is over all non-negative integer-valued distribution sequences
µX = {µX(fi) : fi ∈ F , 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1} on F that satisfy the constraint:
∑
f∈F
µX(f) = v. (2.11)
Without loss of generality, assume:
µX(f0) ≤ µX(f1) ≤ . . . ≤ µX(fm−1).
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Then µX is a distribution that minimises β if µX(fm−1)− µX(f0) ≤ 1.
Further, with constraint (2.11), the minimisation β can be achieved when the dis-
tribution µX is nearly uniform:
v = am+ r, 0 ≤ r < m, a ∈ Z+.
Then the following distribution can be used to obtain β:

µX(f0) = µX(f1) = . . . = µX(fm−r−1) = a,
µX(fm−r) = µX(fm−r+1) = . . . = µX(fm−1) = a+ 1.
(2.12)
We have:
β =
1
m
[(v − r)(v + r) +mr].
Therefore:
H(X) ≥ H¯(X)
≥ 1
v − 1(β − v)
=
(v − r)(v + r −m)
m(v − 1) .
Lempel and Greenberger [55] also developed a lower bound on M(X,Y ) for FH
sequences with particular parameters.
Lemma 2.2.6 (Lempel-Greenberger bound II, [55], Lemma 5). For every pair of se-
quences X,Y of length v = pn − 1 ≥ 2 over F , |F| = pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
M(X,Y ) ≥ pn−i. (2.13)
There are also the Peng-Fan bounds which were developed in [77]. Before discussing
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the Peng-Fan bounds, we make further correlation definitions of an FH scheme.
Definition 2.2.7. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS and X,Y ∈ S.
1. The maximum Hamming auto-correlation of an FH scheme S is:
Ha(S) = max{H(X) : X ∈ S}.
2. The maximum Hamming cross-correlation of an FH scheme S is:
Hc(S) = max{H(X,Y ) : X,Y ∈ S, X 6= Y }.
3. The maximum Hamming correlation of an FH scheme S is:
Hm(S) = max{Ha(S), Hc(S)}. (2.14)
Peng and Fan [77] developed some bounds for the maximum Hamming correlation
of an FH scheme. We are going to give the proof of the bounds. We start with the
Lemmas that lead to Theorem 2.2.11 on the bounds. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS over
F , |F| = m. Consider the sum of the Hamming correlations of two FH sequences
X,Y ∈ S:
P (X,Y ) =
v−1∑
τ=0
HX,Y (τ) (2.15)
Lemma 2.2.8 gives an upper bound on
∑
X,Y ∈S P (X,Y ).
Lemma 2.2.8 ([77], Lemma 1). We have
∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) ≤ vk + (v − 1)kHa + (k − 1)vkHc. (2.16)
See [77] for the proof of Lemma 2.2.8.
Lemma 2.2.9 gives the value of
∑
X,Y ∈S P (X,Y ) in terms of occurrences of fre-
quency channels on an FH sequence, Equation (2.5).
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Lemma 2.2.9 ([77], Lemma 2).
∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) =
∑
f∈F
(∑
X∈S
µX(f)
)2
. (2.17)
For all integers 0, 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1, let
gi =
∑
X∈S
µX(fi) (2.18)
be the number of times that frequency channel fi ∈ F occurs in the FH scheme S.
By definition, an FH scheme S is non-empty. That is, there exists at least one FH
sequence in the FH scheme. Further, we can assume that each FH sequence in the
(v, k,m)-FHS has frequency channels from the frequency library. Therefore, gi ≥ 0 for
all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1. That is gi ∈ Z≥0, gi is a non-negative integer.
Next, we consider the lower bound on
∑
X,Y ∈S P (X,Y ).
Lemma 2.2.10 (Lemma 3, [77]). Let I = bvk/mc, we have:
∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) ≥ v
2k2
m
(2.19)
and ∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) ≥ (2I + 1)vk − (I + 1)Im. (2.20)
Proof. From Equation (2.18) and Lemma 2.2.9 we have:
∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) =
m−1∑
i=0
g2i
and the following constraints: 
gi ≥ 0,
m−1∑
i=0
gi = vk.
(2.21)
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First, suppose all g0, g1, . . . , gm−1 are real numbers. We use the Lagrange’s method
to find the minimum on
∑
X,Y ∈S P (X,Y ). Let f(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1) =
∑m−1
i=0 g
2
i and
g(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1) =
∑m−1
i=0 gi. Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier and consider the
Lagrange function:
L(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1, λ) = f(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1)− λ (g(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1)− vk)
=
m−1∑
i=0
g2i − λ
(
m−1∑
i=0
gi − vk
)
.
Now we calculate the gradient:
5g0,g1,...,gm−1,λ L(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1, λ)
=
(
∂L
∂g0
,
∂L
∂g1
, · · · , ∂L
∂gm−1
,
∂L
∂λ
)
=
(
2g0 − λ, 2g1 − λ, . . . , 2gm−1 − λ,
m−1∑
i=0
gi − vk
)
.
Then:
5g0,g1,...,gm−1,λL(g0, g1, . . . , gm−1, λ) = 0⇔

2g0 − λ = 0
2g1 − λ = 0
...
2gm−1 − λ = 0
m−1∑
i=0
gi = vk.
We have:
g0 = g1 = . . . = gm−1 =
λ
2
.
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Substituting into
∑m−1
i=0 gi = vk, we have:
m−1∑
i=0
λ
2
= vk
mλ
2
= vk
λ =
2vk
m
.
So:
g0 = g1 = . . . = gm−1 =
vk
m
.
Therefore:
∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) =
m−1∑
i=0
g2i
≥ v
2k2
m
.
Next, suppose all g0, g1, . . . , gm−1 are non-negative. Recall we want to find the minimum
of
∑
X,Y ∈S P (X,Y ). Let
β = min
g0,g1,...,gm−1
{
m−1∑
i=0
g2i
}
. (2.22)
There exist a sequence of integers g0, g1, . . . , gm−1 such that the summand is minimum.
Without loss of generality, assume
g0 ≤ g1 ≤ . . . ≤ gm−1.
It can be seen that the sequence g0, g1, . . . , gm−1 minimizes
∑m−1
i=0 g
2
i when gm−1−g0 ≤
1. Let
gi = Iim+ ri, 0 ≤ ri < m.
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Then:
vk =
m−1∑
i=0
Iim+ ri
= m
m−1∑
i=0
Ii +
m−1∑
i=0
ri.
Let
∑m−1
i=0 ri = ISm+ r. Then:
vk = (IS +
m−1∑
i=0
Ii)m+ r = Im+ r. (2.23)
From condition (2.21) and Equation (2.23) we have
∑m−1
i=0 gi = vk = Im+ r. Then the
following sequence minimizes
∑m−1
i=0 g
2
i :
g0 = g1 = . . . = gr−1 = I + 1,
gr = gr+1 = . . . = gm−1 = I.
(2.24)
Given the sequence of non-negative integers in (2.24), the value of β is:
r(I + 1)2 + (m− r)I2 = mI2 + 2Ir + r
= (2I + 1)vk − (I + 1)Im.
Therefore, ∑
X,Y ∈S
P (X,Y ) ≥ (2I + 1)vk − (I + 1)Im.
Theorem 2.2.11 follows from Lemma 2.2.8 and 2.2.10 withHm(S) = max{Hc(S), Ha(S)}.
Theorem 2.2.11 (The Peng-Fan Bounds, [77], Corollary 1). Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS.
Let I =
⌊
vk
m
⌋
. Then:
Hm(S) ≥
⌈
(vk −m)v
(vk − 1)m
⌉
(2.25)
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and
Hm(S) ≥
⌈
2Ivk − (I + 1)Im
(vk − 1)k
⌉
. (2.26)
Now, we discuss the two bounds given in Lemma 2.2.11. In particular, we note
that optimality should be defined only if the bound (2.26) is met. Normalising the
denominators in both bounds we have,
(vk −m)vk
(vk − 1)km (2.27)
and
(2Ivk − (I + 1)Im)m
(vk − 1)km . (2.28)
Substituting I =
⌊
vk
m
⌋
in the numerator of (2.28) we have,
2
⌊
vk
m
⌋
vkm−
{(⌊
vk
m
⌋
+ 1
)⌊
vk
m
⌋
m2
}
. (2.29)
Let ε denote the fractional part of vkm . Then (2.29) becomes:
2vkm
(
vk
m
− ε
)
−
(
vk
m
− ε+ 1
)(
vk
m
ε
)
m2,
which reduces to:
(vk)2 − vkm−m2(ε2 − ε)
= (vk −m)vk −m2(ε2 − ε). (2.30)
Note that when m divides vk then ε = 0 in (2.30). Therefore (2.30) and the numerator
of (2.27) are the same. That is the two bounds (2.25) and (2.26) are the same when m
divides vk.
On the other hand, when m does not divide vk and thus ε 6= 0, then we have the
following. Note that ε2 − ε < 0 since 0 < ε < 1. Comparing the numerators of (2.27)
43
2.2. Hamming correlation 2. System and attacker model
and (2.28) (which has been reduced to (2.30)) we have:
(vk −m)vk < (vk −m)vk −m2(ε2 − ε).
We conclude that:
(vk −m)vk
(vk − 1)mk ≤
(vk −m)vk −m2(ε2 − ε)
(vk − 1)mk .
So, ⌈
(vk −m)vk
(vk − 1)mk
⌉
≤
⌈
(vk −m)vk −m2(ε2 − ε)
(vk − 1)mk
⌉
.
Therefore the bound in (2.26) is better than that of (2.25).
Most researchers define optimality of FH sequences as follows.
Definition 2.2.12. An FH sequence X ∈ S is optimal in the Lempel-Greenberger
bound if the bound (2.6) is met.
Definition 2.2.13. A pair of FH sequences X,Y ∈ S is an optimal pair in the
Lempel-Greenberger bound if the bound (2.13) is met.
Definition 2.2.14. A (v, k,m)-FHS, is an optimal FH scheme in the Peng-Fan
bound if either of the bounds in Lemma 2.2.11 is met.
Peng and Fan [77] showed that the Lempel-Greenberger bounds are special cases of
the Peng-Fan bounds. Therefore optimality in the Peng-Fan bounds implies optimality
in the Lempel-Greenberger bounds.
Thus far we have looked at how other researchers analyse the performance of FH
sequences in terms of Hamming correlation, as well as how they define optimality of
FH schemes using the Lempel-Greenberger and Peng-Fan bounds. These well-known
bounds are indeed useful and simplify the question of what it means to have good FH
sequences in the presence of Hamming correlation: we only need to have FH sequences
such that the Hamming correlation is minimised with respect to those bounds. In our
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research, however, we consider group-wise mutual interference, which will be defined in
Section 2.3, and adversarial interference to be considered in Section 2.5. Our notion of
optimality considers transmission capacity of a user in the presence of both group-wise
mutual and adversarial interference.
2.3 System model
Consider an FHMA system. As has been previously described, in an FHMA system a
set of users communicate simultaneously using FH sequences defined on the same set
of frequency channels. In this thesis we consider a finite set of n users N = {Ni : 0 ≤
i ≤ n− 1 } communicating pairwise using a given (v, k,m)-FHS, S.
Consider S a (v, k,m)-FHS over F . The FH sequences in a (v, k,m)-FHS are used
periodically. By periodic we mean that given an FH sequence X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1),
then it can be used as X ′ = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1, x0, x1, . . .). A user can be both a trans-
mitter and a receiver when sending and receiving data from another user respectively.
It is outside the scope of this thesis to address how users agree on the sending and
receiving FH sequences in S. In practice an FH sequence could simply be assigned by
some central controlling user, or the transmitters/receivers could have predistributed
keys allowing them to choose an FH sequence in S. So, we make the assumption that
a transmitter-receiver pair can pre-agree on an FH sequence to be used in a session. A
session is a number of pre-defined time slots. In this thesis we define a session as being
made up of v time slots, that is one full length of an FH sequence. We take a time slot
as a unit of time.
Let w, 0 ≤ w < k, be a positive integer. In any session there are w + 1 FH
sequences that are in use by legitimate users. We call these active FH sequences. Let
V ⊆ S be the set of w + 1 active FH sequences. At any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1,
in a session, there are at most w + 1 frequency channels in use, which we call active
frequency channels. At any time slot t, let the multiset Ft = {x0t , ..., xk−1t } denote all
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the frequency channels that appear in all the FH sequences at that time. The vector
Mt = {a0, ..., am−1} denotes the multiplicity of each frequency channel at time slot t,
where ai = |{j : xjt = i}|. Let Factivet = {xi0t , ..., xiwt } and Mactivet = {a′0, ..., a′m−1}
denote the multisets of active frequency channels and multiplicity of active frequency
channels respectively. Note that a′i ≤ ai for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
There is the issue of synchronisation, which is one of the challenges in an FH scheme.
We make the assumption that all users start at t = 0 at the same time. Shifts of an
FH sequence are treated as distinct FH sequences if needed.
In the literature a (v, k,m)-FHS is formed of FH sequences as follows. Some re-
searchers construct a single FH sequence of length v over a frequency library of size
m. Then, each transmitter-receiver pair starts at a particular time slot of the FH se-
quence. That is, a (v, k,m)-FHS contains all cyclic shifts of the single FH sequence
and a particular transmitter and receiver that wish to communicate use one of these
sequences [17, 23, 35, 36, 51, 55, 106]. Another way is to consider cyclic shifts of more
than one FH sequence [27, 91]. Finally, another approach is to obtain k distinct FH
sequences [39, 62, 72, 108]. Our analysis in this thesis covers all these ways of looking
at FH sequences. We treat a FH scheme simply as a collection of FH sequences.
2.4 Effect of mutual interference on an FH scheme
In this section we discuss the performance of an FH scheme in the presence of mutual
interference where an adversary is not present. As mentioned earlier, in an FH scheme
where more than two users can be transmitting at the same time, the Hamming pairwise
criterion which is widely used in the literature is inadequate [73, 110]. We thus introduce
the Hamming group correlation, a parameter that measure the performance of an FH
sequence in the presence of subsets of FH sequences.
Definition 2.4.1. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS, U ⊂ S, |U| = w, 0 ≤ w < k and X ∈ S\U .
The Hamming group correlation G(X,U) between the FH sequence X and the FH
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sequences in U , is defined as the number of coordinates in X that contain the same
symbols as the corresponding coordinates of some FH sequences in U :
G(X,U) = |{xt : ∃Y ∈ U such that xt = yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1 }|. (2.31)
Considering a (v, k,m)-FHS as a set of k codewords of length v over F , |F| = m,
then the Hamming group correlation, G(X,U), coincides with the notion of group
distance as defined by Jin and Blaum [46] in the context of traceability codes.
We now define the main performance measure of an FH scheme which is used
throughout the remainder of the thesis, the throughput of an FH sequence. We use the
basic throughput defined here to develop further throughput measures of an FH scheme.
In the remainder of this chapter we will use the following. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS,
U ⊂ S, |U| = w, V ⊆ S, |V| = w + 1, 0 ≤ w < k and X ∈ S \ U .
Definition 2.4.2. The w-throughput of an FH sequence X is the rate of successful
transmission in a session in the presence of FH sequences in U ,
ρw(X,U) = 1− G(X,U)
v
. (2.32)
Note that when w = 0 then there is only one FH sequence being used in the
communication system and the w-throughput is one. It is desirable that ρw(X,U) be
large, which means an FH sequence transmits at many time slots.
Ideally, we aim to construct a (v, k,m)-FHS that maximises throughput in both the
average case and worst-case.
2.4.1 Average throughput
Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS. We define the average w-throughput of an FH sequence, of
a subset of an FH scheme and of an FH scheme.
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Definition 2.4.3. The average w-throughput of an FH sequence X ∈ S is:
ρ¯w(X,S) = 1(k−1
w
)
 ∑
U⊆S\{X}
ρw(X,U)
 , (2.33)
|U| = w.
The average w-throughput of an FH sequence provides the average number of time
slots in which an FH sequence can successfully send information if w other FH sequences
in an FH scheme are being used.
Definition 2.4.4. The average w-throughput of a subset V is:
ρ¯w(V) = 1
w + 1
(∑
X∈V
ρw(X,V \ {X})
)
, (2.34)
|V| = w + 1.
Thus, given a (w + 1)-subset V of a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, (2.34) provides the aver-
age number of time slots in which an FH sequence X ∈ V can successfully transmit
information if the other w FH sequences in V are also transmitting.
Definition 2.4.5. The average w-throughput of an FH scheme S is the average
of ρ¯w(V), over all (w + 1)-subset V:
ρ¯w(S) = 1( k
w+1
) ∑
V⊆S
ρ¯w(V). (2.35)
So, (2.35) provides the average number of time slots that an FH sequence can
transmit information successfully in the presence of any (w + 1)-subset of S.
2.4.2 Worst-case throughput
Consider S a (v, k,m)-FHS. We define the worst-case w-throughput of an FH sequence,
of a subset of an FH scheme and of an FH scheme. We first look at the case without an
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adversary. The worst-case w-throughput in the presence of an adversary will be dealt
with in Section 2.5.
Definition 2.4.6. The worst-case w-throughput of an FH sequence X is:
ρˆw(X,S) = minU⊆S\{X}
{
ρw(X,U)
}
, (2.36)
|U| = w.
So, given an FH sequence X ∈ S, (2.36) provides the minimum number of time
slots in which the FH sequence can transmit data if some w FH sequences in S are also
in use.
Definition 2.4.7. The worst-case w-throughput of a subset of an FH scheme,
V is:
ρˆw(V) = min
X∈V
{
ρw(X,V \ {X})
}
, (2.37)
|V| = w + 1.
Equation (2.37) provides the minimum number of time slots in which an FH sequence
X ∈ V can transmit information if w FH sequences in V \ {X} are in use.
Definition 2.4.8. The worst-case w-throughput of an FH scheme, S is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
ρˆw(V)
}
, (2.38)
|V| = w + 1.
Equation (2.38) provides the minimum of the values ρw(X,V \ {X}) for each possible
FH sequence X and the set of w FH sequences V \ {X} in S not containing X.
A (v, k,m)-FHS, S with worst-case w-throughput ρˆw(S) will be denoted (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-
FHS.
Clearly ρw and all its associated variations takes on values in the interval [0, 1]. In
Chapter 5 we examine FH schemes with ρˆw(S) = 1 for any w.
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2.5 Attacker model
In both wired and wireless networks, most security issues and data recovery can be
addressed by architectures in advanced higher layers of the Open Systems Interconnec-
tion (OSI) model, such as coding or cryptographic methods [13, 88, 98]. However, there
are problems that exist on the lower physical (PHY) layer that may not be addressed
by these higher layer solutions. In particular jamming is an example of such a threat
on the PHY layer.
2.5.1 Jamming definition
In the literature [47, 58, 82, 101, 103, 107], jamming has been defined as the action of
inserting, modifying or blocking messages. Interference occurs if the jamming signal
is transmitted on a frequency channel that is occupied by legitimate users. A mali-
cious user can replay or insert its own messages on the frequency channel. Further, a
malicious user can modify messages by flipping bits in the transmitted messages. The
receiver will get a different signal which is that of the modified message (a malicious
user’s signal) and not the original transmitted signal that was sent by the legitimate
transmitter. In either case, if the jamming signal has a higher power then the legit-
imate transmitter’s signal is overshadowed and this results in a modified message at
the receiver’s end. The actions of message inserting and modifications are executed in
the higher layers of the OSI reference model and we therefore assume that they can be
taken care of by higher-layer security mechanisms such as coding and cryptographic
methods. In this thesis we only consider signal jamming:
Definition 2.5.1. Jamming is defined as intentionally sending noisy signals on fre-
quency channels to block the signal transmissions of legitimate users. It is considered
as a denial-of-service attack on the physical layer. We call a malicious user that sends
jamming messages a jammer.
A jammer can further be classified according to its capabilities [78, 81, 84]:
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 A narrowband jammer concentrates its jamming signal on a narrowband stretch
of the communication spectrum.
 A broadband jammer generates a jamming signal that occupies a continuous set
of adjacent frequency channels simultaneously, stretching over frequency ranges
longer than those occupied by narrowband transmissions.
A jammer can also be classified according to its behaviour [69, 76, 112]:
 A constant jammer continuously sends jamming signals on the frequency chan-
nels.
 A random jammer switches between jamming and sleeping mode without a de-
fined strategy. This jammer saves energy when in sleeping mode.
 A reactive jammer is only active when a frequency channel is active with le-
gitimate transmissions. This jammer has to be actively eavesdropping to sense
ongoing transmissions on frequency channels. Therefore, it spends more energy
during eavesdropping.
2.5.2 Jamming strategy
We now describe the jamming model that is used in this thesis. Further, we develop
the measures of the performance of an FH scheme in the presence of a jammer and also
incorporate the presence of mutual interference.
The strategy of a jammer in this thesis is to eavesdrop and jam. It knows the
frequency library F , the (v, k,m)-FHS, S, the current time slot t, and thus it knows
Ft and Mt the multiset of all channels that appear in all the FH sequences and the
multiplicity of each channel at time slot t respectively. It also knows w′ = w + 1
( 0 ≤ w < k ), the number of FH sequences being used in a session. However, it has no
knowledge of the actual FH sequences being used if the number of active FH sequences
is less than k. In this case, at each time slot it has no knowledge of Factivet or Mactivet .
51
2.5. Attacker model 2. System and attacker model
At each time slot a jammer has enough resources to eavesdrop on θ1m channels,
0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1. In our model we assume that by eavesdropping a jammer only finds
out whether a channel is active or not, but does not acquire the information being
transmitted on an active channel. We will call a jammer that eavesdrops on an active
and inactive channel at a time slot, t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1, a lucky and unlucky jammer
respectively. We assume that a jammer cannot jam all the frequency channels at each
time slot, but rather say it can jam θ2m channels, 0 ≤ θ2 < 1. A jammer can use
the information it acquires while eavesdropping to jam on frequency channels. This
adversary is denoted as a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer.
Note that a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer includes all the jammers that apply to an FH
scheme. For example, a narrowband jammer can be considered as a (θ1,
1
m)-adaptive
jammer, where it can eavesdrop on any number of frequency channels, 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, but
can only jam on a single narrowband frequency channel. A broadband jammer can be
modelled as a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer, where θ2 ≥ 1m , with an additional condition
that it jams on fi, fi+1, . . . , fi+θ2m−1 and 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1.
At each time slot, a jammer will either send interfering signals on any random
channel(s) or will choose a particular channel such that its chances of jamming an
active FH sequence is improved.
A jammer can improve its chances of jamming an active frequency channel as fol-
lows. At each time slot, there are k FH sequences assumed to be equally likely over m
frequency channels, and for each frequency channel i there are ai FH sequences of that
frequency channel. The probability that frequency channel i is active is
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
. (2.39)
The probability in (2.39) is maximum when the jammer selects a frequency channel i
such that ai ≥ aj for all i 6= j. Therefore, if there exists some i such that ai ≥ aj for
all i 6= j, then a jammer will choose frequency channel i to jam. A jammer can follow
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this strategy at any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1.
A jammer can also try to determine an active FH sequence. It aims to identify
an active FH sequence as quickly as possible. It can then reduce the worst-case w-
throughput to 0, or close to 0. We call the jammer’s search space the set of FH
sequences denoted S∗t , a subset of the (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS, which the jammer needs
to look at to identify an active FH sequence at time slot t. Note that at the beginning
of a session, t = 0, the search space is the whole FH scheme, S∗0 = S. We will denote
the number of time slots it takes a jammer to determine an active FH sequence as γv,
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. It is desirable that γ be large. The aim of a (v, k,m; ρˆw(S))-FHS, S, is to
make the jammer’s advantage not much better than a random guess.
Note that knowledge of F and S is a standard security assumption. For example
in the IEEE 802.11 standard the frequency library and the FH scheme are publicly
known [6]. It is also possible for a jammer to eavesdrop on ongoing transmissions by a
communication system and learn F and S.
When a signal is jammed, legitimate users hear noise and acknowledge failure of
transmission. So we treat a jamming signal as an erasure.
We model a jammer’s channel selection strategy for jamming as a set of FH se-
quences J = {Yi|i = 0, . . . , θ2m − 1}, where Yi is an FH sequence of length v over
F .
Definition 2.5.2. Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS. Let U ⊆ S, |U| = w, 0 ≤ w < k and
X ∈ S \ U . Consider the existence of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. We now define the
throughput of an FH sequence in the presence of w mutual interfering FH sequences
from U , as well as jamming FH sequences from J similarly to Section 2.4:
1. The (w,J )-throughput of an FH sequence X ∈ S \ U :
ρw,J (X, {U ∪ J }) = 1− G(X, {U ∪ J })
v
, (2.40)
is the number of time slots an FH sequence X can successfully transmit in the
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presence of other w mutual interfering FH sequences from U and jamming FH
sequences from J .
2. The average (w,J )-throughput of an FH sequence X ∈ S \ U :
ρ¯w,J (X,S ∪ J ) = 1(k−1
w
) ∑
U⊆S\{X}
ρw,J (X,U ∪ J ), (2.41)
is the average number of time slots in which X can successfully send information
in the presence of other w FH sequences from S, as well as jamming FH sequences
from J .
3. The average (w,J )-throughput of a subset V:
ρ¯w,J (V) = 1
w + 1
∑
X∈V
ρw,J (X,V \ {X} ∪ J ), (2.42)
is the mean number of time slots in which an FH sequence X from V can com-
municate successfully if other w FH sequences from V \ {X}, as well as jamming
FH sequences from J are present.
4. The average (w,J )-throughput of an FH scheme S:
ρ¯w,J (S) = 1( k
w+1
) ∑
V⊆S
|V|=w+1
ρ¯w,J (V), (2.43)
is the overall average of time slots with respect to all (w + 1)-subsets, in which
an FH sequence can successfully transmit in the presence of other w mutual in-
terfering FH sequences from S and jamming FH sequences from J .
5. The worst-case (w,J )-throughput of an FH sequence X:
ρˆw,J (X,S ∪ J ) = minU⊆S\{X} {ρw,J (X,U ∪ J )} , (2.44)
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is the lowest possible number of time slots in which an FH sequence X ∈ S
can communicate in the presence of w mutual interfering FH sequences from
U ⊆ S \ {X} and other jamming FH sequences from J .
6. The worst-case (w,J )-throughput of a subset V:
ρˆw,J (V) = min
X∈V
{ρw,J (X,V \ {X} ∪ J )} , (2.45)
is the least achievable number of time slots for an FH sequences X ∈ S, with
respect to all (w+ 1)-subsets of S, to successfully transmit in the presence of both
mutual interfering FH sequences from V \ {X} and jamming FH sequences from
J .
7. The worst-case (w,J )-throughput of an FH scheme S:
ρˆw,J (S) = min
V⊆S
|V|=w+1
{ρˆw,J (V)} (2.46)
is the minimum number of time slots every FH sequence from S can transmit in
the presence of w FH sequences from S and jamming FH sequences of J ,
In this thesis, the goal of a jammer is to reduce the worst-case (w,J )-throughput
of a (v,m, k)-FHS, S.
2.5.3 Existing jamming countermeasures
In Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 we have defined a jammer and its strategies. Before sum-
marising this chapter we review jamming countermeasures that exist in the literature.
There are three countermeasures to communication jamming [81, 85, 101]:
1. Jamming avoidance methods involve moving out of the jamming signal’s range
or changing the communication medium (switching from wireless to wired com-
munication).
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2. Jamming detection is the action of detecting the presence of jamming activity in
a communication system.
3. Jamming mitigation techniques minimises the effect of jamming in a communica-
tion system. Directional antennas and spread spectrum techniques are considered
as jamming mitigation techniques.
Bluetooth’s adaptive FHSS can be considered as a jamming detection and avoidance
mechanism. As described in Chapter 1, a master user in a Bluetooth network adaptively
changes the frequency library over which the FH sequences are defined by removing
channels on which it experiences interference.
Note that jamming detection and jamming avoidance may not be feasible in other
applications such as wired systems or wireless sensor networks. For example, moving
out of jamming range may not be practical for wired systems. Further, as wireless
sensors are energy constrained devices, detecting jamming will further need the use
of the already limited energy resource. Further, the geographical positions of some
wireless sensors cannot be changed once they have been deployed and thus not making
jamming avoidance viable. In this thesis, we consider FH sequences as a jamming
mitigation method.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we started with a review of the literature on Hamming correlation
and its related bounds. Next, we have presented a new framework for analysing the
performance of an FH scheme considering the presence of both mutual interference and
a jammer. We have taken into account more than two users transmitting simultaneously
and have considered the throughput in that setting. A jammer model was introduced
in an FH scheme. The metrics for the performance of an FH scheme given the presence
of both group-wise mutual interference and jamming signal were presented. We will
now use the new proposed model to analyse the performance of existing FH schemes in
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Chapter 3, as well as new FH schemes to be considered/proposed in Chapters 4 and 5.
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3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we introduced some constructions of FH schemes that exist in the litera-
ture whose performance is measured with respect to the well-known Lempel-Greenberger
or Peng-Fan bounds. The bounds are based on Hamming correlation. In Chapter 2
we developed a new model for analysing the performance of FH schemes: provided an
FH scheme, we consider the successful transmission of an FH sequence in the presence
of group-wise mutual interference, as well as in the presence of an adaptive jammer.
In this chapter we investigate the performance of some of the existing FH schemes
constructions within the new model proposed in Chapter 2. For each FH scheme we:
1. Describe the FH scheme construction in detail;
2. Determine the Hamming group correlation and w-throughput of an FH sequence,
as well as the worst-case w-throughput of the FH scheme;
3. Examine the resistance of the FH scheme against a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer.
We also explore possible relations between various FH schemes. Some of these
can be shown to be the same even though they have been constructed using different
mathematical structures.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We consider existing con-
structions of FH schemes which use the following structures: random walks on a graph
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in Section 3.2, difference packing in Section 3.3, m-sequences in Section 3.4, cyclo-
tomy in Section 3.5, trace functions in Section 3.6, Reed-Solomon codes in Section 3.7,
recursive constructions in Section 3.9. In Section 3.10 we compare the different con-
structions considered in this chapter with respect to their performance in the presence
of both group-wise mutual interference and jamming. We summarise the chapter in
Section 3.12.
3.2 Random walks on a Ramanujan graph
In [31] Emek and Wattenhofer constructed FH sequences as random walks on expander
graphs, in particular on Ramanujan graphs. The authors consider a single pairwise
communication where subsequent channels in an FH sequence for transmission are
included in the data transmitted. The FH scheme is analysed in the presence of an
adversary that can eavesdrop and jam a certain fraction of the available frequency
channels. However, it is not clear what happens if more than one pair of communication
occurs simultaneously. So, we consider their FH scheme in our model where we consider
both mutual (group-wise) and adversarial interference, where the adversary can also
eavesdrop and jam.
3.2.1 Random walks on a graph
Random walks are a combinatorial tool with many applications, such as models in
mathematics and physics (brownian motion of particles) [111], as well as in computer
science, where they are used in the generation of random samples [59]. In these ap-
plications they are attractive for their randomness. In [31] they are used to construct
pseudorandom FH sequences.
We start with the basic definitions of graphs and introduce random walks on graphs,
which are relevant for this construction. We refer the reader to [16, 42] for a detailed
introduction to this topic.
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Definition 3.2.1. A graph G = (V,E) is a set of vertices V = {u0, . . . , um−1} and
a set of edges E = {e0, . . . , en−1}, where eκ = (ui, uj) ∈ E, 0 ≤ κ ≤ n − 1, is an
edge between the vertices ui and uj, and we say that the edge (ui, uj) is incident to
its endpoints ui and uj. Wherever an edge (ui, uj) exists, ui and uj are said to be
adjacent.
The graphs considered in the construction of this section will be simple graphs.
Definition 3.2.2. A simple graph is an undirected graph where both multiple edges
and loops are not allowed.
Given a graph G = (V,E), a walk in G is a finite sequence alternating vertices
uij ∈ V and edges eij ∈ E in the form (ui0 , ei1 , ui1 , ei2 , ui2 , . . . , eiv , uiv), where for
1 ≤ j ≤ v, the edge eij is incident with the vertices uij−1 and uij . Less formally, a walk
describes a sequence of vertices (ui0 , ui1 , ui2 , . . ., uiv), where ui0 is called the initial
vertex and uiv the final vertex and uijuij+1 ∈ E, 0 ≤ j ≤ v− 1. The length of a walk is
the number of edges in a walk. So (ui0 , ei1 , ui1 , ei2 , ui2 , . . . , eiv , uiv) is a walk of length
v starting from vertex ui0 then goes through the edge ei1 to get to vertex ui1 etc. until
the final vertex uiv . A walk with distinct vertices is called a path.
A graph G = (V,E) is undirected if for all ui, uj ∈ V :
(ui, uj) ∈ E ⇔ (uj , ui) ∈ E,
implying that pairs of vertices in the set of edges are not ordered. Otherwise it is called
a directed graph. A graph is connected if for every pair of vertices there exist a path
on the graph joining them. The construction of Emek and Wattenhofer [31] uses a
connected, undirected graph.
Le G = (V,E) be a connected, undirected graph with m vertices. The degree d(ui)
of a vertex ui is the number of edges incident with that vertex. A graph is said to be
r-regular if each vertex has the same degree r. The neighbourhood of a vertex ui ∈ V ,
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denoted N (ui), is the set of adjacent vertices to ui, that is N (ui) = {uj ∈ V : (ui, uj) ∈
E}. We are now in a position to define a random walk on a graph.
Definition 3.2.3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A random walk is a sequence (ui0 , ui1 , ui2 , . . .)
at discrete time steps, where each uij ∈ V , the initial vertex ui0 is chosen randomly,
and suppose at time t the walk is on vertex uit−1, then a single succeeding vertex
uit ∈ N (uit−1) is chosen uniformly,
Pr(uit−1 , uit) =

1
deg(uit−1)
if uit ∈ N (uit−1),
0 otherwise.
(3.1)
The adjacency matrix, A ∈ {0, 1}m×m of a graph is used to analyse random walks
on a graph, where:
A(i, j) =

1 if (uj , ui) ∈ E,
0 otherwise.
Further, a walk matrix W of a graph is an m×m matrix provided by:
W (i, j) =

1
deg(uj)
if (uj , ui) ∈ E,
0 otherwise
If the graph is r-regular then W = 1rA.
Example 3.2.4. Consider G = (V,E), |V | = 6, the 4-regular connected, undirected
graph provided in Figure 3.1
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3 2
1
4 5
6
Figure 3.1: A 4-regular, connected, undirected graph on 6 vertices.
The adjacency matrix A for the graph in Figure 3.1 is,
A =

0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0

,
and the walk matrix is,
W =

0 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 0
1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4
1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4 0 1/4 0 1/4
0 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 0

.
At time t the matrix W t(G) is described as follows. The (i, j)-entry of W t(G) is the
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probability that a random walk of length t starting at vertex uj ends at vertex ui. We
will denote this probability as W t(G)(i, j) = Prtuj (ui). At t = 0, Pr
t
uj (ui) = 1/ deg(uj).
From the example graph in Figure 3.1, the matrix W 5(G) corresponding to random
walks of length 5 is,
W 5(G) =

0.157 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.157
0.173 0.157 0.173 0.157 0.173 0.173
0.173 0.173 0.157 0.173 0.157 0.173
0.173 0.157 0.173 0.157 0.173 0.173
0.173 0.173 0.157 0.173 0.157 0.173
0.157 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.173 0.157

.
So, a random walk of length 5 starting at vertex v6 will be at vertex v3 with probability
0.173.
We end this section by defining Ramanujan graphs, the graphs used by Emek et al.
[31] to construct random walks.
Definition 3.2.5. Let G(V,E) be an r-regular connected, undirected graph on m ver-
tices. Let
ω(G) = max{λ1, |λm−1|},
where λ0 ≥ λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λm−1 are the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of G. If
ω(G) ≤ 2√r − 1 then G is a Ramanujan graph.
Ramanujan graphs belong to a class of important graphs called expander graphs.
Expander graphs are r- regular graphs that are highly connected while, at the same
time, sparse (having very few edges). A graph with m vertices is said to be highly
connected if the minimum number of edges whose deletion results in a disconnected
graph is greater than m/2. We will not provide a formal definition of expander graphs
because the details are outside our scope. For more information on expander graphs
and Ramanujan graphs we refer the reader to [24, 26, 45, 60].
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Several researchers have established the existence of Ramanujan graphs. Existence
of an infinite family of (p+1)-regular Ramanujan graphs, whenever p is a prime number
and p ≡ 1( mod 4) is shown by Lubotzky, Phillips and Sarnak [60]. It is also known
that d-regular complete graphs and and complete bipartite graphs are Ramanujan
graphs [64]. Marcus, Spielman and Srivastava [64] proved the existence of bipartite
Ramanujan graphs of every degree and every number of vertices. Further constructions
of Ramanujan graphs can be found in [18, 48, 63, 65, 68, 80].
3.2.2 Random walks as an FH scheme
We now describe the random walk in detail as an FH scheme.
Construction 3.2.6. Consider G = (V,E) an r-regular, connected, undirected graph
(not necessarily a Ramanujan graph) on m vertices. We consider vertices of the graph
as frequency channels. A transmitter and receiver start at some channel ui0 ∈ V chosen
deterministically and take a random walk of length v. As the graph is r-regular, at each
point in the walk there are r choices, uij such that uij ∈ N (uij−1), for a channel in
the succeeding point of the walk. However, note that uij 6= uij−1 since the graph has no
loops. Therefore, there are rv−1 sequences with ui0 as a first vertex to visit. Thus there
are m×rv−1 possible walks on G when considering all vertices ui ∈ V , 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1 as
the starting vertex of a random walk. Consider a random walk as an FH sequence, then
the set of all possible walks on G is a (v,m× rv−1,m)-FHS, S, where |S| = m× rv−1,
|F| = m.
The properties of the (v,m×rv−1,m)-FHS obtained using random walks on a graph
are as follows. Consider any v − 1 consecutive time slots, for simplicity, 0, . . . , v − 2.
Any frequency channel in F appear rv−1 number of times at time slot 0. Next consider
any rv−1 FH sequences with a particular frequency channel in F that appear at time
slot 0. Then at time slot 1, some r frequency channels in F each appears rv−2 number
of times on the rv−1 FH sequences of interest. If we continue in this manner, we have
that on the last time slot v − 1 we remain with r distinct frequency channels.
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Example 3.2.7. Consider the 4-vertex, 2-regular, connected, undirected graph in Fig-
ure 3.2:
1 2
34
Figure 3.2: A 2-regular, connected, undirected graph on 4 vertices.
We have F = {1, 2, 3, 4}. A (4, 32, 4)-FHS can be constructed using this graph.
Let vi0 = 1 be the initial vertex of walks, 0 ≤ i ≤ 7, then all the FH sequences of
length 4 starting with frequency channel 1 are: X0 = (1, 2, 3, 2), X1 = (1, 4, 3, 2),
X2 = (1, 2, 1, 2), X3 = (1, 4, 1, 2), X4 = (1, 2, 3, 4), X5 = (1, 2, 1, 4), X6 = (1, 4, 1, 4),
X7 = (1, 4, 3, 4).
Note that there are three other sets, each with 8 sequences, each set with frequency
channels 2, 3, 4 at the first time slot.
3.2.3 Correlation
Hamming correlation
In this section we consider the Hamming correlation of FH sequences on the graph
introduced in Section 3.2.2. We point out that Emek et al. [31] considered only adver-
sarial interference and not mutual interference.
Let G = (V,E) be an r-regular, connected, undirected graph on m vertices. Let
X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) and Y = (y0, y1, . . . , yv−1) be two random walks on G. The
probability that these two random walks, X,Y , will start at the same vertex is:
Pr(x0 = y0) =
1
m
. (3.2)
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The probability that a pair of random walks X,Y will visit the same vertex at time
slot i, 1 ≤ i ≤ v − 1 satisfies,
Pr(xi = yi) =
Pr(xi−1 6= yi−1)Pr(xi = yi|xi−1 6= yi−1) + Pr(xi−1 = yi−1)Pr(xi = yi|xi−1 = yi−1).
(3.3)
Now, we impose further restrictions on G to determine Pr(xi = yi). We will
consider G a strongly regular graph.
Definition 3.2.8. ([15]) An m-vertex, r-regular graph G = (V,E) is called an (m, r;λ, µ)-
strongly-regular graph if:
 any two adjacent vertices have λ common neighbours;
 any two non-adjacent vertices have µ common neighbours.
In the handbook of combinatorial designs [25] the authors provide strongly-regular
graphs with different flexible parameters for m, r, λ and µ.
Notice that we lose some properties of expander graphs when we consider strongly
regular graphs. A random walk on an expander graph has the property that after a
finite number of steps the probability that it hits every vertex is uniform. So, we lose
this uniformity of elements on the random walk. However, both strongly regular graphs
and expander graphs are regular graphs. So, the probability of choosing the succeeding
vertex for a random walk is the same in either of the graphs.
Consider G an (m, r;λ, µ)-strongly-regular graph. Let X = (xi), Y = (yi) be a pair
of random walks on G. For any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ v−1 consider the three states for the random
walks X,Y :
 S1: xi = yi,
 S2: xi and yi are distinct and adjacent and
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 S3: xi and yi are distinct and non-adjacent.
Denote the probability of transitioning from state Sh to state Sk in one step by:
Ph,k = Pr(xi, yi are in state Sk|xi−1, yi−1 are in state Sh).
Given the three states for a pair of random walks, a transition matrix M is:
M =

P1,1 P1,2 P1,3
P2,1 P2,2 P2,3
P3,1 P3,2 P3,3
 . (3.4)
To derive Ph,k, h, k = {1, 2, 3} we do the following. We consider xi−1, yi−1 in state Sh.
Then we count the number of pairs xi, yi which satisfy the conditions of the state Sk.
The total number of possibilities xi, yi is r
2. We consider the transition from each state
Sh separately.
We start by deriving the equations for the transition from state S1: P1,k, k =
{1, 2, 3}. In the state S1 we have the following. We have a pair of vertices xi−1, yi−1
such that xi−1 = yi−1. For each yi ∈ N(yi−1) we have N(yi) ∩N(yi−1) = λ.
1. From state S1 to state S1, P1,1.
Out of r2 possibilities xi, yi, we have r of them such that xi = yi. Therefore,
given the state S1, the total number of occurrences such that xi = yi is r. So:
P1,1 =
r
r2
. (3.5)
2. From state S1 to state S2, P1,2.
Out of r2 possibilities xi, yi, we have the total number of occurrences such that
given xi−1 = yi−1 then yi 6= xi and yi, xi are adjacent is λ · r. So:
P1,2 =
λ · r
r2
. (3.6)
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3. From state S1 to state S3, P1,3.
Each vertex yi has λ common neighbours with yi−1 and so has r − λ − 1 that
are not neighbours of yi−1. So each of the r neighbours yi of yi−1 contribute
r− λ− 1 pairs xi, yi such that xi 6= yi and xi, yi are non-adjacent. Therefore the
total number of occurrences such that given state S1 then xi 6= yi and xi, yi are
non-adjacent is r(r − λ− 1). So:
P1,3 =
r(r − λ− 1)
r2
. (3.7)
We now derive the equations for the transition from state S2: P2,k, k = {1, 2, 3}.
In the state S2 we have the following. Given xi−1, yi−1 such that xi−1 6= yi−1 and
xi−1, yi−1 are adjacent. Then xi−1 has λ vertices common with yi−1.
1. From state S2 to state S1.
Let xi−1, yi−1 be in state S2: xi−1 6= yi−1 and xi−1, yi−1 are adjacent. Then xi−1
has λ vertices common with yi−1. Then the total number of occurrences xi, yi
such that xi = yi is λ. Therefore the probability of transitioning from state S2 to
state S1 is:
P2,1 =
λ
r2
. (3.8)
2. From state S2 to state S2.
Suppose we are given xi−1, yi−1 in state S2. Here we consider three cases after
choosing yi ∈ N(yi−1) and count the pairs xi, yi, with xi ∈ N(xi−1) that satisfy
the condition of transitioning to state S2: yi ∈ N(yi−1) and yi = xi−1; yi ∈
N(yi−1), yi ∈ N(xi−1) and yi 6= xi−1; yi ∈ N(yi−1), yi /∈ N(xi−1) and yi 6= xi−1.
There is a vertex yi ∈ N(yi−1) such that yi = xi−1 and thus we have r pairs xi, yi
that are distinct and adjacent.
Next consider vertex yi ∈ N(xi−1) with yi 6= xi−1. Then yi, xi−1 have λ vertices
in common. So, there are λ vertices xi ∈ N(xi−1) such that yi 6= xi and yi, xi
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are adjacent. Now, since xi−1, yi−1 have λ vertices in common for being adjacent
vertices, then there are λ vertices yi ∈ N(yi−1) such that yi ∈ N(xi−1). Then
there are λ2 pairs xi, yi that are distinct and adjacent.
Now consider yi /∈ N(xi−1) and yi 6= xi−1. Then yi and xi−1 have µ vertices
in common in their neighbourhood. That is, there are µ vertices xi such that
yi 6= xi and yi, xi are adjacent. Then we have in total (r − λ− 1) · µ pairs xi, yi
that are distinct and adjacent.
Given xi−1, yi−1 in state S2, the total number of occurrences of xi, yi such that
yi 6= xi and yi, xi are adjacent is:
r + λ2 + (r − λ− 1) · µ.
The probability of transitioning from state S2 to state S2 is:
P2,2 =
r + λ2 + (r − λ− 1) · µ
r2
. (3.9)
3. From state S2 to state S3.
Suppose we are given xi−1, yi−1 in state S2. Here we consider two cases after
choosing yi ∈ N(yi−1) and count the pairs xi, yi, with xi ∈ N(xi−1) that satisfy
the condition of transitioning to state S3: yi ∈ N(yi−1) and yi ∈ N(xi−1); yi ∈
N(yi−1) and yi /∈ N(xi−1).
Consider yi ∈ N(xi−1). We have a pair xi, yi such yi = xi. Next, we know the
pair yi, xi−1 have λ vertices in common in their neighbourhood. Then we have λ
pairs xi, yi that are distinct and adjacent. So, r − λ − 1 pairs xi, yi are distinct
and non-adjacent. However, there are λ vertices yi such that yi ∈ N(xi−1). Then
the total number of occurrences of xi, yi such that yi ∈ N(xi−1), yi 6= xi and
xi, yi are non-adjacent is (r − λ− 1) · λ.
Next consider yi /∈ N(xi−1). The pair yi, xi−1 have µ vertices in common and
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(r − µ) not in common in their neighbourhood. There are r − λ − 1 vertices yi
such that yi /∈ N(xi−1). Then the total number of occurrences xi, yi such that
yi /∈ N(xi−1), yi 6= xi and yi, xi are non-adjacent is (r − λ− 1) · (r − µ).
Given the state S2, the total number of pairs xi, yi such that yi 6= xi and yi, xi
are non-adjacent is:
(r − λ− 1) · λ+ (r − λ− 1) · (r − µ) = (r − λ− 1) · (λ+ (r − µ)).
The probability of transitioning from state S2 to state S3 is:
P2,3 =
(r − λ− 1) · (λ+ (r − µ))
r2
. (3.10)
We now derive the equations for the transition from state S3: P3,k, k = {1, 2, 3}.
1. From state S3 to state S1.
Consider yi ∈ N(xi−1), there is a pair xi, yi such that yi = xi. Now, the vertices
yi−1 and xi−1 have µ vertices in common in their neighbourhood. So, there are
µ vertices yi such that yi ∈ N(xi−1). Therefore, given xi−1, yi−1 in state S3, the
total number of occurrences xi, yi such that xi = yi is µ.
So, the probability of transitioning from state S3 to state S1 is:
P3,1 =
µ
r2
. (3.11)
2. From state S3 to state S2.
Suppose we are given xi−1, yi−1 in state S3. Here we consider two cases after
choosing yi ∈ N(yi−1) and count the pairs xi, yi, with xi ∈ N(xi−1) that satisfy
the condition of transitioning to state S2: yi ∈ N(yi−1) and yi ∈ N(xi−1); yi ∈
N(yi−1) and yi /∈ N(xi−1).
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Consider yi ∈ N(xi−1). The vertices yi, xi−1 have λ common vertices in their
neighbourhoods. Then there are λ pairs xi, yi such that xi, yi are distinct and
adjacent. Now, the vertices yi, xi−1 have µ common vertices in their neighbour-
hoods. Therefore, the total number of occurrences xi, yi such that yi ∈ N(xi−1),
yi 6= xi and yi, xi are adjacent is λ · µ.
Consider yi /∈ N(xi−1). The vertices yi, xi−1 have µ vertices in their neighbour-
hoods. So there are r − µ vertices yi such that yi /∈ N(xi−1). The total number
of occurrences xi, yi such that yi /∈ N(xi−1), yi 6= xi and yi, xi are adjacent is
(r − µ) · µ.
Therefore, given the state S3, the total number of pairs xi, yi such that yi 6= xi
and yi, xi are adjacent is:
λ · µ+ (r − µ) · µ.
The probability of transitioning from the state S3 to the state S2 is:
P3,2 =
λ · µ+ (r − µ) · µ
r2
. (3.12)
3. From state S3 to state S3.
Suppose we are given xi−1, yi−1 in state S3. Here we consider two cases after
choosing yi ∈ N(yi−1) and count the pairs xi, yi, with xi ∈ N(xi−1) that satisfy
the condition of transitioning to state S3: yi ∈ N(yi−1) and yi ∈ N(xi−1); yi ∈
N(yi−1) and yi /∈ N(xi−1).
Consider yi ∈ N(xi−1). There is a pair xi, yi such that yi = xi. We know that
the vertices yi, xi−1 have λ common vertices in their neighbourhoods. Therefore,
we have r−λ− 1 pairs xi, yi where yi 6= xi and yi, xi are non-adjacent. Now, the
vertices yi, xi−1 have µ common vertices in their neighbourhoods. So the total
number of pairs xi, yi such that yi ∈ N(xi−1), yi 6= xi and yi, xi are non-adjacent
is (r − λ− 1) · µ.
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Consider yi /∈ N(xi−1). The vertices yi, xi−1 have µ and r − µ common and not
common vertices respectively in their neighbourhoods. We have r − µ vertices
yi such that yi /∈ N(xi−1). So, the total number of pairs xi, yi such that yi /∈
N(xi−1), yi 6= xi and yi, xi are non-adjacent is (r − µ)2.
Therefore, given the state S3, the total number of pairs xi, yi such that yi 6= xi
and yi, xi are non-adjacent is:
(r − λ− 1) · µ+ (r − µ)2.
The probability of transitioning from state S3 to state S3 is:
P3,3 =
(r − λ− 1) · µ+ (r − µ)2
r2
. (3.13)
We can now put together the transition matrix M as:
M =
1
r2

r λr r(r − λ− 1)
λ r + λ2 + (r − λ− 1)µ (r − λ− 1) · (λ+ (r − µ))
µ λ · µ+ (r − µ) · µ (r − λ− 1)µ+ (r − µ)2
 . (3.14)
Each row of M sum up to 1.
We now determine the initial distribution of the states.
1. The initial probability of being in state S1: Need to find the probability of ran-
domly picking a pair of vertices x0, y0 such that x0 = y0.
Pick a vertex x0 ∈ V at random. There is one way of picking y0 ∈ V such that
x0 = y0. Then,
Pr(x0 = y0) =
1
m
. (3.15)
2. The initial probability of being in state S2: Need to find the probability of ran-
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domly picking a pair of vertices x0, y0 such that x0 6= y0 and x0, y0 are adjacent.
Pick a vertex x0 ∈ V at random. There are r vertices y0 ∈ N(x0) with x0 6= y0,
therefore there are r choices of y0 ∈ V such that x0 6= y0 and x0, y0 are adjacent.
Then,
Pr(x0 6= y0 and adjacent) = r
m
. (3.16)
3. The initial probability of being in state S3: Need to find the probability of ran-
domly picking a pair of vertices x0, y0 such that x0 6= y0 and x0, y0 are non-
adjacent.
Pick a vertex x0 ∈ V at random. Of the m vertices in V there are m − r − 1
vertices y0 such that y0 /∈ N(x0) and x0 6= y0. Then,
Pr(x0 6= y0 and non-adjacent) = m− r − 1
m
. (3.17)
Let pi0 denote the 1× 3 matrix where the jth entry is the initial probability that a
pair of vertices x0, y0 is in state Sj , j = 1, 2, 3. That is:
pi0 =
(
1
m
r
m
m−r−1
m
)
. (3.18)
The probability that xi, yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ v− 1, are in state Sj , j = 1, 2, 3, is given by the
jth entry of the matrix pi0 ·M i. In particular, the probability that the pair of random
walks X,Y will visit the same vertex at time slot i, Pr(xi = yi), 1 ≤ i ≤ v− 1, is given
by the first entry of the matrix pi0 ·M i.
Lemma 3.2.9. Let G be an (m, r, λ, µ)-strongly regular graph. The transition and the
initial probabilities matrices of G satisfy pi0 ·M i = pi0
Proof. The parameters of G satisfy [15]:
(m− r − 1)µ = r(r − λ− 1). (3.19)
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Consider M and pi0 given in (3.14) and (3.18) respectively. Then we compute pi0 ·M .
The 1st entry of pi0 ·M is:
1
m
· r
r2
+
r
m
· λ
r2
+
m− r − 1
m
· µ
r2
=
1
m
·
(
r
r2
+
rλ
r2
+
r(r − λ− 1)
r2
)
=
1
m
·
(
r + rλ+ r2 − rλ− r
r2
)
=
1
m
. (3.20)
The 2nd entry of pi0 ·M is:
1
m
· rλ
r2
+
r
m
· (r + λ
2 + (r − λ− 1)µ)
r2
+
m− r − 1
m
· λµ+ (r − µ)µ
r2
r
m
(
λ
r2
+
r + λ2 + (r − λ− 1)µ
r2
+
λ(r − λ− 1) + (r − µ)(r − λ− 1)
r2
)
=
r
m
. (3.21)
Finally, the 3rd entry of pi0 ·M is:
1
m
· r(r − λ− 1)
r2
+
r
m
·
(
(r − λ− 1)(r + λ− µ)
r2
)
+
m− r − 1
m
·
(
(r − λ− 1)µ+ (r − µ)2
r2
)
=
1
m
· (m− r − 1)µ
r2
+
1
m
·
(
(m− r − 1)µ(r + λ− µ)
r2
)
+
m− r − 1
m
·
(
(r − λ− 1)µ+ (r − µ)2
r2
)
=
m− r − 1
m
·
(
µ
r2
+
µ(r + λ− µ)
r2
+
(r − λ− 1)µ+ (r − µ)2
r2
)
=
m− r − 1
m
. (3.22)
Therefore pi0 ·M = pi0. By the associative property of matrices we have pi0 ·M i =
pi0.
Lemma 3.2.10. Let G be an (m, r, λ, µ)-strongly regular graph. The probability Pr(xi =
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yi) that a pair of random walks X,Y will visit the same vertex at time slot i is:
Pr(xi = yi) =
1
m
, 0 ≤ i ≤ v − 1. (3.23)
Let pi = Pr(xi = yi) and H be the number of collisions between a pair of random
FH sequences X and Y . The probability of the event H = h is:
Pr(H = h) =
(
v
h
)
phi (1− pi)v−h (3.24)
The expected number of collisions between any two random sequences is given by:
E(H) =
v∑
h=0
h · Pr(H = h), (3.25)
where Pr[H = h] is provided by Equation (3.24).
Example 3.2.11. Consider a (9, 4, 1, 2)-strongly-regular graph G = (V,E) [25]. Con-
sider the set S of all random walks of length 10 on G, a (10, 9 × 49, 9)-FHS. For any
two random FH sequences X,Y , on G we have the following.
The initial probabilities matrix pi0 is:
pi0 =
(
1/9 4/9 4/9
)
.
The probability Pr(xi = yi), that a pair of random walks X,Y will visit the same vertex
at time slot i is:
Pr(xi = yi) =
1
9
. (3.26)
Using Equation (3.25), the expected number of collisions between any pair of random
walks on G is E(H) = 1.111.
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Hamming group correlation
Let S be a (v,m× rv−1,m)-FHS. We estimate the Hamming group correlation as,
G(X,U) ≤ wE,
where U ⊆ S, |U| = w, X ∈ S \U and E is the expected Hamming correlation provided
in Equation (3.25). So the w-throughput of X is,
ρw(X,U) ≥ 1− wE
v
.
An estimation of the worst-case w-throughput of S can be obtained in a similar
manner,
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
X∈V
{ρw(X,V \ {X})}
}
= 1− wE
v
,
where X ∈ V, V = U ∪ {X} and ρw(X,V \ {X}) = 1− G(X,V\{X})v .
3.2.4 Jamming resistance
Recall the (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer introduced in Section 2.5. The jammer eavesdrops
on θ1m channels 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, and jams on θ2m channels 0 ≤ θ2 < 1. It changes its
channel jamming strategy according to information it can acquire from eavesdropping.
We now analyse how a jammer’s behaviour changes with respect to information of
the channel it was eavesdropping on a particular time slot. We consider the follow-
ing: eavesdropping on an active or inactive channel consecutively, and when a jammer
switches from eavesdropping on an active to an inactive channel. We consider the
situation where there is only one active FH sequence in use. We will provide details
of the case of more than one active FH sequence, for an FH scheme in Chapter 6,
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in the future work section. Now, introducing a (1/m, 1/m)-adaptive jammer in our
(v,m × rv−1,m)-FHS, S = {Xi : 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1}, Xi a random walk on a graph, we
have the following:
J1 A jammer that eavesdrops on an active channel consecutively: At any time slot t
that a jammer has eavesdropped on an active channel, this jammer removes all
but the FH sequence containing the active channel at that particular time slot.
Let |S∗t | denote the size of the search space of a jammer at time slot t. With
respect to the (v,m× rv−1,m)-FHS properties described in Section 3.2.2, at time
slot t = 0 the jammer has mrv−1 = |S| = |S∗0 | FH sequences in its search space.
At any time slot t 6= 0, the jammer has rv−t. Therefore, on the last time slot
t = v − 1 there are r FH sequences in a jammer’s. So, the jammer does not
identify the active FH sequence.
J2 A jammer that eavesdrops on an inactive channel consecutively: At t = 0 we have
|S∗0 | = m · rv−1, all the FH sequences in the FH scheme. Suppose at t = 0
this jammer eavesdropped on channel f0. Recall each channel appears r
v−1 at
each time slot in the FH scheme. So, discarding all inactive FH sequences with
xj0 = f0, 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 the jammer has |S∗1 | = (m − 1) · rv−1. Now suppose it
eavesdrops on an inactive channel f1 at time slot t = 1. If f1 /∈ N (f0) then f1
appears on rv−1 FH sequences in S∗1 . Otherwise, if f1 ∈ N (f0) then f1 appears
on rv−1 − rv−2 FH sequences in S∗1 . So, at any time slot t 6= 0, the jammer has
|S∗| ≤ mrv−1 −∑ti=1 rv−i. For m ≥ 2, r ≥ 2 then mrv−1 −∑ti=1 rv−i 6= 1 at
any time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v − 1 and thus a jammer can not identify the active FH
sequence.
J3 Mixed fate jammer: From the discussions on J1 and J2 a jammer that eavesdrops
on an active channel consecutively reduces the search space at least as quickly as
when it eavesdrops on an inactive channel consecutively. Further, neither of these
jamming strategies enables a jammer to identify the active FH sequence. Now,
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suppose we have a change of fate from eavesdropping an active FH sequence to
that which is inactive. Then we still have rv−t ≤ |S∗| ≤ mrv−1 −∑ti=1 rv−i at
any time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v − 1. That is a change of fate will not make a jammer
have a single FH sequence in |S∗|: the active FH sequence is not identified.
We conclude with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2.12. Consider the set of all random walks as a (v,m× rv−1,m)-FHS
with one active FH sequence. Let m ≥ 2, r ≥ 2. At any time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v − 1
the jammer’s search space S∗ has the following number of FH sequences rv−t ≤ |S∗| ≤
mrv−1 −∑ti=1 rv−i and does not identify the active FH sequence.
3.3 Difference packing
In this section we consider the construction by Fuji-Hara et al. [35, Section 4]. It is a
combinatorial construction based on difference packing and cyclic resolvable balanced
incomplete block designs. We point out that the authors provide several combinatorial
constructions of FH sequences and we only consider one of them in this section. Ng
and Paterson [70] showed that another construction [35, Section 3], based on projec-
tive geometry, provide the Lempel-Greenberger algebraic m-sequence transformation
sequences. The Lempel-Greenberger sequences will be considered in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce difference packing, a combinatorial object that will be used to obtain
an FH sequence.
Definition 3.3.1. A collection P = {B0, B1, . . . , Bm−1} of subsets of Zv form a dif-
ference packing over Zv, denoted m-DP(v,K, λ), where K = {|Bi| : 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1},
if |{b − b′ (mod v) : b 6= b′, (b, b′) ∈ Bi × Bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1}| ≤ λ. It is denoted as
m-DP(v, κ, λ) when |Bi| = κ for all i = 0, . . . ,m− 1.
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A collection P is called a difference family when among the differences {b−b′ (mod v) :
b, b′ ∈ Bi, b 6= b′, i = 0, . . . ,m− 1} each nonzero g ∈ Zv occurs exactly λ times and it is
denoted (v,K, λ)-difference family, where K is as previously defined in Definition 3.3.1.
Definition 3.3.2. A difference packing over Zv that partitions Zv is called a partition
type difference packing.
Let X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) be an FH sequence over F , |F| = m. Define m disjoint
sets B0, B1, . . . , Bm−1 using X, where each Bi is the support of i, i ∈ F , corresponding
to
Bi = suppX(i) = {t : xt = i, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1}. (3.27)
That is, each Bi specifies the position on which the frequency channel i appears in the
FH sequence X.
Next, we define the rotational closure of an FH scheme.
Let βiX denote the cyclic shift of an FH sequence X to the right by i places:
βiX = (xv−i, xv−i+1, . . . , xv−1x0, x1, . . . xv−i−2, xv−i−1). (3.28)
We have βiX = βi(xt) = (xt+i) and β
i′(βiX) = βi
′+iX, i, i′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v − 1}, where
the operations of both the exponents and indices are conducted modulo v.
Definition 3.3.3. Let X = (xt)
v−1
t=0 be an FH sequence over F , |F| = m. Then X
form a (v, 1,m)-FHS, S. The rotational closure of S is the set:
⇔
S= {βiX : 0 ≤ i ≤ v − 1},
where βiX is as defined by Equation (3.28).
When we consider the rotational closure of a (v, 1,m)-FHS, S from Definition 3.3.3
as an FH scheme then we call
⇔
S a rotational closure (v, v,m)-FHS.
Fuji-Hara [35], Theorem 2.3, provide a correspondence between FH sequences and
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partition type difference packing. The authors provide several combinatorial construc-
tions of partition type difference packings and thus construct FH schemes.
Theorem 3.3.4 (Theorem 2.3, [35]). There exists an FH sequence of length v over a
frequency library of size m with maximum Hamming auto-correlation λ if and only if
there exists a partition type m-DP(v,K, λ), P = {B0, . . . , Bm−1}, over Zv, where Bi,
0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, is the support of frequency channel i, K = {|Bi| : 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1}.
To discuss the construction of a partition type m-DP(v,K, λ) we first need to intro-
duce block designs. We provide an introduction here to block designs and the relevant
preliminaries which will be needed for the construction considered in this section. For
references on block designs see [7, 12, 25, 97].
Definition 3.3.5. A design is a pair (X , B) such that the following properties are
satisfied:
1. X is a finite set of elements called points, and
2. B is a collection of nonempty subsets of X called blocks.
We are interested in balanced incomplete block designs.
Definition 3.3.6. Let v, κ, and λ be positive integers such that v > κ ≥ 2. A 2-
(v, κ, λ)-balanced incomplete block design, denoted 2-(v, κ, λ)-BIBD, is a design
(X ,B) such that the following properties are satisfied:
1. |X | = v,
2. each block contain exactly κ points, and
3. every pair of distinct points is contained in exactly λ blocks.
A 2-(v, κ, λ)-BIBD with λ = 1 is called a Steiner design. For simplicity we will
denote a 2-(v, κ, λ)-BIBD as (v, κ, λ)-BIBD. We define an automorphism on a (v, κ, λ)-
BIBD as follows.
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Definition 3.3.7. Suppose (X ,B) is a design. If there exists a bijection τ : X → X
such that if we apply τ to the elements of any block of B we obtain a block of B again
then the bijection τ is called an automorphism. The automorphism τ is a permutation
of X and B the multiset of blocks can be written as:
B = {{τ(x) : x ∈ B} : B ∈ B} ,
where {τ(x) : x ∈ B} denote a block in B.
The mapping τ(x) = x, x ∈ B, B ∈ B is a trivial automorphism.
In the construction considered in this section we will use a cyclic BIBD.
Definition 3.3.8. A (v, κ, λ)-BIBD design with an automorphism τ of order v is called
a cyclic (v, κ, λ)-BIBD.
The set of points of a cyclic (v, κ, λ)-BIBD can be identified with Zv. In this case
the BIBD has an automorphism τ : i → i + 1 (mod v). The orbit containing a block
B ∈ B is the set of the distinct blocks:
τ i(B) = B + i = {b1 + i, . . . , bκ + i} (mod v),
for i ∈ Zv. We sometimes denote an orbit containing a block B as Orb(B). The
development of a block B is the orbit containing the block. The length of an orbit
is its cardinality. A base block is a block chosen arbitrarily from an orbit. An orbit
containing a block of the form:
v
κ
Zκ =
{
0,
v
κ
, . . . , (κ− 1)v
κ
}
, (3.29)
is called a regular short orbit. A base block of Equation (3.29) generate vκ blocks that
are pairwise disjoint.
Consider a BIBD (X ,B). We now define partitions of the blocks called resolution
classes where each resolution class contains v distinct points: it forms a set of points X .
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This gets us closer to the correspondence between BIBD and partition type difference
packings.
Definition 3.3.9. A (v, κ, λ)-BIBD, (V,B), is resolvable if the blocks can be arranged
into r classes R0, . . . , Rr−1 such that the br =
v
κ blocks ( where b = |B|) of each class are
disjoint and every point of point set V is contained in exactly one block in each class.
The classes Ri are called resolution classes. The set of resolution classes, R =
{R0, . . . , Rr−1}, is called a resolution.
Definition 3.3.10. Suppose we have a cyclic resolvable BIBD, (V,B), with resolution
R = {R0, . . . , Rr−1}. Consider a resolution class Ri ∈ R and let Ri + 1 = {B +
1 (mod V )|B ∈ Ri}. If R + 1 = {R0 + 1, . . . , Rr−1 + 1} = R then the design is called
a cyclically resolvable BIBD, denoted CRB-(v, κ, λ).
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a CRB-(v, κ, 1) is that
v ≡ 1, κ (mod κ(κ− 1)), [61]. A CRB-(v, κ, 1) with v ≡ 1 (mod κ(κ− 1)) has no short
orbit while a CRB-(v, κ, 1) with v ≡ κ (mod κ(κ− 1)) has a single regular short orbit.
It is known [61] that a CRB-(v, κ, 1) with v ≡ κ (mod κ(κ− 1)) consists of v−κκ(κ−1) full
orbits and a single regular short orbit.
Example 3.3.11. The following is a CRB-(21, 3, 1):
R0 : {1, 4, 16} {8, 11, 2} {15, 18, 9} {19, 20, 3} {5, 6, 10} {12, 13, 17} {0, 7, 14}
R1 : {2, 5, 17} {9, 12, 3} {16, 19, 10} {20, 0, 4} {6, 7, 11} {13, 14, 18} {1, 8, 15}
R2 : {3, 6, 18} {10, 13, 4} {17, 20, 11} {0, 1, 5} {7, 8, 12} {14, 15, 19} {2, 9, 16}
R3 : {4, 7, 19} {11, 14, 5} {18, 0, 12} {1, 2, 6} {8, 9, 13} {15, 16, 20} {3, 10, 17}
R4 : {5, 8, 20} {12, 15, 6} {19, 1, 13} {2, 3, 7} {9, 10, 14} {16, 17, 0} {4, 11, 18}
R5 : {6, 9, 0} {13, 16, 7} {20, 2, 14} {3, 4, 8} {10, 11, 15} {17, 18, 1} {5, 12, 19}
R6 : {7, 10, 1} {14, 17, 8} {0, 3, 15} {4, 5, 9} {11, 12, 16} {18, 19, 2} {6, 13, 20}
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R7 : {1, 11, 9} {4, 14, 12} {7, 17, 15} {10, 20, 18} {13, 2, 0} {16, 5, 3} {19, 8, 6}
R8 : {2, 12, 10} {5, 15, 13} {8, 18, 16} {11, 0, 19} {14, 3, 1} {17, 6, 4} {20, 9, 7}
R9 : {3, 13, 11} {6, 16, 14} {9, 19, 17} {12, 1, 20} {15, 4, 2} {18, 7, 5} {0, 10, 8}
There are 10 resolution classes. Each box represent an orbit. So there are three full
orbits and one regular short orbit.
3.3.2 Construction of FH sequences using a difference packing
In this section we consider the construction of FH sequences proposed by Fuji-Hara
et al. [35] which use a CRB-(κm, κ, 1). We refer to Mishima and Jimbo [67] for the
specific type of CRB-(κm, κ, 1), simply referred to as type (T2) in the discussion of
this section. The classification of the CRB-(κm, κ, 1) made by Mishimo and Jimbo is
according to the relationship between the regular short orbit and the resolution classes
of the CRB-(κm, κ, 1). In particular, a type (T2) CRB-(κm, κ, 1) has a special property
that every block in a regular short orbit belongs to a distinct resolution class.
Example 3.3.12. The CRB-(21, 3, 1) of Example 3.3.11 is of type (T2).
Construction 3.3.13 (Construction 4.1, [35]). If there exists a CRB-(κm, κ, 1) of
type (T2), then there exists a rotational closure (κm, κm,m)-FHS with maximum out-
of-phase Hamming auto-correlation κ (see Definition 2.2.4), optimal in the Lempel-
Greenberger bound, derived from a partition type m-DP(κm, κ, κ) over Zκm.
Proof. A CRB-(v, κ, 1) consists of v−kk(k−1) full orbits and a single regular short orbit.
Suppose we have a CRB-(v, κ, 1) of type (T2). We know that a CRB-(v, κ, 1) of this
type has the property that each block in the regular short block orbit is in a distinct
resolution class. There are m such resolution classes. The blocks of these m resolution
classes make up (m − 1)/κ full orbits and a single regular short orbit. Each of these
resolution classes with a block from a regular short orbit contain κ blocks from each of
the full orbits and a single block from the regular short orbit.
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Let B be a base block for an orbit Orb(B). Then the set of differences {b −
b′ (mod v) : b, b′ ∈ Bi} is the same for all Bi ∈ Orb(B). So, if each resolution class with
a block from a regular short orbit contain κ blocks from each of the full orbits and a
single block from the regular short orbit then each b − b′ ∈ Zv \ {0}, where b, b′ ∈ Bi
appears at most κ times in B0, . . . , Bv/κ. In particular some d = b − b′ ∈ Zv \ {0}
appears either exactly κ times from the κ blocks in a full orbit or appears once from
the block in the regular short orbit.
So, an arbitrary resolution class in a CRB-(κm, κ, 1) with a block from the regular
short orbit can be viewed as a partition type m-DP(κm, κ, κ). By Theorem 3.3.4 an
optimal rotational closure (κm, κm,m)-FHS can be derived from a partition type m-
DP(κm, κ, κ).
Example 3.3.14. Consider the CRB-(21, 3, 1) of Example 3.3.11. Any of the reso-
lution classes R0, R1, . . . , R6 can be taken as a partition type 7-DP(21, 3, 3) and thus
obtain a rotational closure (21, 21, 7)-FHS with maximum Hamming autocorrelation of
3.
Consider R0 as a 7-DP(21, 3, 3) over Z21. Then we have the following FH sequence
over Z7:
(7, 1, 2, 4, 1, 5, 5, 7, 2, 3, 5, 2, 6, 6, 7, 3, 1, 6, 3, 4, 4).
3.3.3 Correlation
Construction 3.3.13 provides an FH sequence of length κm over F , |F| = m, whose
maximum out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation is κ. As was done in the previous
Construction 3.2.6 using random walks on a graph, we can estimate the Hamming
group correlation of a rotational closure (κm, κm,m)-FHS constructed using a CRB-
(κm, κ, 1) as:
G(X,U) ≤ wκ,
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where U ⊆ S, |U| = w and X ∈ S \ U . The w-throughput of an FH sequence X is:
ρw(X,U) = 1− G(X,U)
κm
≥ 1− wκ
κm
= 1− w
m
.
Likewise the worst-case w-throughput of the scheme is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
X∈V
{ρw(X,V \ {X})}
}
= 1− w
m
.
3.3.4 Jamming resistance
In this section we consider the presence of a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer in a (κm, κm,m)-
FHS. We analyse the FH scheme’s resistance to a jammer with respect to the jammer’s
activity at a time slot: a jammer that listens on an active FH channel at each time
slot consecutively, listens on an inactive channel continuously and finally conclude
with what happens when the jammer switches from listening on an active channel to
listening on an inactive channel, and vice versa, between two consecutive time slots. We
consider the situation where there is only one active FH sequence in use. We determine
how long it takes a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer to identify the active FH sequence in the
(κm, κm,m)-FHS.
 Lucky jammer at every time slot consecutively: Recall a CRB-(κm, κ, 1) of type
(T2) has the following property. A resolution class contains κ blocks from a
full orbit and a single block from a regular short orbit. Suppose that at time 0
a jammer listens on an active channel i, whose corresponding block of position
indices Bi belongs to the regular short orbit. At the first time slot 0, an active
channel i will be on κ FH sequences (the size of the blocks Bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, is
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κ it means each channel i ∈ F appear κ times on the constructed FH sequence
and the FH scheme take all cyclic shifts of it). Then at time 1 all the frequency
channels appearing on the κ FH sequences with channel i from the previous time
slot are distinct. Next, suppose that at time 0 a jammer listens on an active
channel i whose block Bi belong to a full orbit. Further, suppose the resolution
class contain the blocks Bi + t, Bi + (t + 1), . . . , Bi + (t + κ − 1). Then for κ
time slots the jammer will be eavesdropping on an active channel appearing on
κ FH sequences. Therefore it needs κ + 1 time slots to identify the active FH
sequence. In conclusion, the worst case scenario for our FH scheme is that this
type of jammer only needs to listen on two time slots to identify the active FH
sequence.
 Unlucky jammer consecutively at each time slot. At any time slot t this jammer
will have |S∗t | = κm−κt, 1 ≤ t ≤ m− 1, FH sequences in its search space. So, to
force the jammer to be as fast as the jammer that listens on an active channels
consecutively at each time slot, we should have κm− κt active FH sequences for
2 ≤ t ≤ m− 1.
 Mixed fate jammer: If we have only one active FH sequence and such that 1 ≤
κm − κt, 2 ≤ t ≤ m − 1, then a mixed fate jammer will take at least two time
slots to identify the active FH sequence. A mixed fate jammer was defined in
terms of a jammer’s luck changing from eavesdropping on an active channel to
that which is inactive or vice versa.
3.4 Linear recurring sequences
In this section we consider an algebraic construction of an FH scheme provided by
Lempel and Greenberger [55]. In this construction, a transformation of a maximum
length sequence (m-sequence) provide optimal FH sequences in the Lempel-Greenberger
bound (2.6). As described in Section 1.2.1 this bound and the analysis of the perfor-
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mance of the FH sequences constructed by Lempel and Greenberger is based on Ham-
ming correlation. We explore the performance of this FH scheme in terms of group-wise
mutual interference. Further, we consider the effect of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer in
the FH scheme.
3.4.1 Construction of m-sequences
We start by describing linear feedback shift registers, which are the building blocks of
m-sequences. A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a device whose output value
depends on a preceding input called the state. An LFSR can be used to generate a
sequence satisfying a linear recurrence relation.
Definition 3.4.1. Let p be a prime power. A sequence (xt) of length p
n − 1, defined
over GF (p) satisfying the n-order linear recurring condition,
xt+n = c0xt + c1xt+1 + · · ·+ cn−1xt+n−1, ci ∈ GF (p), cn−1 6= 0,
is called a maximum length sequence denoted m-sequence.
To generate an m-sequence of order n over a finite field GF (p) using a linear re-
curring sequence we need an initial state B0 = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1) 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0), where
bi ∈ GF (p), 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Note that if B0 = (b0, b1, . . . , bn−1) = (0, 0, . . . , 0) then we
get an all zero sequence since each output is a linear function of the previous state. An
m-sequence has a maximum length of pn− 1 with every n-state appearing once except
the all zero n-state.
A formal construction of an m-sequence is as follows. Let p be a prime number.
Let GF (p) be a finite field of p elements. An m-sequence of degree n and period
v = pn − 1 is provided by:
B = {bj}, (3.30)
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where 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and bj satisfies the linear recurrence relation:
n∑
i=0
fibi+j = 0,
where the coefficients are taken from the primitive polynomial over GF (p):
f(z) =
n∑
i=0
fiz
i.
Figure 3.3 depicts a feedback shift register (it is linear if the feedback function f is
linear):
bj+n−1 bj+n−2 . . . bj+1 bj
f(bj , bj+1, . . . , bj+n−2, bj+n−1)
Figure 3.3: A feedback shift register.
Example 3.4.2. Consider f(z) = 1 + 2z2 + z3, a primitive polynomial over F3. Then
the linear recurrence of this primitive polynomial is:
bj + 2bj+2 + bj+3 = 0. (3.31)
Expressing bj+3 in Equation (3.31) in terms of preceding terms:
bj+3 = bj+2 + 2bj .
Let the string 100 be an initial state, that is b2 = 1, b1 = 0, b0 = 0. The m-sequence
over F3 of degree 3 and period 26 is shown in Table 3.1:
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Time step, j State, (bj+2, bj+1, bj) bj
0 100 0
1 110 0
2 111 1
3 011 1
4 201 1
5 120 0
6 112 2
7 211 1
8 121 1
9 012 2
10 101 1
11 010 0
12 001 1
13 200 0
14 220 0
15 222 2
16 022 2
17 102 2
18 210 0
19 221 1
20 122 2
21 212 2
22 021 1
23 202 2
24 020 0
25 002 2
Table 3.1: Generating m-sequence of degree 3, period 26.
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The m-sequence generated in Table 3.1 is:
X = (00111021121010022201221202). (3.32)
Example 3.4.3. Consider f(z) = z2 + 2z + 3, a primitive polynomial over F5. An
m-sequence over F5 of degree 2 and length 24 with primitive polynomial f(z) is:
X = (013144134322042411021233). (3.33)
3.4.2 Frequency hopping sequence: transform of an m-sequence
We now consider a construction of FH sequences using m-sequences.
Construction 3.4.4. Let p be a prime number, n and v positive integers. Let X =
(x0, . . . , xv−1) be an m-sequence of degree n and length v = pn − 1 over a prime field
Zp. Let i be a positive integer such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Zpi = {0, 1, . . . , pi − 1} and let
Zip be the set of all words of length i over Zp. Let X(t, i) denote the i-tuple of successive
elements in X starting from xt, that is X(t, i) = xt, xt+1, . . . , xt+i−1. Define a sequence
Y = (yt) of length v = p
n − 1 over Zpi as the σi-transform of an m-sequence X:
yt = X(t, i)σi =
i−1∑
k=0
xt+kp
k, (3.34)
where 0 ≤ t < v.
The σi-transform Y of an m-sequence X will be denoted by Y = Xσi.
Example 3.4.5. Consider the ternary m-sequence X of Equation (3.32). The σi-
transform, i = 2, 3, of X over Z32 and Z33 respectively are:
Y1 = Xσ2 = (0, 3, 4, 4, 1, 6, 5, 4, 7, 5, 1, 3, 1, 0, 6, 8, 8, 2, 3, 7, 8, 5, 7, 2, 6, 2), (3.35)
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Y2 = Xσ3 = (9, 12, 13, 4, 19, 15, 14, 22, 16, 5, 10, 3, 1, 18, 24, 26, 8, 11, 21, 25, 17, 23, 7, 20, 6, 2).
(3.36)
Construction 3.4.6. Let Y be a σi-transform, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of an m-sequence of length
v = pn − 1. Then:
S =⇔Y , (3.37)
is a rotational closure (pn − 1, pn − 1,m)-FHS, where:
m =
 p
i if i < n,
pi − 1 otherwise.
Example 3.4.7. Consider X to be the m-sequence of Equation (3.32). Given Y = Xσ2
of Equation (3.35), then
⇔
Y is a rotational closure (26, 26, 9)-FHS.
3.4.3 Correlation
Let X be an m-sequence of length v = pn − 1 over an alphabet of size p. For i ≥ n,
all the σi transforms of X provide sequences with distinct elements. So, cyclic shifts
of the σi transform sequence for i ≥ n provide an FH scheme which is equivalent to a
Latin square. A Latin square over an alphabet of size v is a square array such that each
symbol occurs exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. In Section 3.8
we consider a construction of FH sequences which uses Latin squares and they trivially
satisfy the optimality criterion in terms of both Hamming correlation and Hamming
group correlation. Henceforth, we consider i ≤ n.
The multiplicity µX(x) of the i-tuple x = X(t, i) in X is defined as:
µX(x) = |{t : x = X(t, i) in X, 0 ≤ t < v}|.
That is µX(x) denotes the number of distinct positions t, for 0 ≤ t < v, where the
i-tuple x = X(t, i) appears in X.
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Lemma 3.4.8. (Lemple and Greenberger, Lemma 1, [55]). Consider an FH sequence
Y defined over Zpi, the σi transform of an m-sequence X, of length v = pn − 1, where
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then each frequency fj ∈ Zpi appears the following number of times on Y :
µY (fj) =
 p
n−i − 1 if fj = 0,
pn−i if fj 6= 0.
(3.38)
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that an m-sequence X has pn−i distinct n-tuples
x′ = x′0, x′1, . . . , x′n−1 with x = x′0, x′1, . . . , x′i−1 and that the all-zero n-tuple does not
exist on X.
Lemma 3.4.9. (Lempel and Greenberger, Lemma 3, [55]). Let Y be an FH sequence
as defined in Construction 3.4.4. Then the Hamming correlation is:
HY Y (t) =
 v if t = 0,pn−i − 1 if t 6= 0. (3.39)
Lemma 3.4.10. Let X = (xt) be an m-sequence of length v = p
n − 1 over Zp, and let
Y = (yt) be the σi-transform of X, for some i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. Let S =
⇔
Y be a
rotational closure (pn − 1, pn − 1, pi)-FHS. For Yj , Yj′ ∈ S, Yj 6= Yj′, we have:
G(Yj , {Yj′}) = pn−i − 1.
Proof. Consider any two sequences Yj , Yj′ ∈ S, j 6= j′. Then the number of places in
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which Yj and Yj′ are the same is provided by:
G(Yj , {Yj′}) = HYj ,Yj′ (0)
=
v−1∑
k=0
h[yk+j , yk+j′ ]
=
v−1∑
k=0
h[yk, yk+j′−j ]
= HY Y (j
′ − j)
= pn−i − 1,
since j 6= j′ and from Equation (3.39), HY Y (t) = pn−i − 1 if t 6= 0. Therefore
G(Yj , {Yj′}) = pn−i − 1.
Theorem 3.4.11. Suppose S =⇔Y is a rotational closure (pn−1, pn−1, pi)-FHS, where
Yj is a σi-transform of an m-sequence of length v = p
n − 1, 1 ≤ i < n. The worst-case
w-throughput of S is at least
1− w(p
n−i − 1)
pn − 1 .
If ρˆw(S) ≥ 0 then
w ≤ p
n − 1
(pn−i − 1) .
Proof. Suppose U ⊆ S, |U| = w and Yj ∈ S \ U . Then for any Yj′ ∈ U ,
G(Yj , {Yj′}) = pn−i − 1.
Then
G(Yj ,U) ≤ w(pn−i − 1).
The w-throughput of an FH sequence Yj in V, V = U ∪ {Yj} is:
ρw(Yj ,V \ {Yj}) = 1− G(Yj ,V \ {Yj})
v
≥ 1− w(p
n−i − 1)
pn − 1 .
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Then the worst-case w-throughput of S is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
Yj∈V
{ρw(Yj ,V \ {Yj})}
}
,
= 1− w(p
n−i − 1)
pn − 1 .
It must be the case that w ≤ pn−1
pn−i−1 , so that ρˆw(S) ≥ 0.
3.4.4 Jamming resistance
In this section we look at how long it takes a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer to identify an
active FH sequence in an m-sequence transformation FH scheme of Construction 3.4.6.
We divide the discussion of the jamming resistance of the FH scheme into three
parts. In Proposition 3.4.12 we consider a jammer that is lucky (listens on an active
frequency channel) at each and every time slot consecutively. In Proposition 3.4.13
we consider a jammer that is unlucky (listens on an inactive frequency channel) at
every time slot successively. Finally we conclude on the jamming resistance of the FH
scheme in Theorem 3.4.14. We consider the situation where there is only one active
FH sequence in use.
Proposition 3.4.12. Consider the Lempel-Greenberger FH scheme in Construction 3.4.6.
A jammer that is lucky at each and every time slot takes n− i+ 1 time slots to identify
the active sequence.
Proof. Let X be an m-sequence as previously defined. Without loss of generality we
will consider non-zero i-tuples on m-sequence X.
Consider bj = (bj0 , bj1 , . . . , bji−1), an i-tuple on X. Such an i-tuple appears p
n−i
number of times on X if bj is not the zero i-tuple.
Suppose at t = 0 a jammer eavesdrops on an active channel x0 = fj , fj ∈ F , which
is mapped under σi from bj . From the relationship between X and Y , we know that at
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t = 1 a jammer has pn−i sequences in its search space, those with channel fj at t = 0.
The sequences discarded at this stage are inactive FH sequences.
Let bj+1 be the i-tuple succeeding bj on X, that is bj+1 = (bj1 , . . . , bji−1 , bji). There
are pn−i−1 distinct i-tuples bj+1 with bj as the preceding i-tuple. Then a jammer has
pn−i−1 sequences in its search space at time slot t = 2 with an active channel that
corresponds to bj+1 under σi. If we continue in this manner, at t = n− i the jammer
that is lucky at each of the n − i preceding time slots will have FH sequences with
distinct channels mapped from distinct i-tuples bj+n−i = (bn−i, . . . , bn−1).
Therefore a jammer that is lucky at each and every time slot can identify the active
FH sequence in n− i+ 1 time slots.
Proposition 3.4.13. If w+1 ≤ pn−1−∑n−ij=0(p−1)jpn−i−j, a jammer that is unlucky
at each and every time slot takes at least n− i+ 1 time slots to identify the one active
FH sequence.
Proof. An unlucky jammer as previously described discards only sequences Xj with
inactive frequency channels xt at each time slot t. So,
at t = 0, |S∗0 | = pn − 1,
at t = 1, |S∗1 | = pn − 1− pn−i,
at t = 2, |S∗2 | = pn − 1− pn−i − (p− 1)pn−i−1,
at t = 3, |S∗3 | = pn − 1− pn−i − (p− 1)pn−i−1 − (p− 1)2pn−i−2.
If we continue in this manner such that a jammer has been unlucky at each of the
preceding κ time slots successively, κ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v − 1} then at t = κ, |S∗κ| = pn − 1−∑κ−1
j=0 (p− 1)jpn−i−j .
If we consider one active FH sequence, then taking 1 ≤ pn−1−∑n−ij=0(p−1)jpn−i−j
forces a jammer that is unlucky at each of the n− i preceding time slots to take at least
n− i+ 1 time slots, as long as the all lucky jammer (discussed in Proposition 3.4.12),
to identify an active FH sequence.
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As discussed by Nyirenda, Ng and Martin [74], a mixed fate jammer will be as fast
as either a jammer that is lucky or one which is unlucky at each and every time slot.
A change in fate does not speed up things up for the (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer as it is
forced to behave as an all lucky jammer; that is it can only start jamming if and only
if there is one FH sequence in its search space.
We conclude the discussion of Propositions 3.4.12 and 3.4.13 with Theorem 3.4.14.
Theorem 3.4.14. Consider Y , the σi transform of an m-sequence X of length v =
pn − 1, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Consider S =⇔Y to be a rotational closure (pn − 1, pn − 1, pi)-
FHS. If we have one active FH sequence and 1 ≤ pn− 1−∑n−ij=0(m− 1)jpn−i−j, then a
( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer will identify an active sequence in at least n− i+ 1 time slots.
Example 3.4.15 illustrate Theorem 3.4.14.
Example 3.4.15. Let X be a ternary m-sequence of Equation (3.32). Let Y be the
σ2-transform of X and S =
⇔
Y be a rotational closure (26, 26, 9)-FHS made up of Y and
all its cyclic shifts. If we have one active FH sequence and since 1 < 26− 3 = 23, then
γv ≥ 2.
Consider a lucky jammer that eavesdrops on an active channel at each time slot
consecutively. Suppose the jammer picks any symbol f on Y , which occurs 3 times
(2 times if f = 0). However, the symbol that comes after f is always distinct. That
is, if f occurs at time t1, t2, t3, the symbols at time t1 + 1, t2 + 1, t3 + 1 are always
distinct. That means we can tell exactly where we are in a shift, that is we can tell
which shifted sequence is being used if we can find two consecutive slots with active
frequency channels.
Now we go further to determine the probability of identifying an active FH sequence
in at least two time slots.
The probability that a jammer’s first guess is active is:
Pr[ first guess is active ] = 1/26.
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Next, the probability that the ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer’s frequency channel guess on the
second time slot is active given that it guessed correctly at the first time slot is:
Pr[ second guess is active | first guess is active ] =
 1/3 if f 6= 0 at t0,1/2 if f = 0 at t0.
Then the probability of identifying an active FH sequence in two time slots is:
Pr[ determining active sequence in 2 time slots ]
= Pr[ first guess is active ] ∗ Pr[ second guess is active ]
=
 1/26 ∗ 1/3 if f 6= 0 at t0,1/26 ∗ 1/2 if f = 0 at t0.
That is Pr[ determining active sequence in 2 time slots ] ≥ 1/26 ∗ 1/3.
Therefore if we have one active FH sequence then γv ≥ 2 for a (1/m, 1/m)-adaptive
jammer, m = pi, with probability greater than 178 .
We conclude this section with a note on the worst-case w-throughput of a rotational
closure (v, v,m)-FHS based on m-sequences and resistance against a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive
jammer of an FH scheme. There is a trade-off between the worst-case w-throughput
of an FH scheme, which is an m-transform, and its resistance to a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive
jammer. From Theorem 3.4.11 we have ρˆw(S) ≥ 1− w(p
n−i−1)
pn−1 . So we would like i large
in order to maximise ρˆw(S). On the other hand, we have the minimum number of time
slots to resist a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer as n− i+ 1. Therefore we would like i to be
small so that the FH scheme resists the jammer longer.
3.5 Cyclotomy
In this section we consider the construction of FH schemes via cyclotomy.
The research that exists in the literature that employs cyclotomic numbers to con-
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struct FH sequences includes [19, 22, 29, 40, 57, 87, 116, 117]. Chu and Colbourn [19]
developed FH sequences over a prime field, Fp. Using interleaving techniques Chung
et al. [21] obtained FH sequences of twice the length of those obtained by Chu and
Colbourn [19]. Ding and Yin [29] generalised Chu and Colbourn’s construction to a
prime power field, Fpn . Han and Yang [40] provided corrections to some of Ding and
Yin’s constructions. Zhang [117] used cyclotomy over F2n and the Chinese remainder
theorem to construct FH sequences. Chung and Yang [22] obtained FH sequences with
odd prime length. Zeng, Cai, Tang and Yang [115] also constructed FH sequences of
odd length. Liu, Peng, Zhou and Tang [57] used generalized cyclotomy to construct FH
sequences. Ren, Fu and Zhou [87] used cyclotomy and the Chinese remainder theorem
to generalise some of the existing constructions [29] and [117]. Further, the authors of
[87] also constructed sets of FH sequences.
In this section we look at the construction by Chu and Colbourn [19] as this is
one of the early works employing cyclotomic numbers, and is a special case of most
of the constructions that use cyclotomy to obtain FH sequences. The authors first
construct FH sequences that meet the Lempel-Greenberger bound (2.6). That is, the
FH sequences are optimal with respect to the maximum Hamming auto-correlation.
3.5.1 Cyclotomic classes
Let v = mf + 1 be an odd prime. Let Fv be a finite field and F∗v the set of nonzero
elements of Fv.
Definition 3.5.1. Let α be a primitive element of Fv. The cyclotomic classes of Fv
of order m:
Ci = {αtm+i : 0 ≤ t ≤ f − 1}, i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1,
are the m disjoint subsets that partition F∗v.
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Definition 3.5.2. The cyclotomic numbers of order m are:
(i, j) = |(Ci + 1) ∩ Cj |,
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ m− 1 and addition in a class is defined by:
Ci + 1 = {ci + 1 (mod v) : ci ∈ Ci}.
The cyclotomic numbers (i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ m − 1, of order m, are the number of
solutions to the equation:
ci + 1 = cj , ci ∈ Ci, cj ∈ Cj .
That is, (i, j) is the number of ordered pairs s, t such that:
αms+i + 1 = αmt+j , 0 ≤ s, t ≤ f − 1.
For the interested reader see [100] for an introduction to cyclotomy.
3.5.2 Construction of FH sequences with cyclotomic classes
In this section we will use the combinatorial characterisation of an FH sequence which
was introduced in Section 3.3.1. We associate an FH sequence X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1)
defined over an alphabet F , |F| = m, with m disjoint sets B0, B1, . . . , Bm−1, where
each Bi is the support of i, i ∈ F defined in Equation (3.27).
Construction 3.5.3. Let v = mf + 1. Let F = Zm be a frequency library. Let
C0, C1, . . . , Cm−1 be the cyclotomic classes of Fv of order m. An FH sequence X =
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(x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) over F is given as:
B0 = C0 ∪ {0},
Bi = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, (3.40)
with the sets B0, Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 as previously defined. The FH sequence together
with all its cyclic shifts form an (mf + 1,mf + 1,m)-FHS.
Note that the FH sequence X = (xt) can also be written as:
xt =
 0 if t = 0,i if t ∈ Ci.
Example 3.5.4. Let |F| = 7 and v = 29. The cyclotomic classes of F29 of order 7
are:
C0 = {1, 12, 28, 17}, C1 = {2, 24, 27, 5}, C2 = {4, 19, 25, 10}, C3 = {8, 9, 21, 20},
C4 = {16, 18, 13, 11}, C5 = {3, 7, 26, 22}, C6 = {6, 14, 23, 15}.
An FH sequence of length 29 over F is:
X = (0, 0, 1, 5, 2, 1, 6, 5, 3, 3, 2, 4, 0, 4, 6, 6, 4, 0, 4, 2, 3, 3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 5, 1, 0).
Example 3.5.5. Let |F| = 23 and v = 47. The cyclotomic classes of F47 of order 23
are:
C0 = {1, 46}, C1 = {5, 42}, C2 = {22, 25}, C3 = {16, 31}, C4 = {14, 33},
C5 = {23, 24}, C6 = {21, 26}, C7 = {11, 36}, C8 = {8, 39}, C9 = {7, 40},
C10 = {12, 35}, C11 = {13, 34}, C12 = {18, 29}, C13 = {4, 43}, C14 = {20, 27},
C15 = {6, 41}, C16 = {17, 30}, C17 = {9, 38}, C18 = {2, 45}, C19 = {10, 37},
C20 = {3, 44}, C21 = {15, 32}, C22 = {19, 28}.
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Then an FH sequence of length 47 over an alphabet of size 23 is:
X =(0, 0, 18, 20, 13, 1, 15, 9, 8, 17, 19, 7, 10, 11, 4, 21, 3, 16, 12, 22, 14, 6, 2, 5, 5,
2, 6, 14, 22, 12, 16, 3, 21, 4, 11, 10, 7, 19, 17, 8, 9, 15, 1, 13, 20, 18, 0).
3.5.3 Correlation
Lemma 3.5.6 is used in the determination of the maximum Hamming auto-correlation
of an FH sequence constructed using cyclotomic techniques. Lemma 3.5.6 exists in the
literature [19] without proof, so we provide a proof here.
Lemma 3.5.6. Let Fv be a finite field, v = mf+1 an odd prime. The cyclotomic classes
Ci, 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, of Fv of order m satisfy the following property, |(Ci + w) ∩ Cj | =
|(w−1Ci + 1) ∩ w−1Cj |. If w−1 ∈ Ch, then:
|(Ci + w) ∩ Cj | = (i+ h, j + h).
Proof. For all 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, the cyclotomic classes Ci can be written in terms of the
cyclotomic class C0:
C0 = 〈αm〉
= {αmt : 0 ≤ t ≤ f − 1};
Ci = α
iC0
= {αi · αmt : 0 ≤ t ≤ f − 1}
= {αmt+i : 0 ≤ t ≤ f − 1}.
If w−1 ∈ Ch then w−1 = αmt1+h for some t1 ∈ {0, . . . , f − 1}. Now,
w−1Cj = {αm(t1+t2)+h+j : 0 ≤ t2 ≤ f − 1},
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w−1Ci + 1 = {αm(t1+t3)+h+i + 1 : 0 ≤ t3 ≤ f − 1}.
Next,
Cj+h = {αmt4+h+j : 0 ≤ t4 ≤ f − 1},
Ci+h = {αmt5+h+i : 0 ≤ t5 ≤ f − 1}.
For any w−1 ∈ Ch we have w−1Cj = Cj+h. Therefore,
|(w−1Ci + 1) ∩ w−1Cj | = |(Ci+h + 1) ∩ Cj+h| = (i+ h, j + h).
The conclusion then follows:
|(Ci + w) ∩ Cj | = |(w−1Ci + 1) ∩ w−1Cj | = (i+ h, j + h).
Theorem 3.5.7 provide the maximum Hamming correlation of the FH sequence (3.40).
We make a correction on the lower limit of the summation for the formula of maximum
Hamming correlation provided by Chu et al. [19] and we provide a proof of the theorem.
Theorem 3.5.7. (Theorem 1, [19]). Let X be an FH sequence of length v = mf + 1
given in Construction 3.5.3. Then X is a Lempel-Greenberger optimal FH sequence
(Definition 2.2.12), where the maximum Hamming auto-correlation is:
H(X) =

∑m−1
i=1 (i, i) + 1 if f odd,∑m−1
i=1 (i, i) + 2 if f even.
(3.41)
Proof. The maximum Hamming auto-correlation is:
H(X) = max
1≤t≤v−1
{HX,X(t)} ,
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where HX,X(t) is the intersection of X and its t cyclic shift to the right given by:
HX,X(t) =
m−1∑
i=0
|(Bi + t) ∩Bi|
= |B0 ∩ (B0 + t)|+
m−1∑
i=1
|(Bi + t) ∩Bi|. (3.42)
By definition, from Equation (3.40), B0 = C0 ∪ {0}, Bi = Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
The shifted version of B0 to the right by t places is B0 + t = (C0 + t)∪{0 + t}. The
number of places in which B0 + t and B0 intersect is:
(B0 + t) ∩B0 = |(C0 ∪ {0}) ∩ ((C0 + t) ∪ {0 + t})|
= |(C0 ∪ {0}) ∩ ((C0 + t) ∪ {t})|
= | ((C0 ∪ {0}) ∩ (C0 + t)) ∪ ((C0 ∪ {0}) ∩ {t}) |
= | ((C0 + t) ∩ C0) ∪ ((C0 + t) ∩ {0}) ∪ ({t} ∩ C0) ∪ ({t} ∩ {0}) |.
For all t 6= 0,
((C0 + t) ∩ C0) = ∅,
({t} ∩ {0}) = ∅,
and ((C0 + t) ∩ {0}) ∩ ({t} ∩ C0) = ∅.
So,
| ((C0 + t) ∩ {0}) ∪ ({t} ∩ C0) | = | ((C0 + t) ∩ {0}) |+ | ({t} ∩ C0) |.
Therefore,
(B0 + t) ∩B0 = | ((C0 + t) ∩ {0}) |+ | ({t} ∩ C0) |.
Then
HX,X(t) = |{t} ∩ C0|+ |{0} ∩ (C0 + t)|+
m−1∑
i=1
|(Ci + t) ∩ Ci|.
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From Lemma 3.5.6, if t−1 ∈ Ch then
m−1∑
i=1
|(Ci + t) ∩ Ci| =
m−1∑
i=1
(i+ h, i+ h) =
m−1∑
i=1
(i, i).
Finally, |{t} ∩ C0|+ |{0} ∩ (C0 + t)| is maximum when f is even where t,−t ∈ C0.
That is:
|{t} ∩ C0|+ |{0} ∩ (C0 + t)| = 2
when f is even. On the other hand when f is odd:
|{t} ∩ C0|+ |{0} ∩ (C0 + t)| = 1.
This completes the proof.
It was shown in [19] that the FH sequences in Construction 3.5.3 are optimal with
respect to the Lempel-Greenberger bound (2.6) on the maximum out-of-phase Ham-
ming auto-correlation.
Hamming Group correlation. Let S be a (mf + 1,mf + 1,m)-FHS of Construc-
tion 3.5.3. The Hamming group correlation can be estimated as:
G(X,U) ≤ wH(X),
where U ⊆ S, |U| = w, X ∈ S\U and H(X) is the maximum Hamming auto-correlation
given in Equation (3.41). Then the lower bound for the w-throughput of X is:
ρw(X,U) ≥ 1− wH(X)
mf + 1
.
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Further, the worst-case w-throughput of S is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
X∈V
{ρw(X,V \ {X})}
}
= 1− w(H(X))
mf + 1
,
where X ∈ V, V = U ∪ {X} and ρw(X,V \ {X}) = 1− G(X,V\{X})v .
3.5.4 Jamming resistance
In the definition of an FH sequence, the size of the supports of frequency channels are
|B0| = f + 1 and |Bi| = f , 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, with B0, Bi as previously defined. That
is every frequency channel, except 0, appears f number of times in the FH sequence.
The 0 channel appears one time slot more than the others. Then the probability
that a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer listens on an active frequency channel was given in
Equation (2.39):
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
,
where ai is the number of times that frequency channel i appears at a particular time
slot of interest, and w is the number of active FH sequences. For the FH scheme in
Construction 3.5.3 we have:
Prob(i is active) ≥ 1−
(
mf + 1− f
w + 1
)
/
(
mf + 1
w + 1
)
. (3.43)
3.6 Trace functions
A number of FH sequence constructions based on trace functions have been proposed
over the years, [27, 28, 37, 109]. In this section we consider a construction by Ge et
al. [37], which is a generalisation of some known FH sequences constructions that use
trace functions.
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3.6.1 Preliminaries
Definition 3.6.1. For β ∈ Fmn and Fmκ, κ|n, the trace function Trmn/mκ(β) of β
over Fmκ is the map defined by:
Trmn/mκ(β) = β + β
mκ + . . .+ βm
κ(nκ−1) ,
from Fmn to the subfield Fmκ. If Fmκ is the prime subfield of Fmn, then Trmn/mκ(β)
is called the absolute trace function, which will be simply called the trace function in
this section as it is the only trace function we consider and is denoted by Trmn(β).
A trace function is a map that enables a transfer of elements from a finite field to
its subfield.
Let F = Fmn and K = Fm. For the remainder of this section we will denote the
trace function as TrF/K(β). We state Lemmas 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 of properties of trace
functions [56], which will be used in the subsequent sections.
Lemma 3.6.2. The trace function satisfies the following properties:
i TrF/K(α+ β) = TrF/K(α) + TrF/K(β) for all α, β ∈ F ;
ii TrF/K(cα) = cTrF/K(α) for all c ∈ K, α ∈ F ;
iii TrF/K(c) = nc, for all c ∈ K;
iv TrF/K(α
m) = TrF/K(α), for all α ∈ F .
Lemma 3.6.3. The trace function is an mn−1-to-1 map.
3.6.2 Frequency hopping sequences obtained using trace functions
In this section we consider the construction of Ge et al. [37, Section V] which provided
more parameters and is a generalization of many other constructions that use trace
functions.
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Construction 3.6.4. Let m = pr, p be a prime and r be some positive integer. Let n, l
be two positive integers such that l|(mn−1) and gcd(mn−1m−1 , l) = 1. Let α be a primitive
element of the field F = Fmn. Let s be a positive integer such that gcd(s,mn − 1) = 1
and β = αls. Let v = m
n−1
l . An FH sequence over the field K = Fm of length v is
defined as
Xg = (TrF/K(g), T rF/K(gβ), . . . , T rF/K(gβ
v−1)), (3.44)
for all g ∈ F . The FH scheme defined by Equation (3.44):
S = {Xg : 0 ≤ g ≤ mn − 1},
form a rotational closure (m
n−1
l ,
mn−1
l ,m)-FHS.
3.6.3 Correlation
Lemma 3.6.5 provides the Hamming correlation of the sequence defined in Equa-
tion (3.44).
Lemma 3.6.5. (Ge et al., [37],Lemma 4.3). Let Xg be an FH sequence defined in
Equation (3.44). Its maximum out-of-phase Hamming correlation is:
H(Xg) =
mn−1 − 1
l
, (3.45)
with g ∈ F∗mn.
Now we consider the maximum Hamming cross-correlation of two distinct FH se-
quences Xg, Xh.
Theorem 3.6.6. (Ge et al., [37],Theorem 4.5). If g, h belong to distinct cyclotomic
classes of order l in Fmn , then Xg and Xh constitute a Lempel-Greenberger optimal pair
(Definition 2.2.13) of FH sequences where the maximum Hamming cross-correlation is
mn−1−1
l .
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Note that if g, h as defined in Theorem 3.6.6 belong to the same cyclotomic classes
then H(Xg, Xh) =
mn−1
l = v. Then Ge et al. [37] provided a revision of Construc-
tion 3.6.4 to consider a subset of the FH sequences so that the maximum Hamming
cross-correlation is improved.
Construction 3.6.7. (Ge et al., [37],Theorem 4.7). Let {g0, g1, . . . , gl−1} be a com-
plete set of representatives for the cyclotomic classes of order l in Fmn. Then:
S = {Xg0 , Xg1 , . . . , Xgl−1},
is a (m
n−1
l , l,m)-FHS with maximum Hamming correlation
mn−1−1
l .
Example 3.6.8. Let m = |F|, m ≡ 1 (mod 4), n = 2, l = 2(m − 1), v = m+12 . Then
Construction 3.6.7 provides a (m+12 ,m
2,m)-FHS with Hamming correlation 1.
Theorem 3.6.9. For a (m
n−1
l , l,m)-FHS given by Equation (3.44), the worst-case
w-throughput is at least 1− w(mn−1−1)mn−1 .
Example 3.6.10. Let m = p = 23. If n = 2 then consider l = 11 and v = 48. We
have a (48, 11, 23)-FHS with Hamming correlation 2 and a worst-case w-throughput of
at least 1− w24 .
Hamming group correlation. Let S be a rotational closure (mn−1l , m
n−1
l ,m)-FHS
of Construction 3.6.4. The Hamming group correlation can be estimated as:
G(X,U) ≤ wH(X),
where U ⊆ S, |U| = w, X ∈ S\U and H(X) is the maximum Hamming auto-correlation
given in Equation (3.45). Then the lower bound for the w-throughput of X is:
ρw(X,U) ≥1− wH(X)
v
(3.46)
=1− w(m
n−1 − 1)
mn − 1 . (3.47)
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Further, the worst-case w-throughput of S is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
X∈V
{ρw(X,V \ {X})}
}
= 1− w(H(X))
v
= 1− w(m
n−1 − 1)
mn − 1
where X ∈ V, V = U ∪ {X} and ρw(X,V \ {X}) = 1− G(X,V\{X})v .
3.6.4 Jamming resistance
Consider Construction 3.6.4. From Lemma 3.6.3 we deduce that each channel in F
appears mn−1 number of times at each time slot. We now consider how a ( 1m ,
1
m)-
adaptive jammer will affect an FH scheme at a single time slot.
The probability that a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer listens on an active channel was
given in Equation (2.39):
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
,
where ai is the number of times that frequency channel i appears at a particular time
slot of interest. For the construction considered in this section we have:
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
mn −mn−1
w + 1
)
/
(
mn
w + 1
)
. (3.48)
Now consider the modified FH scheme of Construction 3.6.7, a (m
n−1
l , l,m)-FHS.
Recall that the l representatives for the cyclotomic classes of order l in Fmn are chosen
randomly. Then we have 1 ≤ ai ≤ min{mn−1, l} and Equation (3.48) can be modified
accordingly.
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3.6.5 Comparison with m-sequences
It is well known that m-sequences can be defined in terms of the trace function. Let
X = (xt) be an m-sequence of length v = m
n − 1 over GF (mn). Let α be a primitive
element of the field GF (mn), that is an element of order mn − 1. Then xt = aαt +
(aαt)m + (aαt)m
2
+ . . . (aαt)m
n−1
and thus an i-tuple of X is given as:
(xt, xt+1, . . . , xt+i−1) = (Tr(δ), T r(δα), . . . , T r(δαi−1)),
where δ = aαt, a ∈ GF (mn) \ {0}.
Recall the FH sequence construction considered in this section, Construction 3.6.4,
provides the FH sequence:
Xg = (TrF/K(g), T rF/K(gβ), . . . , T rF/K(gβ
v−1)), (3.49)
where β = αls. Note that when l = 1 and s = 1, Equation (3.49) provides an m-
sequence.
Example 3.6.11. Let p = 3, n = 3 and F33 be an extension field of F3. Let α be a
primitive element of F33. Using Construction 3.6.4, we can obtain the following FH
sequence of length 26 defined over F3:
Xi = (Tr32/3(α
t)),
where 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1. Then:
Xi = (0, 0, 2, 0, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 0, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1, 1, 1),
is an m-sequence.
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3.7 Reed-Solomon codes
In this section we consider FH scheme constructions which use Reed-Solomon codes
[27, 91, 94, 114]. The FH schemes obtained in this section are subcodes of Reed-Solomon
codes. A subcode is a code contained in another code.
3.7.1 Preliminaries
We first define a Reed-Solomon code.
Definition 3.7.1. Let v and κ be integers where v ≥ 2 and κ ≥ 2. Let m be a prime
power such that m ≥ v. Let F be the finite field of cardinality m and α a primitive
element. Let f(x) = f0 + f1x + . . . + fκ−1xκ−1 be a polynomial, where fi ∈ F for all
0 ≤ i ≤ κ− 1. A length v and κ dimensional Reed-Solomon code, denoted (v, κ)-Reed-
Solomon code, S over F is:
S = {(f(1), f(α), f(α2), . . . , f(αv−1))} , (3.50)
where the generator matrix of the code is represented as:
G =

1 1 1 · · · 1
1 α α2 · · · αv−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(v−1)
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ακ−1 α2(κ−1) · · · α(κ−1)(v−1)

.
3.7.2 Subcode of Reed-Solomon code as an FH scheme
Consider a (v, κ)-Reed-Solomon code C. Define an equivalence relation on the code-
words of C such that two codewords X,Y are said to be equivalent if one codeword
can be obtained from the other by some cyclic shifts, that is Y = βiX and X = βjY ,
for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , v− 1} and where β is a cyclic permutation function defined in
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Equation (3.28). An equivalence class obtained by this relation contains all codewords
βiX, 0 ≤ i ≤ v−1, X ∈ C. The codewords in an equivalence class are said to be cyclic
equivalent codewords.
Let C be a (v, κ)-Reed-Solomon code with parameters as previously defined. By
choosing one codeword from each equivalence class of C, we can obtain a subcode of C,
which we denote C ′. The subcode C ′ has a property that any two distinct codewords
have the same symbols in at most κ− 1 corresponding coordinates.
We are interested in representative codewords with full period. A codeword is said
to have full period if βiX 6= βjX, for 0 ≤ i, j ≤ v − 1. So, we consider equivalence
classes of maximum size v. So, let C ′′ be a subset of C ′ containing codewords of full
period. In the literature the subcode C ′′ of C formed by picking one element from each
equivalence class of full order is called a cyclically permutable code. The subcode C ′′
has an additional property that any two distinct cyclic shifts of a single codeword have
the same symbols in at most κ− 1 corresponding coordinates. That is, the maximum
out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation of a codeword is κ− 1.
Corollary 3.7.2 provides the size of the subcode C ′′.
Corollary 3.7.2. (Song and Golomb, [94], Corollary 2.1) Given m and κ such that
1 ≤ κ ≤ m− 2, let N = |{i : gcd(i,m− 1) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ}|. If m− 1 is a prime power
then:
|C ′′| = m
κ −mκ−N
m− 1 . (3.51)
Construction 3.7.3. Consider a (v, κ)-Reed Solomon C with parameters as previously
defined. A subcode C ′′ of C made up of representative codewords from each equivalence
classes of maximum size v is considered as a (v, k,m)-FHS where v = m− 1 and k is
given by Equation (3.51).
Several authors have obtained FH schemes with Construction 3.7.3. Reed [86, 91]
obtained FH schemes using Construction 3.7.3 with k ≥ mκ−1 FH sequences. Ding et
al. [27] consider the same construction when m− 1 is a prime number and thus obtain
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a (v, m
κ−1
m−1 ,m)-FHS. Yang, Tang, Parampalli and Peng [114] used the same idea of
Construction 3.7.3 to obtain an FH scheme from punctured Reed-Solomon codes. For
the remainder of this section we consider Reed’s construction [86] since it does not put
any restriction on the length of the FH sequences or the size of the FH scheme (there
is no restriction on the alphabet on which the Reed-Solomon code is defined).
Example 3.7.4. Let C be a (m− 1, 2)-Reed-Solomon code with generator matrix
G =
1 1 1 · · · 1
1 α α2 · · · αm−2
 ,
where α is a primitive element of a field F , |F| = m. Using Reed’s construction [86],
we have m FH sequences:
Xi = (δi, δi, . . . , δi) + (1, α, α
2, . . . , αm−2), (3.52)
for δi ∈ F and 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
As a specific case of Construction 3.7.3, we have the following FH sequences over
an alphabet of size 23, using a (22, 2)-Reed-Solomon code, where a random codeword
was selected from each equivalence class of maximum size:
(1, 5, 2, 10, 4, 20, 8, 17, 16, 11, 9, 22, 18, 21, 13, 19, 3, 15, 6, 7, 12, 14),
(2, 6, 3, 11, 5, 21, 9, 18, 17, 12, 10, 0, 19, 22, 14, 20, 4, 16, 7, 8, 13, 15),
(3, 7, 4, 12, 6, 22, 10, 19, 18, 13, 11, 1, 20, 0, 15, 21, 5, 17, 8, 9, 14, 16),
(4, 8, 5, 13, 7, 0, 11, 20, 19, 14, 12, 2, 21, 1, 16, 22, 6, 18, 9, 10, 15, 17),
(5, 9, 6, 14, 8, 1, 12, 21, 20, 15, 13, 3, 22, 2, 17, 0, 7, 19, 10, 11, 16, 18),
(6, 10, 7, 15, 9, 2, 13, 22, 21, 16, 14, 4, 0, 3, 18, 1, 8, 20, 11, 12, 17, 19),
(7, 11, 8, 16, 10, 3, 14, 0, 22, 17, 15, 5, 1, 4, 19, 2, 9, 21, 12, 13, 18, 20),
(8, 12, 9, 17, 11, 4, 15, 1, 0, 18, 16, 6, 2, 5, 20, 3, 10, 22, 13, 14, 19, 21),
(9, 13, 10, 18, 12, 5, 16, 2, 1, 19, 17, 7, 3, 6, 21, 4, 11, 0, 14, 15, 20, 22),
(10, 14, 11, 19, 13, 6, 17, 3, 2, 20, 18, 8, 4, 7, 22, 5, 12, 1, 15, 16, 21, 0),
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(11, 15, 12, 20, 14, 7, 18, 4, 3, 21, 19, 9, 5, 8, 0, 6, 13, 2, 16, 17, 22, 1),
(12, 16, 13, 21, 15, 8, 19, 5, 4, 22, 20, 10, 6, 9, 1, 7, 14, 3, 17, 18, 0, 2),
(13, 17, 14, 22, 16, 9, 20, 6, 5, 0, 21, 11, 7, 10, 2, 8, 15, 4, 18, 19, 1, 3),
(14, 18, 15, 0, 17, 10, 21, 7, 6, 1, 22, 12, 8, 11, 3, 9, 16, 5, 19, 20, 2, 4),
(15, 19, 16, 1, 18, 11, 22, 8, 7, 2, 0, 13, 9, 12, 4, 10, 17, 6, 20, 21, 3, 5),
(16, 20, 17, 2, 19, 12, 0, 9, 8, 3, 1, 14, 10, 13, 5, 11, 18, 7, 21, 22, 4, 6),
(17, 21, 18, 3, 20, 13, 1, 10, 9, 4, 2, 15, 11, 14, 6, 12, 19, 8, 22, 0, 5, 7),
(18, 22, 19, 4, 21, 14, 2, 11, 10, 5, 3, 16, 12, 15, 7, 13, 20, 9, 0, 1, 6, 8),
(19, 0, 20, 5, 22, 15, 3, 12, 11, 6, 4, 17, 13, 16, 8, 14, 21, 10, 1, 2, 7, 9),
(20, 1, 21, 6, 0, 16, 4, 13, 12, 7, 5, 18, 14, 17, 9, 15, 22, 11, 2, 3, 8, 10),
(21, 2, 22, 7, 1, 17, 5, 14, 13, 8, 6, 19, 15, 18, 10, 16, 0, 12, 3, 4, 9, 11),
(0, 4, 1, 9, 3, 19, 7, 16, 15, 10, 8, 21, 17, 20, 12, 18, 2, 14, 5, 6, 11, 13).
Note that taking C ′′, the FH scheme using Construction 3.7.3, together with the
cyclic shifts of the FH sequences in the set, we do not get the Reed-Solomon code back.
3.7.3 Correlation
Hamming correlation: The notion of Hamming correlation is related to the Ham-
ming distance when we consider codes (or their subcodes) as FH schemes, as is shown
in Proposition 3.7.5.
Proposition 3.7.5. Given C a (v, κ)-MDS code and C ′′ as previously defined. The
maximum Hamming correlation of C ′′ is at most κ− 1.
Proof. The code C has the following codewords. Constant codewords, X = (c, . . . , c),
where c ∈ F . Constant codewords have the property βiX = X, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ v − 1. Next,
there are codewords with non-full period, Cn1 =
⇔
X, where 1 < |Cn1 | < v. Finally, there
are codewords with full period, Cn2 =
⇔
X, where |Cn2 | = v. Any two codewords in Cn2
are not the same.
116
3.7. Reed-Solomon codes 3. Investigating existing FH schemes
We know that the minimum distance of a [v, κ,m]-MDS code is d(C) = v − κ+ 1.
That is d(X,Y ) ≥ d(C) = v − κ+ 1, ∀ X,Y ∈ C. Therefore the Hamming correlation
is h(X,Y ) ≤ v− (v−κ+1) = κ−1 ∀ X,Y ∈ C. By definition, the FH sequences in C ′′
(Construction 3.7.3) are obtained as representative codewords from each each subcode
Cn2 . Consider X ∈ C ′′. Then there exist X ′ ∈ Cn2 , for some Cn2 ⊂ C, such that X ′ =
βiX ∀1 ≤ i ≤ v − 1, because codewords in C ′′ have full period. Therefore we can find
the maximum out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation of each FH sequence X ∈ C ′′,
H(X) ≤ κ− 1. Further, for any two distinct codewords X,Y ∈ C ′′, d(X,Y ) ≥ d(C) =
v− κ+ 1 and the maximum Hamming cross-correlation is H(X,Y ) ≤ κ− 1. Then the
maximum Hamming correlation Hm(S) = maxX,Y ∈C′′{H(X), H(Y ), H(X,Y )} ≤ κ−1.
Hamming group correlation The maximum Hamming correlation given in Propo-
sition 3.7.5, Hm(S) ≤ κ− 1, allows us to estimate the throughput measures of an FH
scheme based on Reed-Solomon codes considered in this section.
Let C be a Reed-Solomon code and C ′′ its subcode as previously defined. The
Hamming group correlation of a Reed-Solomon code based FH scheme C ′′ is:
G(X,U) ≤ w(κ− 1),
where U ⊆ C ′′, |U| = w and X ∈ C ′′ \ U . Then the w-throughput of an FH sequence
X is:
ρw(X,U) = 1− G(X,U)
v
≥ 1− w(κ− 1)
v
,
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and the worst-case w-throughput of the scheme is:
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
Xi∈V
{ρw(Xi,V \ {Xi})}
}
= 1− w(κ− 1)
v
.
3.7.4 Jamming resistance
Recall that the FH sequences in C ′′ are randomly chosen from the code C. An explicit
way of obtaining the subcode C ′′ is difficult to present. So, the resistance of the FH
scheme against a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer will depend on the FH sequences obtained
from the code. However, we consider Proposition 3.7.6.
Proposition 3.7.6. If w+ 1 6= |C ′′| then a ( 1m , 1m)-adaptive jammer will need at least
a single time slot to determine an active FH sequence.
Proof. The proof is based on the fact that if only a fraction of the codewords are active,
then a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer is forced to eavesdrop on at least one time slot.
Consider a (22, 2)-Reed-Solomon code. In the remainder of this section we use this
code as an illustration to determine its resistance against a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer.
Example 3.7.7. Consider C a (22, 2)-Reed-Solomon code from Example 3.7.4. Let C ′′
be a (22, 22, 22)-FHS obtained using Construction 3.7.3. A ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer
takes at least two time slots to establish an active codeword.
We know that any two codewords X,Y in C ′′, X 6= Y are distinct, that is X 6= βiY
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 21. However, for any channel xt on codeword X, there exist some
Y ∈ C ′′ such that xt = yt′, 0 ≤ t, t′ ≤ 21. In fact there exist some βiY ∈ C, where
t = i + t′ (mod v). As the codewords in C ′′ are randomly selected from the Reed-
Solomon code we have the following. Suppose xt 6= yt for all codewords in C ′′. In this
case a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer only needs to eavesdrop on at least a single time slot
to identify an active codeword. On the other hand suppose xt = yt for all codewords in
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C ′′. That is all the codewords have the same frequency channel at time slot t. However,
for any two consecutive time slots (xt, xt+1) 6= (yt′ , yt′+1), 0 ≤ t, t′ ≤ v − 1. Therefore
in the worst-case scenario, it can take a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer at least two time slots
to establish an active codeword.
3.8 Bag-Ruj-Roy scheme
In this section we discuss the Bag-Ruj-Roy (BRR) scheme constructed by Bag et al.
[9]. The FH sequences in the BRR scheme are derived using a pair of orthogonal Latin
squares. We provide an interpretation of the BRR scheme in our model. The FH
sequences are pseudorandom and form another FH scheme that provides maximum
throughput of one for any FH sequence in the presence of other mutual interfering FH
sequences. However, they can withstand an adversary for only one time slot.
3.8.1 Preliminaries
The FH schemes considered in this section use a combinatorial structure called a Latin
square, which is described using a v × v array.
Definition 3.8.1. Let Z be a set of size v. A Latin square of order v defined over
Z is a v × v array L such that no element of Z appears more than once in any row or
in any column of L.
Example 3.8.2. Consider the group Z7, integers modulo 7. The following is a Latin
square of order 7 over Z7:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 6 0 1 2 3 4
4 5 6 0 1 2 3
3 4 5 6 0 1 2
2 3 4 5 6 0 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 0
.
Note that a Latin square defined over Zv is equivalent to a (v, v, v)-MDS code up
to renaming the alphabet symbols if necessary and a combination of permutation of
alphabet symbols in a particular coordinate position and/or permuting the coordinate
positions of the codewords.
Lemma 3.8.3 shows that adding an element from the set defining a Latin square
to all the entries of the Latin square returns a Latin square. In other words it is a
permutation of the original Latin square.
Lemma 3.8.3. Let L = [αij ]v×v be a Latin square of order v over Zv. Suppose x ∈ Zv.
Let L+ x = [βij ]v×v, where βij = αij + x (mod v). Then L+ x is also a Latin square.
Next we define orthogonality of a pair of Latin squares.
Definition 3.8.4. Let L1 = [αij ]v×v is a Latin square of order v with entries from a
set Z1 of cardinality v and L2 = [βij ]v×v be a Latin square of order v with entries from
a set Z2 of cardinality v. We say that L1 and L2 are orthogonal Latin squares if
the v2 ordered pairs (αij , βij) are distinct.
Example 3.8.5. A pair of orthogonal Latin squares, L1, L2 of order 7:
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L1 =
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 0
2 3 4 5 6 0 1
3 4 5 6 0 1 2
4 5 6 0 1 2 3
5 6 0 1 2 3 4
6 0 1 2 3 4 5
, L2 =
0 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 0 6 5 4 3 2
2 1 0 6 5 4 3
3 2 1 0 6 5 4
4 3 2 1 0 6 5
5 4 3 2 1 0 6
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
.
Lemma 3.8.6 extends Lemma 3.8.3 in that adding an element from the set on which
the orthogonal Latin squares are defined to all the entries in the Latin squares preserves
their orthogonality.
Lemma 3.8.6. Let L1 = [αij ]v×v and L2 = [βij ]v×v be a pair of orthogonal Latin
squares of order v over Zv. Suppose x, y ∈ Zv. Then L1 + x and L2 + y are orthogonal
Latin squares.
The existence of orthogonal Latin squares is assured in Theorem 3.8.7.
Theorem 3.8.7. For every odd integer v > 1, there exists a pair of orthogonal Latin
squares of order v.
A set of s Latin squares of order v, any pair of which are orthogonal, is called a set
of mutually orthogonal Latin squares denoted MOLS(v, s) (in other literature they are
sometimes referred to as pairwise orthogonal Latin squares, abbreviated POL(v, s)).
Theorem 3.8.8. Let N(v) denote the maximum number of MOLS(v, s), v ≥ 2.
1. N(6) = 1. If v 6= 2, 6, then N(v) ≥ 2.
2. N(v) ≤ v − 1, with equality if and only if there exists a projective plane of order
v.
3. N(v) = v − 1, if v is a prime power number.
For construction of orthogonal Latin squares we refer the reader to [43, 97].
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3.8.2 Construction
The Bag-Ruj-Roy (BRR) [9] scheme is as follows.
Consider an FH scheme with m users {N0, . . . , Nm−1} and a frequency library of
size m. We can identify the frequency channels with F = Zm. Let F1 and F2 be
pseudo-random functions where the input-output of an instance is computationally
indistinguishable from that of a random function. The two-input functions F1 and F2
takes K, s, a long term key and a session number respectively. As defined in Section 2.3,
a session is a number of pre-defined time slots and made up of v time slots, each the
length of a single sequence. The values K and s are shared by all users. All users
generate shared session keys x, y ∈ Zm which are the outputs of the pseudo-random
function denoted x = F1(K, s) and y = F2(K, s).
The BRR FH scheme is modelled for unicast communication at each time slot.
In more detail, at each time slot a single user (otherwise termed as a device) sends
information on frequency channels to a particular receiver in the system. In a single
session each user transmits to every other user in the system. A single user is equipped
with both a sending and a receiving sequence. On each time slot a sending sequence
defines the channel and the recipient of data to be sent. On the other hand a receiving
sequence defines a channel and the sender of information at each time slot.
Construction 3.8.9. (BRR FH scheme) Let L1 = [αij ]m×m and L2 = [βij ]m×m be a
pair of orthogonal Latin squares of order m. Let L3 = [(L1(i, j), L2(i, j))]m×m be a Latin
square that is the superposition of L1 and L2. From L3 user Ni is given i
th row Ri =
{(αi0, βi0), (αi1, βi1), . . . , (αim−1, βim−1)} and ith column Ci = {(α0j , β0j), (α1j , β1j), . . . ,
(αm−1j , βm−1j)} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. A row and column (Ri, Ci) are used to derive
the sending and receiving FH sequences respectively. Let x, y be session keys and
L4 = [(L1(i, j) + x, L2(i, j) + y)]m×m be an array which is L1 + x superimposed (see
Example 3.8.10) with L2 + y. At each session, the sending FH sequences of length m
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over F = Zm are derived from:
R∗i = {(αij + x, βij + y, j) : 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1},
where (αij + x, βij + y, j) corresponds to the (frequency channel, time slot, identity of
receiver). For a sending FH sequence the entry (αij + x, βij + y, j) means that user Ni
transmits to user Nj on frequency channel αij + x at time slot βij + y. The receiving
FH sequence is obtained likewise using:
C∗i = {(αij + x, βij + y, j) : 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}.
User Ni receives data from user Nj on frequency channel αij + x at time slot βij + y.
The sender and receiver both have the same (αij + x, βij). Therefore the receiver-
sender pair will be on the same channel at the same time.
We use Example 3.8.10 to illustrate Construction 3.8.9 in the model of Section 2.3
used in this thesis.
Example 3.8.10. Consider L1, L2, the pair of orthogonal Latin squares in Exam-
ple 3.8.5. The Latin square L3 is the superposition of L1 and L2:
L3 =
( 0, 0 ) ( 1, 6 ) ( 2, 5 ) ( 3, 4 ) ( 4, 3 ) ( 5, 2 ) ( 6, 1 )
( 1, 1 ) ( 2, 0 ) ( 3, 6 ) ( 4, 5 ) ( 5, 4 ) ( 6, 3 ) ( 0, 2 )
( 2, 2 ) ( 3, 1 ) ( 4, 0 ) ( 5, 6 ) ( 6, 5 ) ( 0, 4 ) ( 1, 3 )
( 3, 3 ) ( 4, 2 ) ( 5, 1 ) ( 6, 0 ) ( 0, 6 ) ( 1, 5 ) ( 2, 4 )
( 4, 4 ) ( 5, 3 ) ( 6, 2 ) ( 0, 1 ) ( 1, 0 ) ( 2, 6 ) ( 3, 5 )
( 5, 5 ) ( 6, 4 ) ( 0, 3 ) ( 1, 2 ) ( 2, 1 ) ( 3, 0 ) ( 4, 6 )
( 6, 6 ) ( 0, 5 ) ( 1, 4 ) ( 2, 3 ) ( 3, 2 ) ( 4, 1 ) ( 5, 0 )
.
Let x = 4 and y = 6 be the session keys. Then the Latin square L4 is the superposition
of the pair of orthogonal Latin squares L1 + x and L2 + y:
123
3.8. Bag-Ruj-Roy scheme 3. Investigating existing FH schemes
L4 =
( 4, 6 ) ( 5, 5 ) ( 6, 4 ) ( 0, 3 ) ( 1, 2 ) ( 2, 1 ) ( 3, 0 )
( 5, 0 ) ( 6, 6 ) ( 0, 5 ) ( 1, 4 ) ( 2, 3 ) ( 3, 2 ) ( 4, 1 )
( 6, 1 ) ( 0, 0 ) ( 1, 6 ) ( 2, 5 ) ( 3, 4 ) ( 4, 3 ) ( 5, 2 )
( 0, 2 ) ( 1, 1 ) ( 2, 0 ) ( 3, 6 ) ( 4, 5 ) ( 5, 4 ) ( 6, 3 )
( 1, 3 ) ( 2, 2 ) ( 3, 1 ) ( 4, 0 ) ( 5, 6 ) ( 6, 5 ) ( 0, 4 )
( 2, 4 ) ( 3, 3 ) ( 4, 2 ) ( 5, 1 ) ( 6, 0 ) ( 0, 6 ) ( 1, 5 )
( 3, 5 ) ( 4, 4 ) ( 5, 3 ) ( 6, 2 ) ( 0, 1 ) ( 1, 0 ) ( 2, 6 )
.
Table 3.3 provides the sending and receiving FH sequences for N0 and N6:
N0 N6
R∗i {(4, 6, 0), (5, 5, 1), (6, 4, 2), (0, 3, 3), (1, 2, 4), (2, 1, 5), (3, 0, 6)}
{
(3, 5, 0), (4, 4, 1), (5, 3, 2), (6, 2, 3), (0, 1, 4), (1, 0, 5), (2, 6, 6)
}
C∗i
{
(4, 6, 0), (5, 0, 1), (6, 1, 2), (0, 2, 3), (1, 3, 4), (2, 4, 5), (3, 5, 6)
}
{(3, 0, 0), (4, 1, 1), (5, 2, 2), (6, 3, 3), (0, 4, 4), (1, 5, 5), (2, 6, 6)}
FH sequence
for sending (3, 2, 1, 0, 6, 5, 4) (1, 0, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2)
FH sequence
for receiving (5, 6, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4) (3, 4, 5, 6, 0, 1, 2)
.
Table 3.3: Sending and receiving FH sequences for users N0 and N6 in a Latin square
based FH scheme.
From Table 3.3, (3, 0, 6) ∈ R∗i for N0 means N0 will send data on channel 3 at time
0 to N6, and (3, 0, 0) ∈ C∗i for N6 means N6 will switch to channel 3 at time 0 to receive
data from N0. Likewise for (3, 5, 0) ∈ R∗i for N6, N6 will be transmitting on channel
3 at time slot 5 to N0, and (3, 5, 6) ∈ C∗i for N0, N0 will be listening on channel 3 at
time slot 5 for messages from N6.
Note that the FH sequences for sending and receiving are arranged in the format
used in this thesis (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1), where the indices are time slots in R∗i and C
∗
i
accordingly.
In the system model of this thesis (Section 2.3) we consider only sending FH se-
quences. Therefore the FH scheme in Construction 3.8.9 is considered as an (m,m,m)-
FHS.
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3.8.3 Correlation
In this section we consider the correlation and throughput of the (m,m,m)-FHS ob-
tained from Construction 3.8.9.
Theorem 3.8.11. Consider S to be the (m,m,m)-FHS obtained from Construction 3.8.9.
The w-throughput of any FH sequence in S is 1 for any w, 0 ≤ w < m.
Proof. Let S be an (m,m,m)-FHS with FH sequences from Construction 3.8.9. Con-
sider L1 and L2, a pair of orthogonal Latin squares of order m defined over Zm. From
Lemma 3.8.6 we have: L1+x and L2+y are orthogonal Latin squares for any x, y ∈ Zm.
Consider the superposition of a pair of orthogonal Latin squares L1 + x = [α
′
ij ]m×m,
L2 +y = [β
′
ij ]m×m, where α
′
ij = αij+x and β
′
ij = βij+y. There exist a unique cell (i, j)
with the ordered pair (αij +x, βij + y). Therefore, for all FH sequences Xi ∈ S derived
using X∗i , 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1, all the frequency channels at each time slot are distinct. That
is, at any time slot t, the multiset Ft has distinct channels and ai = 1 for all i ∈ F .
This implies that there is no mutual interference at each time slot for any FH sequence
Xi ∈ S in the presence of other FH sequences Xi′ ∈ S, i 6= i′. Hence the w-throughput
of any FH sequence Xi in the presence of other FH sequences Xi′ ∈ U ⊂ S is
ρw(Xi,U) = 1.
From Theorem 3.8.11, we can deduce that the worst-case w-throughput of S is:
ρˆw(S) = 1.
Therefore S is an (m,m,m; 1)-FHS.
Despite the fact that FH sequences in S, the (m,m,m; 1)-FHS, achieve maximum
w-throughput of one, this does not resist a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer. In Section 3.8.4
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it will be shown that a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer eavesdropping at one time slot will be
able to identify all the FH sequences of the FH scheme.
3.8.4 Jamming resistance
Using the jammer model introduced in Chapter 2, a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer knows
N , F and the Latin square L3 is public. Further we can assume that a ( 1m , 1m)-adaptive
jammer knows time zero of the FH scheme, t = 0.
As observed in all the previous FH schemes that have been considered thus far in
this thesis, when all the FH sequences are active a jammer can jam any FH sequence
from the start and thus reduce the worst-case w-throughput of the FH scheme to zero.
We have Theorem 3.8.12 for the case when the number of active FH sequences is less
than the size of the FH scheme.
Theorem 3.8.12. Consider S to be the (m,m,m)-FHS obtained from Construction 3.8.9.
If w+1 ≤ m−1 then a ( 1m , 1m)-adaptive jammer needs at least one time slot to identify
an active FH sequence.
Proof. Let S be the (m,m,m)-FHS obtained from Construction 3.8.9. From the dis-
cussion in the proof of Theorem 3.8.11, we have that at any time slot t, the multiset
Ft has distinct channels and so ai = 1 for all i ∈ F .
Suppose that at time slot t = 0 the ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer eavesdrops on an
active channel. Since the channels are distinct, then the jammer has found an active
FH sequences. Hence it starts jamming this particular active FH sequence from time
slot t = 1 and onwards.
On the other hand, suppose at time slot t = 0 the ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer eaves-
drops on an inactive channel. If w + 1 = m − 1, the jammer will have all the active
FH sequences in its search space after removing the single inactive FH sequence from
its search space. However, if w + 1 < m − 1, then the jammer is forced to continue
eavesdropping on the succeeding time slot t = 1.
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We conclude that if w + 1 ≤ m − 1 then a ( 1m , 1m)-adaptive jammer needs at least
1 time slot to identify an active FH sequence.
We now show how a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer can trivially construct any FH se-
quence of the FH scheme.
Suppose a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer eavesdrops on frequency α
′ at time slot β′,
where user Ni was transmitting to user Nj . The jammer discovers one hop element,
(α′, β′, j) = (αij + x, βij + y, j). Then the jammer can retrieve the session keys x and
y as follows:
α′ij = αij + x
β′ij = βij + y
x = (α′ij − αij) (mod n)
y = (β′ij − βij) (mod n).
The values αij and βij are obtained from L3.
Knowledge of x, y enables the jammer to derive subsequent hops, or in fact the
whole FH sequence of any user and then jam accordingly. A jammer can pick αij+1
and βij+1 from the public Latin square L3, to compute α
′
ij+1 and β
′
ij+1 as follows:
α′ij+1 = αij+1 + (α
′
ij − αij)
β′ij+1 = βij+1 + (β
′
ij − βij).
Suppose a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer obtains the session keys x, y on the first time slot.
Then the BRR FH scheme has thus γv = 1 resistance against a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jam-
mer.
In Chapter 5 we provide a fix to the problem observed with the BRR FH scheme:
that the BRR FH scheme can not withstand a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer for more than
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a single time slot.
3.8.5 IEEE 802.11: Latin square based FH scheme, a practical exam-
ple
Recall that in Section 1.1.5 we described frequency hopping spread spectrum as defined
in the IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN [5]. The standard provides four ways in which FH
sequences can be obtained: HCC, EHCC, random generation and using FH sequences
in a fixed table.
The HCC method defines an FH sequence Xi = (xt) of length v over a frequency
library of size v as
xt =
i
t
(mod (v + 1)),
where v + 1 is a prime number, 1 ≤ i, t ≤ v. So, the HCC method provides a (v, v, v)-
FHS.
The EHCC FH sequences are obtained by deleting the diagonal entries of the FH
sequences given by the HCC method. So, the EHCC method provide a (v−1, v, v−1)-
FHS.
It can be observed that the FH sequences obtained using the HCC, EHCC and the
fixed table methods form an FH scheme that is equivalent to a Latin square. So each
of the FH schemes achieve a maximum throughput of one as for the BRR FH scheme.
Note that the generation of the FH sequences do not use pseudorandom numbers,
but rather fixed parameters. Suppose the number of active FH sequences is less than
the size of the FH scheme. Then the resistance of the FH schemes is based on the fact
that a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer has no knowledge of the active FH sequences. However,
as was the case with the BRR FH scheme, it should take a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer at
least a single time slot to identify an active FH sequence in the HCC, EHCC and the
fixed table.
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3.9 Recursive combinatorial construction
Several authors have constructed FH schemes from existing ones. Fuji-Hara et al.
[35] obtain an FH sequence using difference matrices and difference packing. The new
FH sequence is of composite length, v1v2, where v1 and v2 are the lengths of old FH
sequences. Ding et al. [27] extend the construction of Fuji-Hara et al. [35]. The authors
use two FH schemes to obtain a new FH scheme of composite length with the size of
the new FH scheme as the minimum of the sizes of the two old FH schemes. Chung
et al. [21] use interleaving techniques to obtain a new FH scheme from another FH
scheme. In this construction the new FH scheme is defined on the same frequency
library as the old one and the size is the minimum of the sizes of the old FH schemes.
Zeng et al. [115] (interleaving technique) get new FH schemes with a preserved number
of FH sequences but increased frequency library size. Chung, Gong and Yang [20] use
the Chinese remainder theorem to present an FH scheme with preserved maximum
Hamming correlation but increased length and size of the frequency library.
The recursive constructions mentioned thus far, each provide new parameters that
could not be otherwise obtained using the old FH schemes. In this section we consider
Ding et al. [27] recursive construction, which is a generalisation of the Fuji-Hara et
al. [35] construction. The construction uses a combinatorial matrix called the cyclic
difference matrix.
3.9.1 Difference matrices
Definition 3.9.1. Let G be an abelian group of order p. A difference matrix, denoted
(p, n;λ)-DM, is an n× λp matrix A = [αij ] such that αij ∈ G and for each pair of two
distinct rows i and i′, 1 ≤ i, i′ ≤ n, every element of G occurs exactly λ times among
the differences {(αij−αi′j) (mod p) : 1 ≤ j ≤ λp}. If G = Zp then the difference matrix
is called a cyclic difference matrix, denoted (p, n;λ)-CDM.
Theorem 3.9.2 (Existence theorem, Theorem 2.2, [49]). Let D be a (p, n, λ)-difference
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matrix. Then n ≤ λp.
Removing a row from a (p, n, λ)-difference matrix provides a (p, n− 1, λ)-difference
matrix. A difference matrix with all zero first row is said to be normalized. A homo-
geneous difference matrix is obtained from a normalized difference matrix by deleting
the all zero row. A homogeneous difference matrix has the property that every element
of Zp appears in every row exactly λ times.
Lemma 3.9.1 is a construction of a homogeneous (p, n; 1)-DM.
Lemma 3.9.3 (Lemma 1.2, [8]). Let p and n be positive integers such that gcd(p, (n−
1)!) = 1, and let αij = ij (mod p) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ p− 1. Then D = [αij ]
is a normalized (p, n; 1)-difference matrix. In particular, if p is an odd prime number,
then there exists a (p, n; 1)-difference matrix for any integer n ≤ p− 1.
We consider the recursive construction of Ding et al. [27]. The authors use cyclic
difference matrices with λ = 1.
Let S be a (v, k,m)-FHS with the property that for each X ∈ S, there exists f such
that xt = f for precisely one single time slot t.
Let µX(f) denote the multiplicity of frequency channel f on FH sequence X. Let
µS(f) =
∑
X∈S µX(f), the number of occurrences of frequency channel f in the FH
scheme S. Finally, the maximum occurrence of frequency channels in S the (v, k,m)-
FHS is denoted µ¯S = maxf∈F µS(f).
The authors also use S, a (v, k,m)-FHS with the following property. The frequency
channel 0 appears only at the first time slot on all the FH sequences in S. Further, for
any pair of FH sequences X,Y ∈ S, h(xi, yi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , v−1, where h(xt, yt) is as
previously defined for Hamming correlation in Definition 2.2.3. Therefore HX,Y (0) = 1.
Let λa = H(X) and λc = H(X,Y ) denote the maximum out-of-phase Hamming
auto-correlation and maximum Hamming cross-correlation defined in Equations (2.2) and (2.3)
respectively. Construction 3.9.4 follows closely [27, Theorem 13]. We have additional
conditions for the use of a particular FH scheme and we have also clear notation on
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the construction of support blocks for ease of understanding.
Construction 3.9.4. Let v ≡ 1 (mod k(k − 1)). Let V be a (v, k,m)-FHS defined
over Fm, with correlation values λa and λc. Further, for any X,Y ∈ V, x0 = y0 = 0,
h(x0, y0) = 1 and h(xi, yi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , v − 1. Let U be a (v′, k′,m′)-FHS defined
over Fm′, and given its correlation values λ′a and λ′c. Further, for any X,Y ∈ U ,
h(xi, yi) = 0 for i = 0, . . . , v − 1. If there exists a homogeneous cyclic difference
matrix (v′, µ¯V ; 1)-CDM, then there exists S a (vv′,min{k, k′}, (m − 1)v′ + m′)-FHS
with maximum out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation and maximum cross-correlation
max{λa, λ′a} and max{λc, λ′c} respectively.
Let D = [αij ]µ¯V×v′ be a (v
′, µ¯V ; 1)-CDM. For each block B
j
i = {bji1, . . . , bjikj}, a
support (see Equation (3.27)) for frequency channel i ∈ Fm \ {0}, on FH sequence
Xj ∈ V construct v′ blocks,
Bji (l) = {bji1 + α1lv, . . . , bjikj + αkj lv}, 0 ≤ l ≤ v′ − 1.
For each block Cji′ = {cji′1, . . . , cji′kj}, a support block for frequency channel i′ ∈ Fm′ on
FH sequence Yj ∈ U construct a block,
Cji′v = {cji′1v, . . . , cji′kjv}.
Construct an FH sequence of length vv′ defined over a frequency library F , |F| =
(m − 1)v′ + m′ using the following set of support blocks P = {Bji (l), Cji′v : 0 ≤ j ≤
min{k − 1, k′ − 1}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, 0 ≤ i′ ≤ m′ − 1}.
Example 3.9.5 illustrates Construction 3.9.4.
Example 3.9.5. Consider V a (7, 3, 6)-FHS,
V = {(0, 1, 4, 5, 5, 2, 3), (0, 4, 1, 2, 2, 5, 1), (0, 2, 2, 1, 3, 4, 2)},
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U a (5, 2, 4)-FHS,
U = {(1, 3, 2, 3, 1), (0, 2, 1, 1, 3)},
and D a homogeneous (5, 3; 1)-CDM,
D =

0 1 2 3 4
0 2 4 1 3
0 3 1 4 2
 .
Then:
7D =

0 7 14 21 28
0 14 28 7 21
0 21 7 28 14
 .
Consider Y1 = (0, 1, 4, 5, 5, 2, 3). Then B
1
1 = {1}, B12 = {5}, B13 = {6}, B14 = {2}, B15 =
{3, 4}. The 25 blocks from the B1i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 are as follows:
B11(0) = {1}, B11(1) = {8}, B11(2) = {15}, B11(3) = {22}, B11(4) = {29},
B12(0) = {5}, B12(1) = {12}, B12(2) = {19}, B12(3) = {26}, B12(4) = {33},
B13(0) = {6}, B13(1) = {13}, B13(2) = {20}, B13(3) = {27}, B13(4) = {34},
B14(0) = {2}, B14(1) = {9}, B14(2) = {16}, B14(3) = {23}, B14(4) = {30},
B15(0) = {3, 4}, B15(1) = {10, 18}, B15(2) = {17, 32}, B15(3) = {24, 11}, B15(4) = {31, 25}.
Consider U1 = (1, 3, 2, 3, 1). We have
C10 = ∅, C11 = {0, 4}, C12 = {2}, C13 = {1, 3},
and
C10β = ∅, C11β = {0, 28}, C12β = {14}, C13β = {7, 21}.
Table 3.4 shows the support Bji (l) and C
j
i′ 0 ≤ j ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, 0 ≤ i′ ≤ 3 with the
corresponding frequency channel number.
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Bji (l) B
1
1(0) B
1
1(1) B
1
1(2) B
1
1(3) B
1
1(4)
No. 0 1 2 3 4
Bji (l) B
1
2(0) B
1
2(1) B
1
2(2) B
1
2(3) B
1
2(4)
No. 5 6 7 8 9
Bji (l) B
1
3(0) B
1
3(1) B
1
3(2) B
1
3(3) B
1
3(4)
No. 10 11 12 13 14
Bji (l) B
1
4(0) B
1
4(1) B
1
4(2) B
1
4(3) B
1
4(4)
No. 15 16 17 18 19
Bji (l) B
1
5(0) B
1
5(1) B
1
5(2) B
1
5(3) B
1
5(4)
No. 20 21 22 23 24
C1i′β C
1
0β C
1
1β C
1
2β C
1
3β
No. 25 26 27 28
Table 3.4: Frequency channel assignment for a recursive FH scheme construction.
A new FH sequence of length 35 over a frequency library of size 29 is:
X = (26, 0, 15, 20, 20, 5, 10, 28, 1, 16, 21, 23, 6, 11, 27, 2, 17, 22, 21, 7, 12, 28,
3, 18, 23, 24, 8, 13, 26, 4, 19, 24, 22, 9, 14) (3.53)
3.9.2 Correlation
In this section we consider the Hamming correlation and Hamming group correlation
of the FH scheme of Construction 3.9.4.
Hamming correlation: Let V and U be FH schemes with parameters as given in
Construction 3.9.4. Let S be a (vv′,min{k, k′}, (m−1)v′+m′)-FHS be a recursively con-
structed FH scheme from Construction 3.9.4. Then S is an FH scheme with maximum
out-of-phase Hamming auto-correlation and maximum cross-correlation max{λa, λa′}
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and max{λc, λc′} respectively. Then the maximum Hamming correlation of the set S
is:
Hm(S) = max{max{λa, λa′},max{λc, λc′}}. (3.54)
Hamming group correlation: Let S be an FH scheme as previously defined. Then
the Hamming group correlation is:
G(X,U) ≤ wHm(S),
where U ⊆ S, |U| = w, X ∈ S \ U and H(S) is as given in Equation (3.54). Then the
w-throughput of an FH sequence X ∈ S, ρw(X,U), and the worst-case w-throughput
of the scheme, ρˆw(S) can be defined in a similar manner to the previous constructions
considered in Sections 3.2.3, 3.3.3, 3.4.3, 3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.7.3, where the Hamming
group correlation has been estimated using the maximum Hamming correlation.
3.9.3 Jamming resistance
We note that the channel number assignment for a frequency library used in Construc-
tion 3.9.4 is arbitrary. That is, any Aji (l) for 1 ≤ j ≤ k , 0 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 can be a
support set of any frequency channel in F(m−1)v′+m′ . Without loss of generality, we
assume that at time slot t there exists a frequency channel that appears at least once.
That is, ai ≥ 1 for any frequency channel i appearing on FH sequence(s) at time slot t.
So, to determine the jamming resistance of an FH scheme we take the probability that
a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer is jamming on an active frequency channel i at a particular
time slot t as:
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
≥ 1−
(
k − 1
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
.
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3.10 Comparison of FH schemes
Having discussed a large number of FH schemes in the preceding sections, we now
present a comparison in terms of their performance in the presence of mutual interfering
FH sequences. We also compare the FH schemes according to the resistance against
a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. We compare FH schemes with approximately the same
frequency library size. It is reasonable to fix the size of the frequency library because
it is the parameter that is regulated and constrained in practice. Without loss of
generality, we consider the size of the frequency library comparable to those used for
IEEE 802.11 networks [5]. We consider the case |F| ≈ 23, 79. We have seen that
the parameters v, k,m for a (v, k,m)-FHS have constraints and can be related in most
cases. So, when we fix m, the choice of v and k will follow. However, it was mentioned
in Section 2.3 that FH sequences can be used periodically. Therefore for a fixed m, we
can define a (v, k,m)-FHS and then extend it to a (v′, k,m)-FHS, where v′ = v · n+ r,
where n, r are integers and v′ is the desired length. We mention this because due to
computational limitations we use a random walk of length three, a (3, 23 · 82, 23)-FHS,
in our comparison. However, the (3, 23 · 82, 23)-FHS can be used periodically until a
desired length is obtained.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the parameters of the FH schemes that we use for the
comparison in Sections 3.10.1 and 3.10.2. Further, the tables also shows the sections
in which each FH scheme was described in this chapter.
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Mathematical tool Abbreviation Parameters
Random walks, Section 3.2 RW (3, 23 · 82, 23)-FHS
Difference packing, Section 3.3 DP (232, 232, 23)-FHS
m-sequences, Sections 3.4 LG (233 − 1, 233 − 1, 23)-FHS
Cyclotomy, Section 3.5 CC (47, 47, 23)-FHS
Trace functions, Section 3.6 TF (48, 11, 23)-FHS
Reed-Solomon code, Section 3.7 RS (23, 23, 23)-FHS
Latin square, Section 3.8 LS (23, 23, 23)-FHS
Recursive, Section 3.9 RC (65, 3, 23)-FHS
Table 3.5: Parameters of (v, k, 23)-FHS.
Mathematical tool Abbreviation Parameters
Random walks, Section 3.2 RW2 (3, 79 ∗ 222, 79)-FHS
Difference packing, Section 3.3 DP2 (792, 792, 79)-FHS
m-sequences, Section 3.4 LG2 (792 − 1, 792 − 1, 79)-FHS
Cyclotomic classes, Section 3.5 CC2 (79, 79, 78)-FHS
Trace functions, Section 3.6 TF2 (792 − 1, 39, 79)-FHS
Reed-Solomon code, Section 3.7 RS2 (79, 79, 79)-FHS
Latin square, Section 3.8 LS2 (79, 79, 79)-FHS
Recursive, Section 3.9 RC2 (844, 15, 79)
Table 3.6: Parameters of (v, k,≈ 79)-FHS.
3.10.1 Throughput comparison
In this section we compare the worst-case w-throughput of the (v, k,m)-FHS considered
in this chapter in the presence of mutual interference only. We will make a comparison
of the resistance of the (v, k,m)-FHS in the presence of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer in
136
3.10. Comparison of FH schemes 3. Investigating existing FH schemes
Section 3.10.2.
Recall the worst-case w-throughput for S a (v, k,m)-FHS defined by Equation (2.38):
ρˆw(S) = minV⊆S
{
min
Xi∈V
{ρw(Xi,V \ {Xi})}
}
,
where Xi ∈ V, V = U ∪ {Xi}, U ⊂ S and ρw(Xi,V \ {Xi}) = 1 − G(Xi,V\{Xi})v .
The Hamming group correlation is G(Xi,V \ {Xi}) ≤ w · Hm(S), where Hm(S) is
the maximum Hamming correlation of a set, Equation (2.14). We approximate the
worst-case w-throughput of a set S using:
ρˆw(S) ≥ 1− w ·Hm(S)
v
. (3.55)
With Equation (3.55), we suppose that the time slots on which each additional
mutual interfering FH sequence contributes towards Hamming group correlation are
distinct. Table 3.7 summarises the formulae of approximate worst-case w-throughput
for FH schemes from Table 3.5 with respect to the number of mutual interfering FH
sequences.
(v, k,m)-FHS, S Approximate ρˆw(S)
RW, (3, 23 · 82, 23)-FHS 1− w/3
DP, (232, 232, 23)-FHS 1− w/23
LG, (233 − 1, 233 − 1, 23)-FHS 1− (232 − 1)w/233 − 1
CC, (47, 47, 23)-FHS 1− 2w/47
TF, (48, 11, 23)-FHS 1− 2w/48
RS, (23, 23, 23)-FHS 1− 2w/23
LS, (23, 23, 23)-FHS 1
RC, (65, 3, 23) 1− 3w/65
Table 3.7: Approximate worst-case throughput formula of (v, k, 23)-FHS.
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The results presented in Table 3.8 use the formulae in Table 3.7, where we have
considered the presence of at most 6 mutual interfering FH sequences in a (v, k,m)-
FHS. The results of RC (65, 3, 23)-FHS in Table 3.8 include up to two mutual interfering
FH sequences since there are only three FH sequences in the FH scheme. We also
approximate similarly the worst-case w-throughput for FH schemes from Table 3.6 and
provide the results in Table 3.9.
FHS\ w 1 2 3 4 5 6
RW 0.66667 0.33333 0 0 0 0
DP 0.95652 0.91304 0.86957 0.82609 0.78261 0.73913
LG 0.95660 0.9132 0.8698 0.8264 0.7830 0.7396
CC 0.957 0.915 0.872 0.83 0.787 0.745
TF 0.95833 0.91667 0.875 0.83333 0.79167 0.75
RS 0.91304 0.82609 0.73913 0.65217 0.56522 0.47826
LS 1 1 1 1 1 1
RC 0.95385 0.90769 - - - -
Table 3.8: Throughput of (v, k, 23)-FHS.
FHS\ w 1 2 3 4 5 6
RW2 0.66667 0.33333 0 0 0 0
DP2,CC2,RS2 0.98734 0.97468 0.96203 0.94937 0.93671 0.92405
LG2 0.9875 0.975 0.9625 0.9500 0.9375 0.9250
TF2 0.97468 0.94937 0.92405 0.89873 0.87342 0.84810
LS2 1 1 1 1 1 1
RC2 0.99882 0.99763 0.99645 0.99526 0.99408 0.99289
Table 3.9: Throughput of (v, k,≈ 79)-FHS.
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The results in Table 3.8 show that LS (23, 23, 23)-FHS achieves maximum worst-
case w-throughput of one for any w, 1 ≤ w ≤ 6. The TF (48, 11, 23)-FHS is the next
best in performance, while the RW (3, 23 · 82, 23)-FHS performs poorly.
For large m = 79, the LS (79, 79, 79)-FHS is still the best with maximum w-
throughput of one. However, the performance of TF2 (792 − 1, 39, 79)-FHS fare less
than its counterpart TF (48, 11, 23)-FHS. The RC2 (844, 15, 79)-FHS performance is
considerably better than the remaining FH schemes.
We also consider how many of the FH sequences in a (v, k,m)-FHS can be active
in a session such that the w-throughput of an FH sequence in the presence of mutual
interfering FH sequences is not zero. This is useful in defining the maximum size of
an FHMA. It can also be useful in instances where storage space is limited such as
wireless sensors. In this case not all the FH sequences need to be stored when only a
small fraction of them can be usable and active. A central controlling authority can be
used to distribute FH sequences to be used. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 provide the minimum
number of active FH sequences such that the worst-case throughput is not zero. This
information is also presented as a percentage of the total number of FH sequences in
the (v, k,m)-FHS.
FHS RW DP LG CC TF RS LS RC
Usable active
FH sequences 3 24 26 24 11 12 23 3
Percentage 0.203 4.54 0.21 51.06 100 52.17 100 100
Table 3.10: Approximate number of active FH sequences for positive worst-case
throughput for (v, k, 23)-FHS.
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FHS RW2 DP2 LG2 CC2 TF2 RS2 LS2 RC2
Usable active
FH sequences 3 80 81 79 39 79 79 15
Percentage 0.00784 1.28 1.3 100 100 100 100 100
Table 3.11: Approximate number of active FH sequences for positive worst-case
throughput for (v, k,≈ 79)-FHS.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 shows that LG and LG2 can accommodate more active FH
sequences (26 and 81 respectively) than the rest of the FH schemes. Due to the nature
of shift registers, the elements of active FH sequences which are transformations of
m-sequences can be generated at a particular time slot. This makes LG and LG2 more
attractive as storage of all the FH sequences is not required. Now the FH schemes,
TF, LS, RC, CC2, TF2, RS2, LS2, RC2 can have all the FH sequences in them being
active in a session.
3.10.2 Comparing jamming resistance
Recall in Chapter 2 that we introduced a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. We considered
the jamming resistance of a (v, k,m)-FHS at a particular time slot. We gave the
probability that a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer is eavesdropping on an active frequency
channel in Equation (2.39):
Prob(i is active) = 1−
(
k − ai
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
, (3.56)
where ai = |{j : xjt = i}|, the number of times that frequency channel i on which a
( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer is jamming appears at a particular time slot t of interest in a
(v, k,m)-FHS, and w+ 1 is the number of active FH sequences. Note that at any time
slot t:
Prob(i is active) ≥ 1−
(
k − aj
w + 1
)
/
(
k
w + 1
)
,
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for i ∈ Ft = {x0t , . . . , xk−1t }, the multiset of all frequency channels that appear in all
the FH sequences at time slot t and aj = min{ai : ai > 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1}. In some of
the FH schemes considered in this chapter we went on to find the minimum number of
time slots a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer needs to identify an active FH sequence. However,
as this was not possible for all the FH schemes, in this section we compare jamming
resistance using Equation 3.56.
Figures 3.4 and 3.6 (with Figures 3.5 and 3.7 showing a magnification of Figures 3.4
and 3.6 respectively at some coordinate for clarity) compares Prob(i is active), denoted
PRai , with respect to w + 1, the number of active FH sequences, for the FH schemes
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
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P
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Figure 3.4: Jamming resistance at a time slot for (v, k, 23)-FHS.
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Figure 3.5: Jamming resistance at a time slot for (v, k, 23)-FHS.
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Figure 3.6: Jamming resistance at a time slot for (v, k,≈ 79)-FHSs.
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Figure 3.7: Jamming resistance at a time slot for (v, k,≈ 79)-FHSs.
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The results in Figures 3.4 and 3.6 show that the resistance of (v, k,m)-FHS with
small k against a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer is poor. This is because the jammer’s chances
of identifying an active FH sequence, given that there are only few FH sequences in
the scheme is high.
3.11 Conclusion on comparison of FH schemes
Numerous FH schemes exist in the literature. In this chapter we have discussed some
of these existing FH schemes. In Section 3.10 we have compared them with respect to
throughput and jamming resistance.
In Section 3.10.1 we compared the worst-case w-throughput of FH schemes. We note
that the size of the frequency library has an impact on the worst-case w-throughput of
an FH scheme. The FH schemes whose size is small, k ≤ m, perform well where there
are minimal interference at each time slot. For example the LS (23, 23, 23)-FHS have
k = m and each frequency channel appears once at each time slot making it achieve
maximum worst-case w-throughput of one.
In Section 3.10.2 we compared the jamming resstance of the FH schemes. In partic-
ular, we considered the probability of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer jamming on an active
frequency channel. We saw that a (v, k,m)-FHS’s jamming resistance is affected by ai,
the number of times that each frequency channel appears at a time slot in all the FH
sequences of the FH scheme. It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that a jammer can choose
i, where ai ≥ aj for all i 6= j, so that it maximises its chances of jamming an active
channel. However, if ai is uniform at each time slot, then each frequency channel is
equally likely to be an active channel and thus a jammer would not be at an advantage.
Now, ai creates a trade-off the between worst-case w-throughput and jamming
resistance of an FH scheme. When ai = 1 or small, then we have the best or better
w-throughput respectively. On the other hand, if ai = 1 or small then the jamming
resistance of an FH scheme against a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer is poor. In Chapter 4
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we consider a (v, k,m)-FHS such that a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer is forced to randomly
choose a frequency channel to jam, since each frequency channel appears the same
number of times at each time slot. Further, the (v, k,m)-FHS to be considered in
Chapter 4 has the property that we can tell the minimum number of time slots it
can withstand a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer, as well as a lower bound on the worst-case
w-throughput.
3.12 Summary
In this chapter we have considered several existing FH schemes in the new model
developed in Chapter 2: FH schemes that use random walks in Section 3.2, difference
packing in Section 3.3, m-sequences in Section 3.4, cyclotomic classes in Section 3.5,
trace functions in Section 3.6, Reed-Solomon codes in Section 3.7, Latin squares in
Section 3.8 and we have also considered recursive constructions in Section 3.9. We
looked at the throughput of these FH schemes, in particular the throughput of FH
sequences and the worst-case throughput of the FH schemes in the presence of mutual
interference. We have also considered how long the FH schemes can withstand an
adaptive jammer. In instances where we were not able to determine a lower bound
on the number of time slots it can take an adaptive jammer to identify an active FH
sequence, we have considered the probability of jamming an active frequency channel
at a single time slot. In Section 3.10 we have compared the FH schemes: first with
respect to their worst-case throughput in the presence of mutual interference, and
second against their resistance to an adaptive jammer at each time slot. It is desirable
to determine the worst-case throughput of an FH scheme in the presence of mutual
interference, as well as its resistance against jamming, in particular the number of time
slots required to identify an active FH sequence. In Section 3.10 we have only dealt
with approximations. In Chapter 4 we introduce an FH scheme in which we can tell
the worst-case throughput in the presence of mutual interference, as well as how long
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it can withstand an adaptive jammer.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we make the third major contribution of this thesis: we discuss the
interpretation of cover-free codes as FH schemes. Preliminaries are covered in Sec-
tion 4.2. In Section 4.3 we point out a correspondence between a cover-free code and
an FH scheme. We note that when a cover-free code is considered as an FH scheme, a
user can successfully transmit in at least a specified fraction of time in the presence of
a given number of interfering FH sequences. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to make this observation. In Section 4.4 we introduce a jammer in the cover-free
code. We examine necessary and desirable additional properties of cover-free codes
such that they can be used in the presence of adversarial interference.
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4.2 Preliminaries
We begin with definitions and preliminaries on codes.
Definition 4.2.1. Let A = {a0, a1, . . . , am−1} be an alphabet. A code C of length v
over the alphabet A is a subset of Av. An element c ∈ C is called a codeword. The
size of the code, |C|, is the number of elements in the code C. A code C ⊆ Av of size k
is called a (v, k,m)-code.
A code of length v that is a linear vector space of dimension κ = logm k over a field
F , |F| = m is called a [v, κ,m]-code.
The Hamming distance of a code helps in analysing errors introduced in codewords.
That is, the Hamming distance is a measure of how different a codeword c that was
sent is from a word x that was received.
Definition 4.2.2. Let X = (x0, x1, . . . , xv−1) and Y = (y0, y1, . . . , yv−1). The Ham-
ming distance between X and Y is the number of coordinates in which they are
different:
d(X,Y ) =
v−1∑
i=0
d(xi, yi),
where
d(xi, yi) =

0 if xi = yi,
1 if xi 6= yi.
Definition 4.2.3. The minimum Hamming distance of a code C ⊆ Fv, F an
alphabet is:
d(C) = min{ d(X,Y ) : X,Y ∈ C, X 6= Y }.
Definition 4.2.4. A code C ⊆ Fv, |F| = m, with k codewords and minimum Hamming
distance d is denoted as a (v, k,m; d)-code, or as a (v, k,m)-code when d is unspecified.
Suppose we consider FH sequences as codewords. Then a (v, k,m)-FHS can be
treated as a (v, k,m)-code when the FH sequences are considered as codewords and
vice versa.
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In this chapter we consider a cover-free code as an FH scheme. Cover-free codes
have been used in numerous contexts. Several authors [30, 44, 54], and the references
therein, defined cover-free codes in the context of binary codes as follows.
Definition 4.2.5. An N × T binary matrix C is called a (w, r)-cover-free code if
for any pair of disjoint subsets J1, J2 ⊂ [T ], |J1| = w and |J2| = r, there exists a row
i ∈ [N ] such that cij = 1 for all j ∈ J1, and cij = 0 for all j ∈ J2.
Stinson and Wei [99] discuss a related concept to cover-free codes.
Definition 4.2.6. Let w, r and d be positive integers. A set system X,F is called a
(w, r, d)-cover-free family ( or (w, r, d)-CFF) provided that, for any w blocks B0, . . . , Bw−1 ∈
F and any other r blocks A0, . . . , Ar−1 ∈ F , we have that∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
w−1⋂
i=0
Bi
)∖r−1⋃
j=0
Aj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ d.
Note that Definition 4.2.6 is defined in terms of a set system called a cover free
family and not codes.
In this thesis we use the definition of cover-free codes of Staddon, Stinson and Wei
[95] with a slight modification. The authors define a cover-free code as a code with a
property that any codeword of the code is not covered in more than αv coordinates by
a subset of w codewords of the code. As will be explained later, this definition provides
one of the measures of performance of a cover-free code.
Definition 4.2.7. Suppose that S is a (v, k,m)-code. For any subset S ′ ⊆ S and any
X ∈ Fv, define:
I (X,S ′) = {i : xi = yi for some Y ∈ S ′}. (4.1)
Then S is called (w,α)-cover-free code, denoted (w,α)-CFC, if |I(Z,S ′)| ≤ (1− α)v
for any S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = w and any Z ∈ S \ S ′.
The difference in Definition 4.2.7 to that of Staddon [95] (Definition 4.1) is that we
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have allowed equality at the size of the set of coordinates that covers a codeword for
reasons that will become apparent later.
Note that a (v, k,m; d)-code is a (1, d/v)-CFC. We are interested in the case where
w > 1.
The concept of cover-free codes as given by Staddon [95] has applications in black-
listing, traitor tracing schemes and digital fingerprinting [46, 52, 95].
4.3 Cover-free codes as FH schemes
There is a direct correspondence between an FH scheme with a given Hamming group
correlation and a cover-free code. Theorem 4.3.1 shows this correspondence.
Theorem 4.3.1. Suppose S is a (v, k,m)-code over F , |F| = m. Then S is a (w,α)-
CFC if and only if S is a (v,m, k)-FHS with worst-case w-throughput at least α.
Proof. Suppose S is a (w,α)-CFC. In a cover-free code any codeword agrees in at most
(1−α)v places with any other w codewords. Now, let us view the codewords of S as FH
sequences of a (v, k,m)-FHS. Then we have G(X,S ′) = |I(X,S ′)| ≤ (1 − α)v, for any
S ′ ⊆ S, |S ′| = w and any X ∈ S\S ′. That is, any FH sequence experiences interference
in at most (1 − α)v time slots from any other w FH sequences of the (v, k,m)-FHS.
Then ρˆw(X,S ′) ≥ α for all X,S ′. Therefore the worst-case w-throughput of the FH
scheme is at least α, ρˆw(S) ≥ α.
Conversely, suppose we have a (v, k,m)-FHS, S, such that ρˆw(S) ≥ α. Clearly we
have ρw(X,S ′) ≥ α for any X ∈ S and any S ′ ⊆ S\{X}, |S ′| = w. Again, if we consider
the FH sequences in S as codewords, we have the following. Any codeword in S has at
most (1 − α)v positions in which corresponding symbols are the same as those of any
w codewords of the code, 1− G(X,S′)v ≥ α,∀X,S ′. Then we have (1− α)v ≥ G(X,S ′).
This implies |I(X,S ′)| ≤ (1− α)v. Therefore S is a (w,α)-CFC.
The following trivial example illustrates Theorem 4.3.1.
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Example 4.3.2. Consider S ⊂ F v, the set of codewords of weight 1, that is the words
of F v with exactly one nonzero component. This is a (w, 15)-CFC for any w, it is a
(v, v(m− 1),m)-FHS with worst-case w-throughput at least 15 .
Suppose we have the alphabet F = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then the code S defined over F5 has
the following codewords:
(0, 0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0, 0, 2), (0, 0, 0, 0, 3), (0, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 2, 0), (0, 0, 0, 3, 0),
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 2, 0, 0), (0, 0, 3, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 2, 0, 0, 0), (0, 3, 0, 0, 0),
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (2, 0, 0, 0, 0), (3, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Note that for any number of interfering FH sequences w, any codeword will transmit in
one time slot. Therefore the worst-case w-throughput of S is 15 . Then S is a (w, 15)-CFC
for any w.
It was proved in [95] (Theorem 4.3) that codes with large minimum distance are
cover-free codes.
Theorem 4.3.3. Suppose that S is a (v, k,m; d)-code such that d ≥ v(1− 1
w2
). Then
S is a (w, 1− 1w )-CFC.
Proof. Suppose S is a (v, k,m; d)-code with minimum Hamming distance d ≥ v(1− 1
w2
).
That is any pair of codewords have at least v(1− 1
w2
) different corresponding coordinates
and that they are the same in at most v
w2
coordinates. Consider U ⊆ S, |U| = w. For
a codeword Z ∈ S \ U and for any Y ∈ S, Y 6= Z, then v(1 − 1
w2
) ≤ d(S) ≤ d(Y, Z).
Let I denote the set of coordinates in which they agree:
I(Y,Z) ≤ v − v(1− 1
w2
) =
v
w2
.
Note that Z agrees in at most v
w2
coordinates with each codeword in U . Thus:
I(Z,U) ≤ w · v
w2
= (1− (1− 1
w
))v.
Hence S is a (w, 1− 1w )-CFC.
150
4.4. Jamming resistance properties for cover-free codes 4. Cover-free codes
We have the following as a corollary of Theorems 4.3.1 and 4.3.3.
Corollary 4.3.4. A (v, k,m; d)-code with d ≥ v(1− 1
w2
) provides a (v,m, k)-FHS with
worst-case w-throughput at least 1− 1/w.
Reed-Solomon codes are codes with large minimum distance and are described in
the following example to illustrate Corollary 4.3.4.
Example 4.3.5. Let v and w be integers where v ≥ 2 and w ≥ 2. Let m be a prime
power such that m ≥ v. Let F be a finite field of cardinality m and α a primitive
element. Define a length v and w dimensional Reed-Solomon code S over F by,
S =
{(
f(1), f(α), f(α2), . . . , f(αv−1)
)
: f ∈ F [x] and deg f <
⌈ v
w
⌉}
. (4.2)
The code S is a (w, 1− 1/w)-CFC code, which is a (v,m
⌈
v
w2
⌉
,m)-FHS with worst-case
w-throughput at least 1− 1/w.
Recall in Section 3.7, Construction 3.7.3, we considered a particular subcode of a
Reed-Solomon code as an FH scheme. Construction 3.7.3 is a special case of Exam-
ple 4.3.5 and thus of a cover-free code when v = m,m− 1, ⌈ v
w2
⌉
= 1.
4.4 Jamming resistance properties for cover-free codes
We now consider the throughput of cover free codes in the presence of both mutual
interference and a jammer. We delve into further properties that cover-free codes should
have to mitigate a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. For simplicity, we assume θ1m = θ2m = 1.
Consider S a (w,α)-CFC and V ⊆ S a set of active FH sequences. A ( 1m , 1m)-
adaptive jammer can trivially reduce the worst-case w-throughput of S to 0 if V = S.
If V = S, then all codewords in the cover-free code are active codewords. A jammer
can choose any codeword X ∈ S and jam this codeword from the beginning of the
session until the end, at each and every time slot. As a mitigation strategy we have:
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M1 Use only a fraction of S, that is V ⊂ S.
Recall the jammer does not know Factivet or Mactivet the multisets of active frequency
channels and multiplicity of active channels respectively. Then it can always guess
which frequency channel to eavesdrop on using Equation (2.39). Recall the probability
in (2.39) is maximum when the jammer selects a frequency channel i such that ai ≥ aj
for all i 6= j. Therefore, if there exists some i such that ai ≥ aj for all i 6= j, then a
jammer will choose frequency channel i to jam. A jammer follows the same strategy
at any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1. As a mitigation strategy against a ( 1m , 1m)-adaptive
jammer we propose that:
M2 A (v, k,m)-FHS should have the property that all frequency channels used at any
time slot t are uniformly distributed, that is we must have a0 = a1 = . . . = am−1.
Recall, for a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer what happens at time t informs its next action
at time t+ 1, therefore we also propose that:
M3 For all FH sequences with frequency channel i at time slot t, all frequency channels
on the next time slot t+ 1 should be uniformly distributed. This forces a jammer
to guess randomly at any time slot.
Properties M2 and M3 describe an orthogonal array.
Definition 4.4.1 ( Hedayat, Sloane and Stufken, [43]). A k × v array A with entries
from F is said to be an orthogonal array with m levels, strength t′, 0 ≤ t′ ≤ v− 1,
and index λ if every k × t′ subarray of A contains each t′ tuple based on F exactly λ
times as a row and is denoted OAλ(k, v,m, t
′).
It is well known that an orthogonal array of certain parameters are MDS codes as
given by Theorem 4.4.2.
Theorem 4.4.2 ( Hedayat, Sloane and Stufken, [43], Theorem 4.21). An OA1(m
t′ , v,m, t′)
(or simply OA(mt
′
, v,m, t′)), A, is a (v,mt′ ,m; v − t′ + 1)-MDS code.
152
4.4. Jamming resistance properties for cover-free codes 4. Cover-free codes
Suppose we treat our (v,mt
′
,m; v − t′ + 1) MDS code as a (v,m,mt′)-FHS. Then
the properties of the (v,m,mt
′
)-FHS are as follows. Consider any t′ consecutive time
slots, for simplicity, 0, . . . , t′−1. Any frequency channel in F appears mt′−1 number of
times at time slot 0. Next consider any mt
′−1 FH sequences with a frequency channel
in F that appears at time slot 0. Then at time slot 1, any frequency channel in F
appears mt
′−2 number of times on the mt′−1 FH sequences of interest. Finally, at time
slot t′− 1 any frequency channel in F appears once on FH sequences with a particular
frequency channel at time slot t′ − 2.
Now we introduce a ( 1m ,
1
m)-jammer in our (v,m
t′ ,m; v − t′ + 1)-MDS code. We
consider the situation where there is only one active FH sequence in use. At any time
slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ v − 1, the number of times any symbol in F is used is uniform, a
jammer randomly guesses a symbol to eavesdrop on. For any active symbol in F that
it eavesdrops on, a jammer will have successfully identified an active codeword if the
multiplicity of that frequency channel is 1. Otherwise, at time slot t + 1 its search
is concentrated on the codewords with that particular symbol that appeared at the
previous time slot. However, for any inactive symbol in F that it eavesdrops on at any
time slot t, it removes from its search space the codewords with that specific symbol
and on t + 1 continues its search on the remaining codewords at time t. The jammer
continues this action until either of the following happens:
1. One active codeword is identified, or the size of its search space is at most the
number of active codewords.
2. The session ends.
Searching until the end of the session means the jammer failed to identify an active
codeword within the session.
Consider a (v,mt
′
,m; v − t′ + 1)-MDS code, S. Recall S∗t is the search space of a
jammer at time slot t. Suppose that at time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ t′, the jammer picks a
channel xjt to eavesdrop on for some Xj ∈ S∗t . If this channel is active then |S∗t+1| =
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1
m |S∗t |, where S∗t+1 has all FH sequences with the active channel xjt and the FH sequences
discarded at this stage are inactive FH sequences. On the other hand, if xjt is inactive
then |S∗t+1| = m−1m |S∗t | and again inactive FH sequences with xjt are discarded at this
stage. Note that a lucky jammer always reduces the search space at least as quickly
as an unlucky jammer. At any time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ t′, |S∗t | = (m − 1)Bmt
′−t, where
B, 0 ≤ B ≤ t ≤ t′, is the number of time slots on which a jammer has been unlucky.
Consider time slot t′. We now discuss what different values of B means with respect
to the size of the jammer’s search space and how long it takes to identify an active FH
sequence:
1. If B = 0, that is a jammer has been lucky at all the t′ time slots, then |S∗t′ | = 1.
Only one active FH sequence remains in the jammer’s search space at this time
slot, thereby successfully identifying the active FH sequence.
2. If B = t′, that is a jammer has been unlucky at all the t′ time slots, then
|S∗t′ | = (m− 1)t
′
. Inactive FH sequences are discarded from the jammer’s search
space at each of the t′ time slots.
3. For any other value of B such that B 6= 0, t′ we have |S∗t′ | = (m− 1)B > 1. So, a
change of luck does not speed up the time to identify an active FH sequence as
it will take at least as long as the jammer that is always lucky at every time slot.
Table 4.1 considers FH schemes defined over frequency libraries of sizes comparable
to those in the IEEE 802.11 standard [5]. It shows the performance of a (v, k,m)-FHS
when w + 1 FH sequences are used in the presence of mutual interferences and when
a single active FH sequence is used in the presence of adversarial interference from a
(1/m, 1/m)-adaptive jammer. We have a guaranteed worst-case w-throughput of at
least α and the FH scheme can withstand a (1/m, 1/m)-adaptive jammer for at least
γv time slots respectively.
154
4.4. Jamming resistance properties for cover-free codes 4. Cover-free codes
(v, k,m)-FHS (w,α) γv
(23, 233, 23) (3, 0.6667) 3
(23, 232, 23) (4, 0.75) 2
(23, 231, 23) (22, 1) 1
(37, 375, 37) (3, 0.6667) 5
(37, 373, 37) (4, 0.75) 3
(37, 372, 37) (5, 0.80) 2
(59, 597, 59) (3, 0.6667) 7
(59, 594, 59) (4, 0.75) 4
(59, 593, 59) (5, 0.80) 3
(79, 799, 79) (3, 0.6667) 9
(79, 795, 79) (4, 0.75) 5
(79, 794, 79) (5, 0.80) 4
Table 4.1: Performance of (v, k,m)-cover-free codes.
From Table 4.1 it can be seen that there is a trade-off between α, the lower bound
of the worst-case w-throughput in the presence of mutual interference, and γv, how
long it takes a jammer to identify an active FH sequence. Note that by increasing the
number of FH sequences, k, while the length, v, and the size of the frequency library, m,
is fixed, then α diminishes while the resistance of the FH scheme against an adaptive
jammer improves. However, the FH scheme does not withstand our jammer for long.
A solution to this dilemma would be to restart the FH scheme every γv time slots.
This will be elaborated further in Chapter 5, where an FH scheme is constructed that
guarantees a w-throughput of one in the presence of mutual interference and withstands
a jammer for an entire session.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter cover-free codes have been considered as FH schemes. Further we
have seen that cover-free codes provide a defined lower bound on the worst-case w-
throughput of an FH scheme.
Further we considered mitigating strategies for cover-free codes to be used in the
presence of both mutual and adversarial interference. However, we showed that in
the presence of our adaptive adversary, the cover-free code based FH schemes do not
withstand the adaptive jammer for long. We will describe the secure Bag-Ruj-Roy (S-
BRR) scheme in Chapter 5 that can be viewed as a cover-free code used in conjunction
with pseudorandomness. This scheme provides an FH scheme with throughput one that
can be used in the presence of an adaptive jammer and can withstand the adaptive
jammer an entire session.
156
Chapter 5
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5.1 Introduction
We have seen that an FH scheme with the property that every frequency channel
appears the same number of times at a single time slot has an improved resistance
against a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. However it has been shown that even a (v, k,m)-
FHS with this uniform number of channels at each time slot does not withstand a
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(θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer for a very long time. In this chapter we propose FH schemes
that employ pseudorandomness.
In Section 5.2 we propose a secure-BRR (S-BRR) FH scheme. The S-BRR FH
scheme uses a pair of orthogonal Latin squares to derive FH sequences as in the BRR
FH scheme discussed in Section 3.8. The S-BRR FH scheme addresses the limitations
of the BRR FH scheme in that it is more resistant to a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer than
the BRR FH scheme: it can withstand a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer for the entire session
of the FH scheme. In Section 5.3 we propose a pseudorandom Latin square (PR-LS)
FH scheme. The PR-LS FH scheme uses a single Latin square to obtain FH sequences.
This PR-LS FH scheme not only has the maximum w-throughput of one but is also
secure in the presence of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer, as well as being attractive for use
in resource-constrained devices.
5.2 Secure Bag-Ruj-Roy (S-BRR) FH scheme
The (v, k,m)-FHS of this section can be considered as a BRR FH scheme that resists a
(θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer for an entire session. We propose a desirable property, some
form of pseudorandomness, which is introduced in a BRR FH scheme such that it can
withstand the attack of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer.
Construction 5.2.1. (S-BRR FH scheme). Let F3 and F4 be pseudorandom functions
that take as input the long term key K, the session number s and the time slot t. The
K and s are shared among all the users of the FH scheme. All users generate new keys
at each time slot called slot keys: xt = F3(K, s, t) and yt = F4(K, s, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1.
Let L1 = [αij ]v×v and L2 = [βij ]v×v be a pair of orthogonal Latin squares of order
m defined over Zm. At each time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ m − 1, user Ni looks up row i in L2
to find the column j such that βij = yt. Then it will looks up αij in L1. Let L3 be
the superposition of L1 and L2. In each session a user Ni derives an FH sequence of
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length m over Zm from:
R∗i = {(αij , βij) : βij = yt, 0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1} ,
where (αij , βij) ∈ L3, αij ∈ L1 and βij ∈ L2. A frequency hop at each time slot t,
0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1, is given by αij + xt. That is the FH sequence is:
Xi = (αij + xt).
The (v, k,m)-FHS in Construction 5.2.1 is an (m,m,m)-FHS. Essentially this FH
scheme generates a new BRR FH scheme at each time slot.
Example 5.2.2. Consider L1 and L2 a pair of orthogonal Latin squares of order 7:
L1 =
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 0
2 3 4 5 6 0 1
3 4 5 6 0 1 2
4 5 6 0 1 2 3
5 6 0 1 2 3 4
6 0 1 2 3 4 5
, L2 =
0 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 0 6 5 4 3 2
2 1 0 6 5 4 3
3 2 1 0 6 5 4
4 3 2 1 0 6 5
5 4 3 2 1 0 6
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
.
Suppose we have the following slot keys:
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
xt 5 6 4 5 5 4 2
yt 3 2 6 6 4 4 0
.
Consider a Latin square L3, the superposition of L1 and L2:
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L3 =
( 0, 0 ) ( 1, 6 ) ( 2, 5 ) ( 3, 4 ) ( 4, 3 ) ( 5, 2 ) ( 6, 1 )
( 1, 1 ) ( 2, 0 ) ( 3, 6 ) ( 4, 5 ) ( 5, 4 ) ( 6, 3 ) ( 0, 2 )
( 2, 2 ) ( 3, 1 ) ( 4, 0 ) ( 5, 6 ) ( 6, 5 ) ( 0, 4 ) ( 1, 3 )
( 3, 3 ) ( 4, 2 ) ( 5, 1 ) ( 6, 0 ) ( 0, 6 ) ( 1, 5 ) ( 2, 4 )
( 4, 4 ) ( 5, 3 ) ( 6, 2 ) ( 0, 1 ) ( 1, 0 ) ( 2, 6 ) ( 3, 5 )
( 5, 5 ) ( 6, 4 ) ( 0, 3 ) ( 1, 2 ) ( 2, 1 ) ( 3, 0 ) ( 4, 6 )
( 6, 6 ) ( 0, 5 ) ( 1, 4 ) ( 2, 3 ) ( 3, 2 ) ( 4, 1 ) ( 5, 0 )
.
In L3 we have highlighted the entries that are used by all the users Ni, 0 ≤ i ≤ m−1,
on t = 0, the first time slot.
Consider user N0. To determine the frequency channel to be used on t = 0 it
employs (4, 3) the entry in row i = 0 with yt = 3. Then the frequency hop on t = 0 is:
4 + 5 ≡ 2 mod 7.
In a similar manner, we can determine the frequency channels employed by all users at
the first time slot. The frequency channels 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 0 are used during the first time
by users N0, N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6 respectively. Note that we have distinct frequency
channels at each time slot.
We now derive an FH sequence for N0:
User N0
R∗i {(4, 3, 5), (5, 2, 6), (1, 6, 2), (1, 6, 2), (3, 4, 4), (3, 4, 4), (0, 0, 1)}
FH sequence (2, 4, 5, 3, 3, 0, 2)
.
Therefore in our notation, an FH sequence for user N0 is (2, 4, 5, 3, 3, 0, 2).
5.2.1 Correlation
Consider S to be an S-BRR (m,m,m)-FHS of Construction 5.2.1. In the S-BRR FH
scheme we have introduced slot keys which are shared by all users of the FH scheme.
Let yt be a slot key for time slot t. By definition each Ni look up row i in L2 to find
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column j such that βij = yt. As L2 is a Latin square, βij appears on m distinct columns.
By the orthogonality property of L1 and L2, we have that all m tuples (αij , βij), where
αij ∈ L1, βij ∈ L2, are distinct. Therefore each frequency channel αij + xt used by
Ni is again distinct. So, for any FH sequences there is no mutual interference in the
presence of other users at each time slot. Therefore the S-BRR FH scheme has the same
throughput as the BRR FH scheme. That is, the w-throughput of any FH sequence
Xi in the presence of other FH sequences in U ⊂ S is:
ρw(Xi,U) = 1. (5.1)
It follows from Equation (5.1) that the worst-case w-throughput of S is ρˆw(S) = 1.
5.2.2 Jamming resistance
Consider an S-BRR (m,m,m)-FHS of Construction 5.2.1. Assume that all the FH
sequences are active.
Without loss of generality, consider a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer. Suppose a (
1
m ,
1
m)-
adaptive jammer can identify αij+xt , an active channel at a particular time slot t,
0 ≤ t ≤ m − 1. Knowledge of αij+xt will not be used to derive any FH sequence
since the slot keys, xt, are updated at every time slot. Therefore a (
1
m ,
1
m)-adaptive
jammer cannot derive any FH sequence as long as the pseudorandom number generator
is secure. Hence the S-BRR is secure for an entire session.
5.3 A secure and efficient FH scheme
The (v, k,m)-FHS discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 have been shown to be insecure when
used in the presence of a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer. In Section 5.2 we proposed the
S-BRR FH scheme where a new BRR FH scheme (see Section 3.8) is generated at each
time slot. The S-BRR is better than the BRR FH scheme in that it not only achieve the
maximum worst-case w-throughput of one but is also secure when used in the presence
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of an adaptive jammer. However, the fact that the S-BRR FH scheme generates a new
BRR FH scheme renders it costly in terms of the additional computations to be done
by users, as well as storage resources since it stores two Latin squares. Therefore in
this section we propose a pseudorandom Latin square (PR-LS) FH scheme that is both
secure and efficient. The PR-LS attains a maximum worst-case w-throughput of one, it
can withstand a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer for the entire session, and it is more efficient
than the S-BRR FH scheme.
5.3.1 Pseudorandom Latin square (PR-LS) FH scheme
Let F be a pseudorandom function that takes inputs K the long term key, s the session
number, and t the current time slot. The key K and s are shared by all legitimate
users. A slot key xt, 0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1, is generated at each time slot as xt = F (K, s, t).
Construction 5.3.1. (PR-LS FH scheme). Let L = [αij ]m×m be a Latin square
defined on Zm. The FH sequences of length m over F = Zm for a PR-LS FH scheme
are:
Xi = (βij),
where βij = αij + xt mod v, xt = F (K, s, t), and 0 ≤ i, j, t ≤ m− 1.
The FH scheme in Construction 5.3.1 is an (m,m,m)-FHS.
Unlike the S-BRR FH scheme the newly proposed PR-LS FH scheme has reduced
overhead in terms of the following:
1. Storage constraints: by definition the S-BRR FH scheme needs two Latin squares,
while the PR-LS FH scheme uses only one Latin square. Therefore the PR-LS FH
scheme is attractive for storage-constrained users, for example in wireless sensor
networks.
2. Computational costs: suppose the existence of a central controlling authority
(CA) that assigns FH sequences to each user in a network. In an S-BRR FH
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scheme, the CA computes a new BRR FH scheme at each time slot to assign a
frequency channel to each user and uses the pseudorandom function twice (for
generating xt and yt). In a PR-LS FH scheme, on the other hand, the CA only
calls the only pseudorandom function for generating xt. Therefore, it is expensive
to run the pseudorandom function for the S-BRR. If individual users generate
their own FH sequences then we consider the difference in the running time of
the FH scheme, which is described next.
3. Running time of the FH scheme: in the S-BRR FH scheme each user searches for
a column such that yt = βij , then finds αij . This is not the case with the PR-LS,
where only αij is needed. Therefore the PR-LS FH scheme has a better running
time.
We now provide an example of the construction of a PR-LS FH scheme.
Example 5.3.2. Consider L1 a Latin square of order 7 over Z7:
L1 =
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
6 0 1 2 3 4 5
5 6 0 1 2 3 4
4 5 6 0 1 2 3
3 4 5 6 0 1 2
2 3 4 5 6 0 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 0
.
Consider the following slot keys:
t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
xt 5 6 4 5 5 4 2
.
An FH sequence for user N0 is X1 = (5, 0, 6, 1, 2, 2, 1).
It is interesting to note that a PR-LS FH scheme can also be interpreted in terms
of codes in two ways:
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1. A collection of m (m,m,m)-FHS, which are (m,m,m)-MDS codes of minimum
distance m, where each FH scheme is used only once.
2. An MDS code with minimum distance one, that is an (m,mm,m)-FHS. Only
m sequences are used and these are determined by the pseudorandom number
generator.
5.3.2 Correlation
Let S be a PR-LS FH scheme. It is easy to see that at each time slot t, 0 ≤ t ≤ m− 1,
all the frequency channels αit + xt, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 are distinct. So, there is no mutual
group interference at each time slot. Therefore we have the maximum achievable w-
throughput of one for any w, 1 ≤ w < m,
ρw(Xi,U) = 1,
where Xi ∈ S and U ⊂ S. As in both the BRR and S-BRR FH schemes, the worst-case
w-throughput of S is ρˆw(S) = 1.
5.3.3 Jamming resistance
Consider a PR-LS FH scheme. By definition, we have introduced pseudorandomness at
each time slot for all the FH sequences in the FH scheme. Suppose all the FH sequences
are active. Now, consider the presence of a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer. The jammer has
no knowledge of K, the long term key, as it is shared by only the legitimate users.
Further, a fresh pseudorandom number xt is generated at each time slot, which means
a new Latin square is generated at each time slot. Suppose a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer
eavesdrops on an active channel at time slot t. Then the jammer obtains αij+xt. Notice
that the jammer cannot use xt to derive any FH sequence since at the succeeding time
slot t+ 1 all users generate a new pseudorandom slot key xt+1 and use it to determine
the new hop αij +xt+1. Therefore a (
1
m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer cannot identify an active
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FH sequence for an entire session, where all the FH sequences in the FH scheme are
allowed to be active. So we have an FH scheme that achieves maximum w-throughput
of one and can withstand a ( 1m ,
1
m)-adaptive jammer for an entire session.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed two new FH schemes: S-BRR and PR-LS FH schemes.
These FH schemes use Latin squares to derive FH sequences. We have shown that Latin
squares can be used to derive FH schemes that achieve both maximum throughput
of one, as well as resist an adaptive jammer for an entire session at the expense of
computation. The S-BRR FH scheme, which can be considered as generating a new
BRR at each time slot, is efficient in terms of both throughput, as well as resistance
against an adaptive jammer. Finally, the PR-LS FH scheme, which is also efficient
in throughput and jamming resistance, is defined using a single Latin square, unlike
the BRR FH scheme and the S-BRR FH scheme, which use a pair of Latin squares.
By using a single Latin square, the PR-LS FH scheme may be desirable in resource-
constrained networks.
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6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we have discussed frequency hopping schemes which are used in frequency
hopping multiple access systems.
In Chapter 1 we introduced the theory of spread spectrum techniques. In more
detail, we looked at direct sequence and frequency hopping spread spectrum techniques.
We considered some existing frequency hopping schemes and pointed out the deficiency
in the analysis of their performance.
In Chapter 2 we developed a new model of analysing the performance of a (v, k,m)-
FHS in the presence of interference. We showed that it is inadequate to consider the
performance of frequency hopping schemes based on either Hamming correlation or
jamming, but not both, as has been the case with most of the existing research in
the literature. So, in this thesis we have considered both group-wise mutual inter-
ference and adversarial interference (jamming), bearing in mind that more than two
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users can be transmitting simultaneously in the presence of an adversary. We defined
Hamming group correlation in Definition 2.4.1, from which many throughput measures
were developed. Further, we modelled a jammer’s strategy as frequency hopping se-
quences defined on the same frequency library as legitimate users. We then re-defined
the throughput measure, bearing in mind the presence of both mutual interfering fre-
quency hopping sequences, as well as jamming frequency hopping sequences.
In Chapter 3 we performed an extensive analysis of some of the existing fre-
quency hopping schemes in the new model proposed in Chapter 2. We considered
frequency hopping schemes constructed using the following mathematical structures:
random walks on a graph, difference packing, m-sequences, cyclotomy, trace functions,
Reed-Solomon codes, Latin squares, as well recursively constructed frequency hopping
schemes. These frequency hopping schemes are optimal in the bounds in which they
were analysed: Lempel and Greenberger, as well as Peng and Fan bounds. However,
we were interested in analysing them in the presence of group-wise mutual interference,
as well as jamming. For each of the frequency hopping schemes we investigated:
1. the w-throughput of a frequency hopping sequence in the presence of group-wise
mutual interference, as well as worst-case w-throughput of a frequency hopping
scheme.
2. the performance of a frequency hopping scheme in the presence of a (θ1, θ2)-
adaptive jammer. In some frequency hopping schemes it was possible to deter-
mine the minimum number of time slots a jammer can take to identify an active
frequency hopping sequence. In the BRR scheme, in particular, we showed that
it is insecure as a jammer only needs to listen on a single time slot to identify an
active frequency hopping sequence. Otherwise, we considered the probability of
jamming on a channel that is being used at a specific time slot.
Next we compared the performance of all the frequency hopping schemes in terms of
worst-case w-throughput. Then we considered the probability of jamming an active
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channel. The results of the comparison of worst-case w-throughput in the presence
of group-wise mutual interference showed that the frequency hopping scheme based
on Latin squares (BRR frequency hopping scheme) is overall good compared to the
other frequency hopping schemes as it achieve a maximum worst-case w-throughput
of one. Now, using the worst-case w-throughput formula, we estimated the minimum
number of active frequency hopping sequences that can be used in a frequency hopping
scheme such that a frequency hopping sequence can transmit with positive throughput
in the presence of other mutual interfering frequency hopping sequences. This result
can be used to determine a lower bound on the maximum size of a network (frequency
hopping multiple access system) such that each user has a positive throughput in the
presence of other legitimate users. On the other hand, the results of the performance
of the frequency hopping schemes in the presence of an adaptive jammer were that the
smaller the size of the frequency hopping scheme, the poorer the performance. Given a
frequency hopping scheme, we came to the conclusion that to minimise the probability
of jamming an active channel it is desirable to have each frequency channel appear the
same number of times at a time slot in the frequency hopping sequences.
In Chapter 4 we considered cover-free codes. When we design a frequency hop-
ping scheme from a cover-free code we note that every frequency channel appears the
same number of times at a time slot in the frequency hopping sequences. Further,
it was observed that by definition a cover-free code provides the minimum number of
time slots a frequency hopping sequence can transmit in the presence of group-wise
mutual interference. Next we introduced a jammer in a cover-free code. The combina-
torial properties of cover-free codes enabled us to determine the minimum number of
time slots a (θ1, θ2)-adaptive jammer can take to identify an active frequency hopping
sequence.
Thus far we have the BRR frequency hopping scheme that achieves worst-case w
throughput of one but is not secure. We also have the cover-free code, for which we
can determine a lower bound on its worst-case w-throughput, as well as the jamming
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resistance, but is also not secure in the presence of an adaptive jammer. In fact the
numerous frequency hopping schemes analysed in Chapters 3 and 4 are not secure
in the presence of jamming. So, in Chapter 5 we proposed two frequency hopping
schemes which use Latin square(s): S-BRR frequency hopping scheme and PR-LS
frequency hopping scheme. Both of the proposed frequency hopping schemes achieve a
throughput of one in the presence of group-wise mutual interference, as well as being
able to withstand jamming until the end of a session. The difference between the two
is that the S-BRR frequency hopping scheme uses a pair of orthogonal Latin squares,
while the PR-LS frequency hopping scheme uses a single Latin square. The latter is
thus both efficient and secure.
6.2 Future work
We now list possible future directions for our work.
 In this thesis we have assumed that users in a frequency hopping scheme can agree
on t = 0, that is users know at which point in a frequency hopping sequence to
start. We have also assumed that all users stay synchronised until the end of the
session, where a session is taken as the length of a frequency hopping sequence.
However, in practice this is not always the case. The length of the correlation
window can sometimes be less than the length of a frequency hopping sequence. It
is sometimes necessary to consider partial synchronisation in applications where
synchronisation time has to be minimized, or to minimize hardware complexity in
a receiver [10, 14, 32, 39, 71]. The question we now ask is how do we define group-
wise mutual interference in a partially synchronised setting where the window
length is less than the length of a frequency hopping sequence and can change
over time depending on channel conditions.
 In Chapter 2 we discussed some of the lower bounds on Hamming correlation that
exist in the literature, Lempel-Greenberger and Peng-Fan bounds. These bounds
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measure the theoretical performance of frequency hopping schemes and involve
some/all of the five parameters: the size of the frequency library, the length of
a frequency hopping sequence, the size of a frequency hopping scheme, the max-
imum Hamming auto-correlation and the maximum Hamming cross-correlation.
In Section 3.10.1 we have compared estimations of worst-case w-throughput of
frequency hopping schemes. To improve the comparison of the different frequency
hopping schemes we suggest determining a lower bound on the Hamming group
correlation of frequency hopping schemes. The bound will then be used in the
computation of the worst-case w-throughput and give a better comparison of the
frequency hopping schemes.
 In some of the FH schemes considered in Chapter 3 and the FH scheme of Chap-
ter 4 we discussed how the information about a channel a jammer eavesdrop on
can determine its action on a succeeding time slot. We pointed out that this
jamming strategy works when there is only one active FH sequence. In real life
applications, we could have more than one active FH sequence. The jammer can
exploit its knowledge of the number of active FH sequences as well as the infor-
mation it obtains from the channels it eavesdrop on, to modify the size of the
search space.
Consider an FH scheme, with w + 1, w + 1 ≥ 1, active sequences being used
in the presence of an adaptive jammer. We consider the information that an
adaptive jammer has, after eavesdropping on t time slots. The jammer uses the
information it learns from eavesdropping to restrict its search space.
At each time slot t ≥ 0, a jammer knows that the channel it was eavesdropping
on is either active or inactive. Further, the jammer has a partial sequence of
channels it has eavesdropped on thus far up to time slot t− 1.
Suppose on the current time slot t the jammer eavesdrop on an active channel.
The jammer creates all (w+1)-subsets from the current search space that are ca-
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pable of producing the partial sequence (including the current frequency channel):
we call these subsets the parent sets.
On the other hand, suppose on time slot t the channel is inactive. Then the
jammer discard from the search space all the FH sequences with the inactive
channel appearing on that time slot. This allows the jammer to restrict the
search space even further. The jammer again creates (w+1)-subsets, parent sets,
from the now smaller search space.
The jammer has identified at least one active FH sequence if the intersection of
all parent sets is non-empty. If the intersection is empty, then the jammer repeats
this algorithm again on time slot t+ 1. It stops when an active FH sequence has
been identified or the session has ended.
So, we would like an FH scheme to have the property that the intersection of all
the parent sets is empty for as large a t as possible.
Note that if an FH scheme is a (w + 1)-IPP code [11, 38, 95] then a jammer
that eavesdrops on an active channel in all v time slots can identify at least
one active FH sequence. However, the identifiable parent property does not
indicate whether it is possible to identify an active FH sequence in fewer time
slots. In addition, in the case of a mixed-fate jammer, the jammer would want
to identify an active sequence from a partial (eavesdropped) sequence. Modelling
this jammer may lead to interesting correspondence between FH schemes with
anti-jamming properties and IPP codes as well as other fingerprinting codes.
 In Chapter 5 we have mentioned that theoretically there is a trade-off between
the security and computation costs for the S-BRR and PR-LS frequency hopping
schemes. In both the S-BRR and PR-LS frequency hopping schemes we have more
computations than in the BRR frequency hopping scheme, however we have the
advantage of jamming resistance for an entire session. So, there is a need for
the construction of frequency hopping schemes whose computational complexity
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is reduced but at the same time is secure and has a worst-case w-throughput of
one.
 Last but not least, in this thesis we have not determined the minimum number
of time slots a jammer can take to identify an active frequency hopping sequence
in most of the frequency hopping schemes. Since the frequency hopping schemes
are diverse, in terms of the size of the frequency library, the length of the fre-
quency hopping sequences, the size of the frequency hopping scheme, a jamming
resistance comparison could be made through practical simulations. It is possible
to reasonably model and simulate a frequency hopping anti-jam system, using for
example SIMULINK.
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